

BEYOND ROLL CALL VOTES: LATINO REPRESENTATION IN THE 108TH-
110TH SESSIONS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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This dissertation answers the following research question: Do Latino members of Congress represent Latinos better than non-Latino representatives? To evaluate this question, I employ a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. I utilize a broad view of representation that includes legislative actions beyond the conventional focus on roll call voting, such as bill introduction and bill co-sponsorship, to examine member activity during the 108th- 110th sessions of the House of Representatives. The statistical analysis finds that Latino members are considerably more active in representing Latino interests than non-Latino members irrespective of the size of the Latino constituency. This finding indicates that Latino legislators as a whole act differently than non-Latino members, which has serious implications for the substantive representation of Latinos. The qualitative components of the dissertation consist of interviews with staff members of Latino legislators and case studies of representatives. Together they probe deeper into the meaning of representation and investigate variation in representation styles between members and within the Latino sub-group. The project argues that Latinos need descriptive representation to achieve the greatest substantive representation and investigations of representation should move beyond roll call votes to include other forms of legislative participation.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Sophia Wallace was born and raised in the San Francisco Bay Area in California. Her parents are immigrants who arrived in the U.S. in 1970. Her father is from Lima, Peru and her mother is from Liverpool, England. Her diverse background led to her interest in racial and ethnic politics. Sophia has a younger sister, Stephanie who is currently a law student at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Sophia pursued her undergraduate studies in La Jolla at the University of California, San Diego and majored in Political Science. After graduation in 2002, Sophia moved to Chicago to explore a new city and then relocated back to San Diego while waiting to hear back from graduate schools. She matriculated at Cornell University in the fall of 2003 for her graduate studies in the Department of Government. While in graduate school, Sophia was quite lucky to find her soul mate in her cohort and has been happily married for nearly five years. Together they have two beautiful and amazing children, Liam and Dahlia. Sophia defended her dissertation in September of 2009. Her dissertation examines the representation of Latinos by members of Congress. Her research and teaching interests include racial and ethnic politics, Latino politics, representation, legislative behavior, Congress, immigration policy, and public policy.

For Frey

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This study investigates the representation of Latino constituents by members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Specifically, this analysis attempts to determine whether Latinos need Latino representatives to attain the greatest amount of substantive representation. Latinos have a long historical presence in the U.S. that dates to before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, when portions of Mexico became part of the United States. However, after the settlement of contemporary national boundaries, we typically think of mass Latino immigration flows from Mexico and other parts of Latin America beginning after the passage of the Hart-Cellar Act in 1965 (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). The Hart-Cellar Act, also referred to as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, fundamentally changed the immigration system by eliminating the stringent national origin quota system and replacing it with a more lax system based on hemispheric allocations and unlimited family reunification visas. After its passage the number of Asian, Caribbean, and Latin American immigrants grew rapidly from 800,000 immigrants in 1950-1960 to 1.8 million during the period of 1961-1970 (Tichenor 2002, 220). By 1980 the U.S. Census estimated the Latino population at 14.6 million, which represented 6.4% of the total U.S. population. By 2000, those estimates had swelled to over 35.3 million and 12.4% of the national population. Most recent estimates from the Current Population Survey in 2007 put the figure at 45 million Latinos, which is 15.1 % of the total population and makes Latinos the largest minority group in the U.S.

Over the last 27 years, Latinos have tripled in size and in proportion of the U.S. population. The sheer size and rapidly growing nature of this minority group mandates an examination of the group in terms of political participation and representation. With this increase in total population has also been the accompanying

geographic dispersion of Latinos across the U.S. to reach many different states in the U.S. as well as many individual Congressional districts. There are currently 115 out of 435 total districts, in which Latinos comprise at least 15% of the population. This means that over one-quarter of the Congressional districts in the U.S., Latinos comprise a sizeable constituency whose needs as a group are worthy of representation. The figure below demonstrates the location of Latinos across the U.S. and their relative concentrations in various parts of the country. As demonstrated by the map, Latinos are geographically dispersed over many parts of the country. While there are significant concentrations in the West and South West, it should be noted that there are many areas that are shaded in the lightest green color that includes areas of up to 17.4% of the population. These areas include states such as Iowa, Arkansas, Georgia, and North Carolina, which are not places we would typically think of as having sizable Latino populations. See Figure 1.1 below.




Figure 1.1 Map of Latino Population in the U.S.

Source: Social Science Data Analysis Network (SSDAN). Based on U.S. Census (2000) estimates

However, despite the burgeoning Latino population the total number of Latino representatives in the U.S. Congress has not grown in a corresponding fashion. Twenty years ago in 1988, there were 10 Latino members in the 100th session. By the 110th session the number of representatives has more than doubled to 23 members, which is shown in the graph below. It displays the increasing presence of Latinos within the institution of Congress, the figures reveal the disjuncture between the Latino population size and the number of Latino representatives. Latinos comprise roughly 15% percent of the U.S. population but Latino representatives are about 5% of the total members of the House of Representatives. Parity between the Latino population size and number of representatives would mean 65 Latino members of the 435 House members. There is mass underrepresentation of Latinos in the Congress and makes the study of Latino representatives particularly important.




Figure 1.2 Number of Latino Representatives

Another essential issue related to the number of Latino representatives is the question of whether Latino members of Congress act differently as group than other members. This brings us to the focus of this research project. I examine whether Latino representatives offer greater substantive representation to Latino constituents

that their non-Latino counterparts in high salience policy areas for the Latino community. If Latino members act differently and offer greater representation to Latinos, then it is particularly important to be aware of the differences given the small number of Latino representatives. The need for Latino representatives becomes even stronger if there are not only symbolic benefits but real substantive benefits as well. The next section discusses in greater detail the significance of the research project, followed by a brief synopsis of the organization of the project, the research questions and goals, and the methods utilized.

Significance of the Study

From a theoretical point of view this study is important because of its role in the untangling of descriptive representation and substantive representation and its implications for district composition for minority groups. In the wake of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the issue of minority groups' access and potential for representation is critical due to the historical past of inequality and disenfranchisement. One of the main purposes of the VRA was to not only allow minorities a voice in government by allowing them to vote but also the ability to elect members of their own group (Goffman and Davidson 1992). It was assumed that minority representation was important for a variety of reasons both symbolic and substantive. For Latinos, they have had limited success in electing House members from their own group. The current literature is either unsure or unconvinced as to whether Latinos are actually better off with Latino representatives (Hero and Tolbert 1995, Casellas 2005).

One of the primary purposes of this research project is to determine in what ways Latino representatives act differently than their non-Latino counterparts and how they may benefit Latino constituents. In contrast to the existing scholarly work in this area, I find a significant amount of evidence in favor of the argument that Latinos need

Latino representatives in order to obtain the maximum amount of representation. This has important implications for the types of districts that may be needed to assure adequate substantive representation of Latinos such as Latino majority districts. However, concentrating Latinos in several districts dilutes their influence across multiple districts. One alternative to this could be the creation of mixed minority districts to achieve maximum substantive representation and maximum influence across many districts. I find evidence that other minority group members of Congress such as black representatives may offer comparable representation for Latinos as Latino members. Ultimately, this project seeks to learn more about minority group representation and the variety of representational acts that members engage in.

Adequate minority group representation is important not only because of past inequality and limited access to politics, but also because of the changing demographics of the United States. In addition to their growing size, Latinos as a group have become increasingly more politically active in a variety of forms of participation. Voting rates among Latino citizens has risen (Hero et. al 2000), participation in hometown associations (Portes et al. 2008), and involvement in community organizations (DeSipio 2002) are well documented. Traditionally, Latinos do not participate as much as other minority groups in terms of voting but have been extremely active in other non-voting activities that have meaningful impacts on their assimilation and incorporation into the U.S. political system (Marquez and Jennings 2000; Hero and Campbell 1996; Garcia 1997). Given the size of the Latino population, they have the ability to become a fairly powerful electoral group within the larger population (Leal et al. 2008; Baretto et. al 2008) and campaigns have begun to reflect a greater awareness of this possibility (Garcia 2008). To slight the group or fail to recognize their potential strength would be a potentially politically foolish and costly mistake. In fact, in the 2008 election both Democrats and Republicans expended

enormous resources in an attempt to woo the Latino vote in case they turned out to be a swing vote and play a decisive role in the election (Rother 2008).

Due to their significant constituency size in 115 districts, one would expect an increasing responsiveness to Latino issues and concerns of Latino constituents by representatives. Analyzing member behavior towards this group is important due to their increasing presence and influence within the political sphere. It is essential to determine if the politicians are responsive to Latino concerns and if the efforts of the VRA have not adequately provided for Latino representation. In addition to non-institutional forms of participation, Latinos need access to members of Congress to express their viewpoints and represent their interests in the legislative process. Traditionally Latinos and other minority groups have fewer avenues to shape politics due to fewer resources, thus making their access to representatives and representatives to serve them even more important.

Moreover in the recent past, the widely covered immigrants' rights marches of spring 2006 brought the power and force of Latinos to the forefront of the public's attention. The marches were a political response to bill H.R. 4437 which sought to increase penalties for illegal immigration and classify unauthorized persons and anyone who aided them in their entry as felons. The mass participation of millions of Latinos in the marches across the country demonstrated several important points that inform the design of this research project First, despite their heterogeneity as a group, Latinos do think of themselves as sharing one pan-ethnic identity in addition to nationality-based identities that is strong enough to incite them into political participation (Paerregaard 2005; Jones-Correa and Leal 1996). Second, Latinos do view some policy issues as group-based issues where they come together to push for their unified group position, in this case comprehensive immigration reform and a path

towards legalization. I now turn to the research questions and organization of the project.

Research Questions & Organization of the Study

The central research questions of this study are twofold:

- 1) Do Latinos members of Congress offer greater substantive representation to Latinos than non-Latino legislators?
- 2) Is this difference most evident in non-roll call behavior such as bill introductions and bill-sponsorships?

In order to address these questions the research project is organized in two main parts. The first section is based on the statistical results of a data set I created based on member actions from the legislative record from in the 108th-110th sessions. The purpose of this segment is to assess whether Latino representatives offer greater representation and in what ways their different characteristics affect member behavior. The second section utilizes data based on interviews with the staffs of Latino legislators and case studies of representatives. Using a series of paired comparisons, I examine in greater detail variation between Latino members of Congress, members with similar Latino populations in their districts, and members who have represented the same district. Additionally, this portion of the project also investigates other forms of non-roll call behavior across a wider policy landscape to gain more traction on how members' behavior in this area differs. Ultimately, the two segments work together to answer the research questions and provide a comprehensive view of the actions of representatives and their various representation styles.

The chapters are organized in the following manner. Chapter Two entitled, "Redefining Representation: A Theoretical Assessment of a Legislator's Role as a Representative" provides an overview of the traditional approaches to conceptualizing representation and the role of a representative. I extensively review the literature on

representation and how members behave in relation to their constituents. I then evaluate the multitude of ways in which we can measure representation and set forth my argument for a broader view of representation that includes a variety of member actions beyond roll call votes.

Chapter Three entitled, “A Quantitative Analysis of Latino Representation in the 108th Session of the U.S. House of Representatives” is a statistical study of member actions in the 108th session of the U.S. House of Representatives. I construct a new data set based on member behavior in four issues areas; immigration, education, labor, and social security, to assess whether there are differences between Latino and non-Latino representatives. The first three issues represent salient public policy areas to the Latino community, while the last issue is included as a basis for comparison since it is a non-salient issue. I adopt a broad definition of representation and include roll call votes, bill introductions, bill co-sponsorships, and house resolutions. The analysis indicates that Latino members of Congress are considerably more active than their non-Latino counterparts across all three of the salient issues, thus affording greater substantive representation for Latinos. In particular, the disparity between member behavior occurs in non-roll call behavior, which bolsters my argument that analyses of representation should look beyond roll call votes. Finally, in the area of social security policy, Latino members were no more active than non-Latinos members, which limits the strength of the claim that Latino members are simply more active or liberal overall.

Chapter Four entitled, “A One Session Phenomenon? Examining the 109th and 110th Sessions” is an additional quantitative investigation that extends the analysis from Chapter Three. I use data from the legislative record of the 109th and 110th sessions to analyze the same sample of members from the previous chapter. The study of additional congressional terms is intended to serve as a robustness check to the quantitative findings and provides evidence that the findings are not specific to a

single session. While Latino representatives continue to be more active than non-Latino legislators on most high salience issues, they do not maintain their representational advantage on education related bills in the 109th and 110th session. Additionally, other variables emerge as important predictors of member behavior such as whether a member is from a border state. Examination of the legislative record in these subsequent terms also reinforces the importance of examining non-roll call behavior by revealing important variables that were obscured in roll call-only models. Finally, the analysis also confirms my theory that Latino representatives are only more active in salient issue areas to the Latino community.

Chapter Five entitled, “Styles of Representation: How Members with Similar Constituencies Behave in Different Ways” is based on interviews with staff members of Latino Congressmen and case studies of members with comparable Latino populations in their districts. The goal of the analysis is to assess differences in their views of representation and their interactions and relationship with their Latino constituents. The paired case studies allow close comparisons of member actions between representatives and provide an opportunity to examine the ways in which the same district was represented by different legislators. Interviews were conducted to determine each office’s assessment of Latino policy interests, actions to serve those interests, and how closely their positions mirror those of their constituents. They provided a rich source of more nuanced detail regarding ways in which each office works with the Latino community and allowed an examination of a broader set of member actions. Lastly, this chapter revisits the theoretical underpinnings of representation by probing each of the primary definitional and conceptual issues.

Finally, Chapter 6, “Conclusion” discusses the implications of the quantitative and qualitative findings for our understanding and measurement of representation and the substantive representation of Latinos. I also examine the implications of my

findings for the literature on race, ethnicity, and representation as well its contribution to our knowledge of descriptive representation. Finally, I address how the legislative behavior I observed necessitates a move beyond roll call analysis in congressional studies and how this might change the ways in which scholars study Congress.

CHAPTER TWO

REDEFINING REPRESENTATION: A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LEGISLATOR'S ROLE AS A REPRESENTATIVE

Introduction

Representation is a fundamental concept in the study of democratic governments. At the heart of the debate are questions of definition, purpose, quality, and access. What is representation and what types of activities define this concept as a whole? Do all representatives behave the same? To who are they obligated and how closely should they mirror their constituents' interests? Does it matter if members represent different groups unequally? Answers to these questions have implications not only for both the people who are being represented, but also our general understanding of representation. One of the critical areas of inquiry in this field is the representation of minority groups who have been historically marginalized and face obstacles in the election of minority members to the legislature.

This dissertation seeks to tackle the above questions through the examination of Latino representation. One reason why the representation of Latinos is a good entrée into the study of representation is the disjuncture between the growing size of the Latino population in the United States, roughly 45 million and 15.1 percent of the national population according to the 2007 Current Population Survey (CPS) estimates, and the small number of Latino representatives in the House, 23 of 435 members. Originally, Latinos were concentrated at geographical points of entry into the U.S but have recently begun to migrate to areas outside of these traditional gateway states. Thus, Latinos are now dispersed across many more congressional districts than before and consequently influence the actions of many different members of Congress. This allows the examination of how member behavior may change over time due to the changing demographics of their constituency. Additionally, unlike African-Americans,

a substantial percentage of Latinos in a given district may be non-citizens. This special characteristic of the group affects how the member defines his obligations to the people he represents. Does citizenship matter or is physical presence in a district enough to wield influence? Finally, the research examining Latino representation is scant and further investigation is necessary to determine possible differences from the representation of other minority groups.

To unpack the theoretical concept of representation, this chapter begins by grappling with different definitions and styles of representation. Next, I examine at length various forms of legislative actions that members of Congress (MCs) engage in that constitute representation. I discuss various findings in the congressional literature regarding the roles and impact of roll call votes, bill introductions and co-sponsorships, and committee action. Then, I probe deeper into the question of specific ways to measure representation as applied to the U.S. Congress. This discussion is followed by a detailed examination of the literature on the representation of minority groups such as African-Americans and Latinos.

Defining Representation

In the broadest sense representation is defined as “The fact of standing for, or in place of, some other thing or person, esp. with a right or authority to act on their account; substitution of one thing or person for another.”¹ This forms the basis for a representative democracy, where members are elected to an independent body to represent and serve the interests of their constituents. This is in direct opposition to a direct democracy, where the role of a representative is either non-existent, or of an extremely limited direct proxy form. In the United States, the public has historically relied on representatives in government to act responsibly in their favor. In theory,

¹ Oxford English Dictionary (2000) “Representation” Definition 7a.

members are supposed to be responsive to their constituent interests and beliefs but are not necessarily strictly bound by their preferences. Additionally, citizens wield a check on members' behavior by using the threat of removal from office to place some modest limits on the representative's actions. Legislators are assumed to possess specialized policy expertise and knowledge (Krehbiel 1991). Consequently, this is intended to result in better representation and higher quality policy outcomes.

Before delving into a discussion of representation, it is first necessary to explore the concept of a constituency. Determining the obligations of a member is defined by the answers to questions of what comprises a constituency and whether there are different types. Members of the U.S. House of Representatives are elected by a local geographic constituency that is bounded by limits according to population size and space. It includes the entire population within those limits. If members are responsive to their constituents, then they tend to focus on local issues facing the district and issues of importance to people in that district. This is in contrast to a focal point on national issues where the constituency is the nation at large.² The primary focus for House members remains geared toward local issues, whereas for U.S. Senators the focus is largely at the national level (Schiller 1995, Oleszek 2007). Another area of concern with regards to constituencies is whether members are equally responsive to the different groups of people within their district. Nested within the geographical constituency is the re-election constituency, a group of people the member believes are most responsible for his election and re-election (Fenno 1978). Closely related to this concept is the notion of a primary constituency, which is comprised of the member's most ardent supporters and advocates who are likely to be quite active in primary elections (Fenno 2003). Do people need to be active supporters

² Herrick and Fisher (2007) p. 22.

or voters in order for the member to be responsive to their concerns? This question is of particular concern in this dissertation since the focus is on the representation of Latinos by U.S. House members. A sizable portion of the Latino population in a given district are non-citizens who are either permanent residents or visa holders and thus non-voters, which begs the question of what exactly constitutes the member's obligation to people in this category? An additional percentage of the Latino population is undocumented and thus even farther from the individuals who make up the re-election and primary constituencies.³ Moreover, members can also be responsive to larger constituencies that are beyond the boundaries of their district, which may be based on gender, ethnicity, or other common interests. The representation of these groups is called surrogate representation and will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Constituencies are complex, multi-layered, and comprised of various groups and demographics that members must attempt to simultaneously represent to their fullest ability.

In addition to the concept of constituency, the remainder of the theoretical literature on representation wrestles with three main issues. First, establishing a precise definition of representation and determining its function. Second, determining how representatives should act with regards to constituents. Third, how to best measure and assess representation. The following section addresses the first two areas before turning to the third on measurement issues.

³ Given that Latinos present a special case where many of them are non-citizen constituents within certain districts, I addressed this issue during my interviews with staff of members of Congress. They were asked if members were more attuned to Latino interests if they were citizens and whether the percentage of non-Latino citizens in the district affected member behavior. The results of these discussions are presented in Chapter 5. Overall, both groups indicated that the issue of non-citizen constituents did not affect their responsiveness to Latinos as a whole.

Trustee v. Delegate

One of the oldest theoretical conceptions of representation is that of the legislator as a trustee or delegate. A trustee is a person who is assumed to have extensive expertise that qualifies him to act on behalf of her constituents without directly following their expressed preferences at all times.⁴ People trust that the member will keep in mind their preferences, wishes, and interests, but rely on his personal experience, expertise, and knowledge to guide him in achieving the best policy outcomes, not only for his constituents but also the nation as a whole. There are various strengths of this model. First, members are free to use their knowledge to help achieve the best possible outcomes. Second, in theory citizens obtain the best of both worlds – good policy and the representation of their interests. Third, members are not forced to act in ways that contradict their own beliefs and preferences. However, one of the serious potential downsides to this model is when a member relies too often on his own knowledge and deviates from his constituents' preferences. The result is a loss of total representation for constituents.

In contrast, a delegate has a much more limited degree of autonomy and does not depart from constituent interests. Rather, the member acts in ways that closely mirror the preferences of the people he represents. The strength of this model is that absent a direct democracy, it affords citizens the most direct representation of their interests. One potential problem with this model is that citizens are not policy experts and do not necessarily understand the complexities of policy formulation and implementation. Their ideal policies may not be realistic, possible to implement, able to obtain passage in the legislature, or even constitute good public policy overall. One of the benefits of the increase of careerism in the U.S. Congress has been the

⁴ From Edmund Burke's speech in 1774 "Speech to the Electors of Bristol."

development of members as policy experts with specialized knowledge. In the delegate model, the utility of this acquired knowledge is heavily discounted. Moreover, it may be difficult for members to ascertain the views of constituents on complex and technical issues, since reliance on polls can be imperfect and certain types of constituents are more likely to write or contact their members.

Often in the literature these two concepts are directly juxtaposed with one another when in actuality very few representatives strictly exhibit one model or the other. What is more likely is that in certain situations or policies, members act according to one logic or often combine elements from both models. For example, on public policies most salient to their constituents, members would be more likely to closely mirror their constituents' preferences and act as a delegate. This behavior can be reasonably assumed because members desire to maintain a positive relationship with constituents and constituents are most likely to be following MCs actions on the issues that are most important to them. However, most MCs eventually develop policy interests and expertise that are not necessarily salient to their constituencies. In these areas, we might expect a member to rely more on his own expertise and knowledge rather than closely follow his constituents' beliefs. I explore the relative balance between the two concepts and member behavior in Chapter 5 which is based on interviews with the staffs of MCs. At its core this dichotomy attempts to dictate the ways in which members should act to best serve those they represent. The next pair of representational theories to is more concerned with the purpose of representation.

Descriptive v. Substantive

Descriptive representation is the notion that representatives should look like those they represent or have shared attributes. In its most literal interpretation this means that women should represent women, and blacks should represent blacks (Pitkin 1967). In its purest form it would result in a legislative body that directly

mirrors the public with roughly the same proportions of minority groups in the legislature as are in the relevant population as a whole (Pitkin 1967). However, most of the literature arguing in support of descriptive representation does not focus on this form. Reasons for this are due primarily to its infeasibility to achieve because of the costs a total re-organization of the U.S. Congress would entail, such as loss of experienced members, cost of re-elections, and loss of relationships with constituents. Rather the discussion is based on a selective version of descriptive representation that results in achieving some minority members in Congress, though the aim is not necessarily total parity with the national population.

The arguments in favor of descriptive representation are multi-dimensional. One argument assumes there are essential characteristics or experiences that are shared between people who are of the same gender, race, or ethnicity (Mansbridge 1999). The assumption is that these members will be better equipped to act in the best interests of these constituents. However, others disagree and argue that such a view leads to the implication that members of a group can only be adequately represented by legislators drawn from that same group (Swain 1993). Proponents contend that descriptive representation results in members who are more likely to bring issues to the agenda or be more active on issues that pertain to minority communities (Cannon 1999). For example, women are more likely than their male counterparts to bring forth women's issues into the legislative agenda and their presence in the legislature adds a further dimension to debates on these issues (Swers 2003). Others point out that even if descriptive representation does not result in better policy or more passed legislation, it can still have important benefits such as people contacting their MCs more frequently than they would otherwise (Gay 2002). Moreover, descriptive representation has also been found to increase individual sentiments of political efficacy (Emig, Hesse, and Fisher 1996), strengthen de facto legitimacy (Gunier 1994), and result in a more

positive view of the representative overall (Gay 2002; Tate 2001, 2003). Ultimately, the main question surrounding descriptive representation is whether minority groups need descriptive representation to achieve substantive representation.

Substantive representation is directly tied to member actions and requires representatives to act in the interests of those represented (Pitkin 1967). Legislators should be responsive to their constituent demands and preferences, though they are not necessarily entirely bound by them. Unlike descriptive representation, the value of substantive representation in and of itself is commonly accepted. All theories of representation argue that a responsive legislator who is aware of the interests of those he seeks to serve is an important component of being a good representative. However, what constitutes substantive representation is a frequent subject of debate in legislative studies. For example, should only policy outcomes, such as voting on legislation, matter or should other actions that shape the policy process, such as debate on the floor, affect how we define substantive representation? This dissertation argues in favor of a broad examination of representation that includes a variety of measures of member actions, including roll call votes, bill introductions, bill co-sponsorships, and house resolutions. A more detailed discussion of this conceptualization and the various ways to measure substantive representation are presented later in this chapter.

The relationship between substantive representation and the trustee/delegate dichotomy is muddled because it is not clear whether members are required to adopt a particular style in order to achieve substantive representation for their constituents. Instead, individual scholars studying substantive representation make claims regarding which style results in more representation. I argue that in certain contexts, such as high salience policy areas for constituents, members are more likely to act as delegates to provide the greatest amount of substantive representation. However, in other less salient areas, members are more likely to act more autonomously and feel free to allow

multiple sources of influence to determine their legislative decisions. The following section briefly discusses several newer conceptualizations of representation that play a role in the conceptualization of this dissertation.

Alternative Models of Representation

While not the focus of this manuscript, there is still some utility in briefly discussing four more recent conceptions of representation analyzed by Mansbridge (2003) and how they may be applicable to portions of this research endeavor. Mansbridge attempts to shift the discussion of representation away from the theories discussed above in order to assess more clearly the motivations behind member behavior. The first model she discusses is called promissory representation which focuses on the classic principal-agent arrangement. It involves the representative making promises to voters prior to the election, voters selecting a candidate based on that information, and then representatives are responsible for abiding by their promises and being responsive to voters' interests. This model most clearly resembles the delegate model where power lies with the voter to sanction the member with the threat of removal from office. The important issue raised by this model concerns the relationship between the principal and the agent. What control does the principal have over the agent and when is this power exerted? In other words, once the member is elected, how much power do constituents actually possess? In theory, they wield significant power with the threat of choosing another candidate in the next election, but in some ways this threat is not credible. For example, high incumbency rates along with the low level of information and limited checking of the member's record that the average constituent engages in would not necessarily merit serious concern on the part of the Congressman.

In the second model, called anticipatory representation, the “representative tries to please future voters”⁵ and voters engage in retrospective voting. Members attempt to shape the preferences and interests of likely voters in the next election. During the period between the first election and the re-election, representatives will engage in more thoughtful deliberation in order to anticipate future outcomes. In contrast, gyroscopic representation occurs when voters choose a representative who will act in ways they support without external motivations. Mansbridge asserts that members act as gyroscopes assessing their surroundings but relying on their internal preferences to guide their actions. In this model, the member is relatively independent of pressures such as constituent interests, lobbyist, or other political forces. Neither of these two models is explicitly tested in this dissertation, though the effect of voters on members’ actions is considered in more detail in Chapter 5.

Finally, the last model discussed by Mansbridge is surrogate representation. This style involves members who act on behalf of people who are not necessarily members of their geographic constituency. Instead they represent people and issues that are part of a larger group. For example, African-American representatives have often discussed the pressure they feel to represent not only black constituents in their district, but black interests at large (Swain 2003). Another example might be based on a substantive policy area such as the environment. A person may not receive much representation in this area because their direct Congressman is not involved in the issue area, however, by proxy they feel represented by other members who champion the cause. In interviews with staffs of Latino MCs, many of them reported that the member expressed feeling the need to be a surrogate representative to Latinos at large.

⁵ Mansbridge (2003) p. 517.

From this discussion of various models and styles of representation in the literature it is clear there is no consensus among scholars on how members should and do act.

Measuring Representation & Representation in Practice

How do Members of Congress spend their time and why?

The most important criteria in assessing representation is defining representation and setting the parameters for which types of behavior should count as representative acts. How do members of the U.S. House of Representatives actually spend their time? Since time is an extremely precious commodity on the Hill and at home in their districts, members must make calculations about how to best allocate their time. According to a 1993 congressional survey, members' top five priorities are 1) meeting with constituents regarding legislative issues, 2) attending committee hearings and meetings, 3) meeting with government officials and lobbyists on legislative issues, 4) studying pending legislation or discussing legislation with other members or staff and 5) working with informal caucuses or groups of colleagues.⁶ Sixty-eight percent of members reported spending a great deal of time on meeting with citizens in their state or district and forty-five percent in Washington, DC, respectively. Interestingly, over forty percent of those who responded to the questionnaire indicated that they allocated little time to attending floor debate, working with party leaders to build coalitions, and overseeing agencies concerning the implementation of policies.⁷ Members cultivate a "homestyle" where they spend considerable amounts of time meeting with constituents, engaging in casework, holding town hall meetings, and making their presence known in the district (Fenno

⁶ Davidson, Oleszek, Lee (2008) p. 131. Source U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Organization.

⁷ Ibid p. 132.

1978). Representatives must engage in an elaborate balancing act between representative and legislative acts.

The next question to follow is what factors motivate members to allocate their time in certain ways? A considerable amount of literature argues that members are primarily focused on re-election and consequently focus on activities that will help achieve this goal (Mayhew 1974, Fenno 1973). Several tactics useful toward re-election include engaging in position-taking and credit-claiming. One reason to use such tactics is as a method of signaling their positions (Fenno 1978), while another is to improve and maintain good relations with one's constituency (Mayhew 1974, Kindgon 1989). Another possible reason is that members who lack general influence over the legislative agenda, such as freshman, minority members, and extremists, are more likely to utilize this behavior to express their viewpoints and establish their reputations (Maltzman and Sigelman 1996). To explain participation in committees and subcommittees, Hall (1996) argues that members are motivated by a desire to serve districts interests, personal policy interests, or promote the agenda of the president from their own party.⁸ In the face of these competing influences, members must make decisions on how to best allocate their time based on demands from constituents, party leaders, interest groups, and their personal preferences.

Measurement Issues in Representation Studies

The following discussion will now turn toward measurement issues and assessing the ways in which existing scholars have attempted to operationalize representation. Delimiting the boundaries of what should count as representation is based not only on what is theoretically important and significant, but also on the type of method the researcher would like to use to analyze representation. For example,

⁸ Hall (1996) p. 174

certain types of member behavior are more amenable to quantitative analysis, such as roll call votes and bill introduction, in contrast to debate on the floor and town hall meetings with constituents. In the narrowest sense, scholars have often limited this definition to actual votes cast. With regards to the study of the U.S. Congress, roll call votes are readily available and easily converted for use in statistical analysis.

Additionally, other measures, such as ideological scores or ratings such as NOMINATE and ADA scores,⁹ utilize roll call votes to devise their composite indices. However, it is unclear whether the choice to primarily use measures based on roll-call voting in many studies of representation has been made from a theoretical stance as opposed to one of methodological convenience.

As far as the theoretical justification for limiting the analysis to voting behavior, some scholars have argued that only policy outcomes and substantive policy changes are what really matters in terms of representation and effectiveness. Others argue that it is the only strong signal of a member's position. The major difficulty with this view is that it reduces MCs to voting machines who do not engage in other meaningful behavior on behalf of their constituents. Despite the plethora of evidence that members devote valuable time to activities that are not directly tied to floor-votes and make careful considerations on how actively to participate (Hall 1996), an overwhelming proportion of the literature focuses on this type of behavior in analyses that assess how well a member is representing his constituents (Fiorina 1974, Kingdon, 1989, Swain 1993, Cannon 1999, Lublin 1997, Whitby 1997). Additionally, while constituent interests play a role in how members cast their votes (Fiorina 1974), the influence of the party as a main explanatory factor in their voting behavior cannot be understated (Cox and McCubbins 1993). If party can often account for differences

⁹ For more information on the calculation of these scores see Poole and Rosenthal (1996) for NOMINATE scores and <http://www.adaction.org/> for Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores.

in member voting behavior, then the role of other influences in motivating members' decisions is obscured. More importantly, voting may be an area in which party is the main explanatory factor, but may not have the same role in explaining other forms of behavior.

Areas of legislative activity that have recently garnered more attention are those of bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, and committee actions. At the Congressional level, several recent studies examine this behavior (Hall 1996, Rocca and Sanchez 2008, Gamble 2007, Swer 2003). The value of these activities is that they are important steps in the deliberative process which eventually lead to policy outcomes. At the very minimum, bill introductions are important given that this is the only way a bill can eventually become a law. While it is true that a very small percentage of bills introduced ever make it out of committee, bill introduction is a necessary step before it can even get to a floor vote. Moreover, introducing legislation is not a costless activity. Researching and drafting legislation takes time and staff resources in addition to the recruitment efforts to identify potential co-sponsors for support. It allows members to bring issues of vital importance to their constituents to the chamber for consideration. Bill introduction also serves an important role as a signaling mechanism to constituents, party leaders, and other members about the MC's positions on issues and how important those issues are to the member. Even bills that do not pass have still been shown to affect the legislative agenda (Schiller 1995). There is also some evidence that members who are more active than simply participating in floor votes, have considerable influence in shaping the legislative agenda (Wawro 2000). Overall, bill introduction is an extremely valuable contribution as a representative act.

While bill co-sponsorship is not as costly of a behavior in terms of the time investment, it still serves many of the same signaling functions and provides needed

support to a bill (Kessler and Kreihbel 1996). For example, if a bill receives a large number of co-sponsors it is more likely to get pushed faster through the committee process and come to the floor for a vote because of its higher perceived salience among members (Adler and Wilkinson 2005). Additionally, both types of activities can help members achieve their goal of re-election via position taking (Mayhew 1974, Koger 2003). Given the effects of bill introduction and co-sponsorship on the discourse of debate, the range of issues debated, and the resources devoted to engaging in this behavior, it is necessary to consider them a vital part of measuring representation. Incorporating these two measures into statistical analysis is feasible given that it is amenable to a coding scheme, however, the coding of such data is a time-intensive endeavor particularly if one desires to account for directionality of the actions.

Committee actions are also important since the actual shaping of legislation takes place in committee in terms of the framing the issue and defining the policy terms. Mark-ups and amendments are dealt with largely within this realm and members engage in longer debates on the merits of each bill than they would on the floor (Oleszek 2007). While not as clearly amenable to quantitative analysis, with the exceptions of committee votes or introduction of amendments, qualitative analysis on the debate, memos, and testimony in committees remain valuable sources of information about representation. The variety of ways in which these behaviors are important and influential, in addition to the fact that members devote significant amounts of time to them, require that these types of behavior also be considered in studies of representation. Analyses that are limited to roll call votes provide us only a glimpse of member behavior and representation. This dissertation demonstrates that broader measures of representation beyond roll call votes are more nuanced, and work better to explain members' behavior.

Minority Groups and Representation

The body of literature closest to this dissertation is that which explores underrepresented racial and ethnic groups, such as African-Americans and Latinos. It explicitly wrestles with the value of descriptive representation and whether it is required for the substantive representation of minority groups. While there is extensive research on black representation, Latino representation has only recently received more attention. I will briefly review the findings in each area and evaluate the ways in which they measure and define representation. Many of the general critiques of the broader congressional representation literature also apply to this smaller subset of work. In particular, the emphasis on voting behavior and roll call votes is dominant and needs to be expanded by incorporating other forms of member actions in future studies.

African-American Representation

The majority of the research examining African-American representation argues that black members of Congress offer greater substantive representation than their white counterparts, even when controlling for party (Lublin 1997, Cannon 1999, Tate 2003, Whitby 1997). Substantive representation is measured by how well the representative acts as a delegate and represents black interests. While members are much more likely to bring these issues to the debate, it does not necessarily result in more policy outcomes favorable to their African-American constituents. Other scholars argue that black legislators are unable to build coalitions with other members in order to pass the legislation they introduce, and thus African-Americans might be better off simply voting for Democrats who generally reflect the policy positions of the African-American community (Black and Black 2002). Additionally, black members vary in the degree of which they actively pursue black interests (Swain 2003). Moreover, others point out that the creation of majority-minority districts to

help black candidates get elected, paradoxically results in the overall dilution of black influence, who previously affected multiple members of Congress as opposed the one black member gained from such a district (Lublin 1997). Despite the consensus that black representatives provide greater substantive representation for blacks, this literature remains unresolved on whether descriptive representation is necessary for substantive representation.

Latino Representation

While not as extensive as the black representation literature, the literature regarding Latino representation is equally as divided regarding the overall benefit of Latino legislators for Latino substantive representation. The earliest work in this area focused on whether Latino members acted in a more liberal fashion than non-Latino members (Welch and Hibbing 1984). Later work found that Latino members with higher ideological scores that favored Latino policies did not act differently than non-Latino representatives (Hero and Tolbert 1995).¹⁰ Casellas (2005) offers the most comprehensive analysis to date of Latino representation and the election of Latino candidates to the U.S. Congress as well as state legislatures. Casellas' work on Latino representatives focuses largely on the process of their election to office. Regarding representation, his work confirms the finding that Latino legislators tend to be more liberal than their non-Latino counterparts. All of the above work relies on ideology scores, which are based on roll call votes. The main problem with this approach is that

¹⁰ This study utilized SWVRI scores which were compiled by polling all Latino state legislators to determine what Latino interests are and then constructing a measure based on these responses. The theoretical problem with the scores is that they assume what Latino state legislators hold Latino interests to be is the same as the Latino public's and Latino national representatives' view of Latino interests. However, there are potentially key differences between these groups and assuming their congruence should not be automatic. Additionally, Kerr and Miller (1997) demonstrate several methodological errors in terms of research design and the interpretation of results made by Hero and Tolbert (1995). Thus, the findings of Hero and Tolbert (1995) should be considered with some reservations.

votes constitute a small proportion of member action and members are often pressured to tow the party line when voting. It is likely that an examination of other legislative activity beyond roll call votes would elucidate more subtle differences between Latino and non-Latino member actions.

A more recent approach adopted by scholars has begun to investigate non-roll-call behavior (Rocca and Sanchez 2008). While the shift away from roll-call votes is an important step, there are some problems with the current approach. This work has generally centered upon measuring representation as the total number of actions and rather than analyzing the substantive nature of those actions. If we assume that members act as delegates, then the substantive nature of their actions matters. This dissertation argues it is important to distinguish not only between the total number of actions in each issue area, and also the nature of those actions. For example, a member could be very active in anti-immigration bills and an examination of the record would count him as a frequent participator and thus more representative than others who are less active. However, a key part of data is lost in this type of coding if these actions end up being against the needs and interests of constituents, which is contrary to the very nature of representation. Even if we assume members are acting as trustees, the general directionality of the actions should matter to some degree since the trustee model is not entirely divorced from constituent preferences.

In sum, the literature on race and representation by and large has indicated there are some significant benefits from descriptive representation. This dissertation elucidates the importance of descriptive representation by demonstrating its requirement for the greatest substantive representation for Latinos.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an extensive discussion of the nature and definition of representation, measurement issues regarding legislator behavior, and the

representation of minority groups. This dissertation aims to expand on theoretical models of trustee and delegate via interviews with staffs of members of Congress and case studies to assess the circumstances under which representatives are more apt to act as trustees or delegates. Furthermore, this dissertation argues for a re-conceptualization of what constitutes representation by providing strong evidence that important differences, such as the impact of a Latino legislator, are obscured by a focus solely on roll call votes. In the next chapter, I develop an empirical model to evaluate member behavior in the 108th session of the U.S. House of Representatives.

CHAPTER THREE
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF LATINO REPRESENTATION IN THE 108TH
SESSION OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I contend that an examination of representation in the U.S. Congress must go beyond roll votes and discussed several limitations in current studies of Latino representation. I argued that given the limited nature and frequency of roll call votes we must begin to incorporate other forms of legislative participation, such as bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, and house resolutions. Additionally, the literature remains unclear on whether Latinos require Latino representatives to achieve greater substantive representation.

This chapter is comprised of a series of statistical models to assess variation in Latino and non-Latino member actions across different types of activities and policy areas. First, I advance my hypotheses and discuss how they stem from the literature on race and representation. Second, I justify the selection of immigration, education, labor, and social security policies for this investigation and discuss the parameters for each policy area. Subsequently, I turn to the research design where I describe the composition of the data set, the theoretical motivations of the dependent and independent variables, and model specifications. Lastly, I present the empirical results and discuss the implications of the findings for the literature and my future research.

As a whole these tests indicate that Latinos achieve the most substantive representation with Latino members of Congress. Latino legislators act differently than their non-Latino counterparts in policy areas of high salience to the Latino community. In contrast, on low salience issues such as social security, Latino members are not different than non-Latinos, and variation in member behavior is mostly accounted for by party. Non-Latino members do not become more responsive

to Latino interests or issues as the proportion of Latinos in their districts increase, thus indicating that descriptive representation does lead to greater substantive representation. Moreover, the effect of a Latino representative is obscured in the models that rely solely on roll call votes. However, the models that incorporate additional forms of legislative participation, demonstrate significant differences between Latino and non-Latino members, thus providing strong support for my methodological argument of the need to move beyond roll call votes.

Theory & Hypotheses

Recall from the previous chapter, the model of the representative as delegate in which the legislator is viewed as strictly adhering to constituent preferences and acts accordingly (Pitkin 1967). The analysis in this chapter measures the degree to which members act as a delegate to assess the substantive representation of Latinos. The existing literature assessing race, ethnicity, and representation has relied primarily on roll call data (Welch and Hibbing 1984, Cannon 1999, Lublin 1997, Casellas 2005). The main problem with this approach is the limited snapshot of member behavior since roll call votes account for a small proportion of how members spend their time (Hall 1996). More recent work has begun to examine non-roll call behavior such as bill introduction and co-sponsorship (Rocca and Sanchez 2008). However, the focus is on the aggregate total of actions to infer the level of representation rather than taking into account their substantive nature. In measuring representation, scholars often assume members act as delegates, thus the substantive nature of their actions matters. The quantitative models in this chapter seek to overcome the limitations of existing approaches by incorporating additional forms of legislative participation, assessing the total number of actions and the directionality of those actions.

Findings from the representation literature indicate that members should act as delegates on high salience issues and be responsive to constituent interests.

Immigration, education, and labor policies are high salience issues in the Latino community.¹¹ If the argument for descriptive representation holds, then Latino members who have more Latino constituents should be more responsive on these issues than their non-Latino counterparts. Conversely, on issues of lower salience to their Latino constituents, Latino members' actions may not differ at all from non-Latinos. I advance two hypotheses and two sub-hypotheses to be examined in this study:

H₁ Latino Representatives will act more often to achieve pro-immigration, pro-education, and pro-labor legislation than Non-Latino Representatives.

H_{1b} The difference in representation acts between Latino and non-Latino members will be most evident in non-roll call legislative action.

H₂ Representatives with larger Latino constituencies will act more often to achieve pro-immigration, pro-education, and pro-labor legislation than representatives with smaller Latino constituencies, irrespective of the race or ethnicity of the representative.

H_{2b} The effect of Latino percentage on member actions will be greatest on non-roll call legislative actions.

H₃ There will be no substantive difference between Latino and non-Latino Representatives' actions in the area of social security, given its limited salience to the Latino community.

The selection of immigration, education, labor, and social security policies stems from the choice to analyze salient policy areas amongst Latinos and one policy area that is considered non-salient as a basis for comparison.¹² Immigration policy

¹¹ Pew Hispanic Center 2008 National Survey of Latinos: Hispanic Voter Attitudes. See footnote 12 for more details on support levels compared to other issues.

¹² It should be noted that immigration, education, and labor are not the only salient Latino policy areas. In recent surveys, education, labor/economic concerns, war, crime and healthcare are top priorities. According to Pew Hispanic Survey of Hispanic Voter Attitudes (2008) the following issues were marked as most important education (93%), cost of living (92%) jobs (91%), health care 90%, crime (82%), war in Iraq (75%), and immigration (75%). See <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/90.pdf> for more details. The selection of labor, education, immigration was due to both high salience among Latino voters and the regular presence of bills in these areas. Bills on crime, war, and cost of living are

was chosen given its direct impact on the Latino community and recent media attention regarding this issue. Additionally, immigration policy has become an increasingly salient issue amongst Latinos in light of debates over a guest worker program, the potential for another amnesty, and the introduction of legislation aimed at illegal immigrants. Salience of the issue among Latinos was demonstrated among other things by the recent pro-immigration marches in the spring of 2006 and 2007 (Lavariega-Montiforti 2008; Barreto et al. 2009). Education policy was selected given its consistency as the most important issue ranked by Latinos in national public opinion surveys.¹³ Similarly, labor issues concerning treatment of workers and labor rights are often cited as a top concern among Latinos.¹⁴

Social security was selected because while it is an issue that is relevant to all districts given the inevitable participation in the program by all individuals, it is generally considered a lower salience issue for Latinos.¹⁵ It provides an opportunity to compare member actions in salient Latino policy areas to a non-salient area to assess if there are substantive differences between non-Latino and Latino member actions. Additionally, it also allows me to determine if Latinos were simply more liberal ideologically than non-Latino Democrats. However, if they do not differ significantly over social security then this suggests they are only more liberal in a selective manner based on reflecting their constituents' interests.

few and far between and rarely voted on. Attitudes on the War in Iraq are also much more divided than some of the other issues, which make it difficult to define directionality. Health care bills are numerous but are typically quite lengthy and contain many different provisions. Coding the directionality of this type of bill would be more difficult and subjective compared to the relatively straightforward and concise nature of education, immigration, and labor bills. Future work in the area would aim to cover additional high salience policy areas.

¹³ Martinez-Ebers et al (2004), LNPS (1989), LNS (2006)

¹⁴ Pew Hispanic Center 2008 National Survey of Latinos: Hispanic Voter Attitudes

¹⁵ Ibid.

The determination of pro-education, pro-immigration and pro-labor positions to be reflected by the representative are rooted in the public opinion data on Latino attitudes on policy positions. For example, in the Kaiser Family Foundation/ Pew Hispanic Center National Survey of Latinos (2002), 76% of Latinos indicated that they feel the United States should allow more Latin American to enter the US. Only 21% believe there should be a reduction in legal immigration from Latin America and 85% indicated support for a path towards legalization for undocumented people.¹⁶ Similarly in a 2004 Kaiser/Pew Study on Education and Latinos, there were high levels of support for various pro-education policies. For example, 93% of Latino respondents felt that state and federal funds should be used to help schools that were not meeting standards and 54% were ‘very concerned’ and 27% were ‘somewhat concerned’ about budget problems affecting education programs. Additionally 65% of Latino respondents indicated that they support measures to ensure equal money spent on each student even if it involves redistribution of funds from wealthy districts to poor districts.¹⁷ A pro-labor stance is substantiated with availability of jobs and improving of the economy as top concerns.¹⁸ Summed together these findings signal broad levels of support of immigration, education and labor by Latinos, thus supporting my position that representatives with sizeable Latino constituents should be reflecting pro-immigration, education and labor standpoints in their legislative behavior.

For the purposes of this analysis, immigration policy is defined as all bills specifically referring to visas and naturalization, deportation, penalties for illegal

¹⁶ See the NSL (2002) report for more information.

<http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14086>

¹⁷ See NSL: Education (2004) for more information. <http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/National-Survey-of-Latinos-Education-Chartpack-and-Summary-of-Findings.pdf>

¹⁸ See NSL: Politics and Civic Participation (2004) <http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/The-2004-National-Survey-of-Latinos-Politics-and-Civic-Participation-Summary-and-Chart-Pack.pdf>

crossings, border control, and the treatment of immigrants during border crossing and/or immigration proceedings.¹⁹ Education policy included all bills related to education, including teacher requirements, funding and appropriations, support of programs such as Head Start, student loan forgiveness, etc. Labor policy was narrowly defined to include bills that directly affected workers rights, working conditions, wages, unions, and protection of workers. General economic bills were not included under labor policy. Social security included almost all bills listed under the keyword Social Security in the legislative record online on THOMAS²⁰ with the exception of bills related to State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), or Medicare. Since these bills are very closely related to health care, they were not included.²¹ Social security bills included bills related to public retirement, disability, survivors, supplemental security income (SSI), as well as access to these benefits and information about them. Overall, the aim in determining appropriate limits was to include bills most directly relevant to each policy area.

Hall (1996) argues that since a relatively small proportion of actual legislative activity involves floor voting, the consideration of other forms of participation, such as bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, committee and subcommittee actions, memos to other members, and actions by the staff of legislators are necessary when assessing the overall amount and degree of representation. I adopt a broader definition of legislative participation in this study. I focus on roll call votes, bill co-sponsorship, house resolutions, and bill introduction since these are both more closely related to potential legislative outcomes and more quantifiable.

¹⁹ This is a more narrowly defined version of immigration policy that is embraced by policy experts in this area. See Tichenor (2002), Massey (2002). Bills dealing with immigrants' access to services such as Medicare or the education system have not been included in this analysis because these issues deal with more than one policy area.

²⁰ <http://thomas.loc.gov/>

²¹ In future analysis, these bills will be included under a separate health care policy category.

Research Design

To determine if Latino members are more likely to represent Latino interests more than non-Latino members, I created several new data sets using member actions from three recent U.S. House of Representatives sessions, the 108th–110th (2003–2008). In this chapter, I present the results of the analysis of the 108th session. To measure the amount of substantive representation, I coded a variety of legislative actions by both Latino and non-Latino members in the four policy areas and summed the total actions in each area to construct three dependent variables. I coded the actions using the Congressional Record online from THOMAS, which is run by the Library of Congress.²² The first measure of representation captures the total number of roll call votes relating to immigration, education, labor, and social security respectively. Member actions were coded as +1 if the vote supported immigration, education, labor, or social security, and -1 if the vote was against any of the issue areas. Members who abstained from the roll call were coded as 0. The next dependent variable measures the total number of member actions in the areas of bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, and house resolutions. If the measure was positive, the member was assigned a score of +1 and if the measure was negative, the member was assigned a score of -1. The last representation measure is a total representation score, which is an aggregate of roll call votes and other legislative actions.

This analysis did not examine all 435 members of the House of Representatives. Rather, I utilized a sample of members due to the nature of collection of the data for the dependent variables.²³ The sample was not completely random

²² <http://thomas.loc.gov/>.

²³ The collection of the data for the dependent variable included a thorough review of the legislative record in order to identify relevant non-roll call behavior. In order to identify all bills introduced and co-sponsored by a given member, one must look at the entire list of bills in a given session that a member was associated with. For many members, this is over 500 bills. The organization of the bills is either numerical or by keyword. When identifying the relevant pieces of legislation it was necessary to

because there were only 22 Latino representatives in the 108th Congress. Thus, a modified stratified sample was relied upon which includes all 22 Latinos, a random sample of 25 non-Latino members with a substantial Latino constituency (defined as more than 15%) from the relevant subpopulation of 91 members, and a random sample of 25 non-Latino members without a substantial Latino constituency from the remaining subpopulation of 322 members.²⁴ The stratified sample allows a comparison of legislative actions from each of the three groups of members. For the purposes of this dissertation the trade-off to code member actions from a sample rather than entire population was made largely to allow for a comparative analysis of member behavior across multiple sessions. In the following chapter, the results from the 109th and 110th sessions are presented and discussed. Table 3.1 lists all members in the sample.

The main explanatory variables to be examined are the racial and ethnic demographics of the district and the race or ethnicity of the representative. The racial and ethnic characteristics that were coded include the percentage of Latinos, Blacks, Asians and Whites, where Whites was treated as the baseline category. In terms of the representative's race or ethnicity, I coded whether the member was Asian, Latino, Black, or White, where White represented the baseline category. With regards to Latinos, I also noted whether the member was of Cuban descent since Cuban representatives might have different views on either immigration or education policies

consult the specifics of each bill to gain more detailed information in order to determine if it should be included and the directionality of the bill's content. On some issues directionality of the bill is difficult to determine due to divided Latino public on the issue and the potentially long and complicated nature of some other issue areas. For example, health care bills contain many provisions that cover a broad set of issues such as availability of services, funding, access, regulations about standards. For these reasons a selection of issues and a sample of members were analyzed rather than coding all issues for all members.

²⁴ The sample was generated using the "sample" command in Stata 10. A complete list of members included in the sample is provided in Table 3.1.

given the special refugee status afforded to Cubans and the generally more conservative inclinations of Cubans.²⁵ The inclusion of the racial and ethnic categories allows the model to ascertain the relationship between the number of substantive acts and the member's race or ethnicity. The purpose is not merely to test white legislator behavior compared to Latino member behavior but also to determine if other minority group legislators such as Asians or Blacks offer equal substantive representation to Latino members. This finding would provide evidence for racial coalitions and the creation of mixed majority-minority districts.

The models also include a variety of control variables. First, party is included to assess whether Latino representatives are simply reflecting their party's positions and partisan ideologies, or whether they are in fact acting differently from representatives who are their fellow party members. In the black representation literature some scholars such as Lublin (1997) argue that black constituents might be better off with democratic representatives because of greater ability to form coalitions with other members and less concentration of black voters in one district. Analyzing party in terms of Latino representation will test whether Latinos are equally served by Democrats.

Years in office is another important control because incumbency has a variety of advantages including more resources, better committee assignments, and better relations with other members (Jacobson 2001). Members who feel more secure about re-election may be more likely to either deviate from the party position or the views of

²⁵ For instance, unlike Mexican or other Latino immigrants, there is no such thing as an undocumented or illegal Cuban immigrant. The U.S. policy towards Cubans prior to the 1980s welcomed all Cubans as political refugees. In 1995, Congress amended the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 and adopted the so-called "Wet foot-dry-foot policy" which holds that Cubans who make it to dry land would be allowed to remain in the U.S. and be eligible for fast-tracked applications to permanent residency. Additionally Cubans tend to be more conservative and more often identify as Republicans than their other Latino counterparts.

their constituents. Age is included because older members may be more conservative than younger members. Conservative viewpoints are in the opposite direction of the Latino issues examined in this study. Moreover, while party can be a proxy for conservatism, there is a segment of the Democratic members that is conservative. These differences would not be captured with the inclusion of party alone.

Gender is coded to examine potential differences in the frequency and type of actions between men and women. Women legislators have a higher propensity to introduce bills related to gender (Swers 2003) and may be more attentive to other minority groups within their district such as Latinos, given a shared experience of marginalization. The percentage of each district that is urban is relevant since recent immigrants are often geographically concentrated in urban areas and may lead members in these districts to be more attentive to Latino issues. Median income is included because it may influence the member's level of responsiveness to class concerns. Median income is a proxy for class and both the Congressional Black and Hispanic Caucuses openly state that they are committed to the representation of people in their respective minority groups but also the poor. Lastly, I created a border state variable since there are large concentrations of immigrants and Latinos in these areas, they are sites of illegal entry which are directly affected by border security policies, and representatives from these areas may feel more pressure from their Latino constituency. The explanatory variables and controls were coded using information from *The Almanac of American Politics* (2004).

Table 3.1: List of Representatives Used in Sample (n = 72)

Representative	District Name, State (District #)
<i>Latinos (n = 22)</i>	
Pastor, Ed	Phoenix, AZ (4th)
Grijalva, Raúl M.	Tucson, AZ (7th)
Becerra, Xavier	Los Angeles, CA (31st)
Solis, Hilda L.	El Monte, CA (32d)
Roybal-Allard, Lucille	Los Angeles, CA (34th)
Napolitano, Grace F.	Norwalk, CA (38th)
Sánchez, Linda T.	Lakewood, CA (39th)
Baca, Joe	Rialto, CA (43d)
Sanchez, Loretta	Santa Ana, CA (47th)
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana	Miami, FL (18th)
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln	Miami, FL (21st)
Diaz-Balart, Mario	Miami, FL (25th)
Gutierrez, Luis V.	Chicago, IL (4th)
Menendez, Robert	Union City, NJ (13th)
Velázquez, Nydia M.	Brooklyn, NY (12th)
Serrano, José E.	Bronx, NY (16th)
Hinojosa, Rubén	Mercedes, TX (15th)
Reyes, Silvestre	El Paso, TX (16th)
Gonzalez, Charles A.	San Antonio, TX (20th)
Bonilla, Henry	San Antonio, TX (23d)
Ortiz, Solomon P.	Corpus Christi, TX (27th)
Rodriguez, Ciro D.	San Antonio, TX (28th)
<i>Non-Latinos with a Latino constituency of at least 15% (n = 25)</i>	
Kolbe, Jim	Tucson, AZ (8th)
Calvert, Ken	Corona, CA (44th)
Lofgren, Zoe	San Jose, CA (16th)
Pelosi, Nancy	San Francisco, CA (8th)
Dooley, Calvin M.	Hanford, CA (20th)
Cardoza, Dennis A.	Atwater, CA (18th)
Honda, Michael M.	San Jose, CA (15th)
Tauscher, Ellen O.	Alamo, CA (10th)
Lee, Barbara	Oakland, CA (9th)
Bono, Mary	Palm Springs, CA (45th)
DeGette, Diana	Denver, CO (1st)
Musgrave, Marilyn N.	Fort Morgan, CO (4th)
Meek, Kendrick B.	Miami, FL (17th)
Keller, Ric	Orlando, FL (8th)

Table 3.1 (Continued)*Non-Latinos with a Latino constituency of at least 15%*

Lipinski, William O.	Chicago, IL (3d)
Rothman, Steven R.	Fairlawn, NJ (9th)
Berkley, Shelley	Las Vegas, NV (1st)
Gibbons, Jim	Reno, NV (2d)
Lowey, Nita M.	Harrison, NY (18th)
Crowley, Joseph	Queens/Bronx, NY (7th)
Rangel, Charles B.	New York City, NY (15th)
Meeks, Gregory W.	Queens, NY (6th)
Stenholm, Charles W.	Abilene, TX (17th)
Sessions, Pete	Dallas, TX (32d)
Thornberry, Mac	Clarendon, TX (13th)

Non-Latinos without a significant Latino constituency (n = 25)

Shadegg, John B.	Phoenix, AZ (3d)
Waxman, Henry A.	Los Angeles, CA (30th)
DeLauro, Rosa L.	New Haven, CT (3d)
Crenshaw, Ander	Jacksonville, FL (4th)
Goss, Porter J.	Sanibel, FL (14th)
Rush, Bobby L.	Chicago, IL (1st)
Evans, Lane	Rock Island, IL (17th)
Johnson, Timothy V.	Urbana, IL (15th)
Pence, Mike	Columbus, IN (6th)
Carson, Julia	Indianapolis, IN (7th)
Lewis, Ron	Cecilia, KY (2d)
Hoyer, Steny H.	Mechanicsville, MD (5th)
Kildee, Dale E.	Flint, MI (5th)
Gutknecht, Gil	Rochester, MN (1st)
Andrews, Robert E.	Haddon Heights, NJ (1st)
McCarthy, Carolyn	Mineola, NY (4th)
Weiner, Anthony D.	Brooklyn, NY (9th)
Quinn, Jack	Hamburg, NY (27th)
Gillmor, Paul E.	Old Fort, OH (5th)
Brown, Sherrod	Lorain, OH (13th)
Cole, Tom	Moore, OK (4th)
Hooley, Darlene	West Linn, OR (5th)
Jenkins, William L.	Rogersville, TN (1st)
Wamp, Zach	Chattanooga, TN (3d)

Empirical Results

The statistical analysis utilizes OLS regression since the dependent variables are approximately interval level.²⁶ For each of the three dependent variables for the four issues, I ran four separate models. The baseline model includes all of the independent variables except those related to race and ethnicity. Model 2 incorporates all of the variables from Model 1 plus the racial and ethnic demographics of each district. Model 3 then includes all of the variables from Model 2 plus the race or ethnicity of the representative. Finally, Model 4 distinguishes between Cuban and other Latino representatives. The purpose of the multi-model approach is to demonstrate how the effects of relevant variables changes when other factors are considered. The advantage of this model is to isolate the effects of certain variables and determine how the effects of those variables changes with the inclusion of other salient variables. In particular, this approach highlights the effect of a Latino representative on the amount of representation garnered. I will now discuss the results for each of the representation measures and their corresponding models.²⁷

Immigration

The first measure of representation presented in Table 3.2 below is the aggregate of roll call votes on immigration bills. Recall that roll call votes have been the primary source of data for the study of congressional representation in general, and

²⁶ The roll call dependent variable for immigration ranges from -5 to 7, the non-roll call measure ranges from -4 to 20 and the total representation measure ranges from -9 to 27. For education the roll call variable ranges from 3 to 9, the non-roll call measure ranges from 0 to 51, and the total representation measure ranges from 3 to 60. The roll call dependent variable for labor ranges from -1 to 1 and for social security ranges from 0 to 2. For non-call measures, the range for labor is from -3 to 20, and the range for social security is from 0 to 11.

²⁷ For the purposes of clarity, full disclosure of results and ease in referencing the statistical results, the full OLS tables with the complete model specification appear in text in the remainder of this Chapter and in Chapter 4. While presentation of abbreviated models with the most significant variables would likely provide a better visual aesthetic, some less salient variables are significant in a few of the models. Therefore, I elected to present the full results so that readers could easily ascertain the effect of each variable across the different issues and sessions.

in studies of black and Latino representation. The main finding of Model 1 is that, controlling for all other variables, a Democrat is associated with a 6.5 increase in the number of roll call votes in favor of immigration. Percent of the district that is urban is also statistically significant but has less overall substantive importance. For example, a ten point increase in the urban percentage of a district is associated with only about a 0.6 increase in roll call votes. None of the other variables in Model 1 are significant.

In Model 2, which incorporates racial and ethnic demographics, party remains significant. Both the percentage of Latinos and Blacks are significant and percent urban is less so. This finding might be accounted for in part by the fact that Latinos and Blacks tend to live in primarily urban areas. This provides some support for H₂, though despite their significance the effects of the coefficients remains modest since a 10 point increase in the percentage of Latinos or Blacks is associated with only around a 0.4 and 0.5 point increase in roll call votes respectively. In Model 3, the effect of the party variable remains strong but the coefficient declines slightly to 5.9. Latino constituency and Latino representative are positive but are not significant. While Black constituency actually remains significant with a weak substantive effect, Black representative is not significant. Finally, Model 4 finds that a Cuban representative results in a 3 point increase in total roll call votes in favor of immigration, however other Latinos representatives is not a significant variable. In general, these results appear to call into question the validity of both H₁, that Latino representatives will be more active than non Latinos, and H₂, that members with larger Latino constituencies will be more active than those with smaller constituencies. The results run counter to the claim that descriptive representation matters. However, they rely on the limited, but commonly used, metric of roll call votes. The next two sets of models use a wider range of representative actions to investigate how the results may be affected.

The specification of the models in Table 3.3 (see below) is the same as in Table 1 except for the different formulation of the dependent variable. Member actions on non-roll call legislative activity such as bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, and house resolutions comprise the second dependent variable, which I will refer to as the representation score (R-score).

In Model 1, presented in Table 3.3, party is again significant with a 5.6 increase in actions if a member is a Democrat. The strength of urban percentage is slightly higher than in the previous set of models with 10 point increase in urban percentage being associated with a 1.3 increase in the R-score. In this case border state is positive and significant resulting in a 2.4 increase in the R-score. Party remains positive though the coefficient declines slightly in Model 2. The percentage of Latinos remains significant and a 10 point increase in percentage is associated with a 1.6 increase in the member's R-score. In Model 3, which incorporates the race or ethnicity of the representative, Latino constituency is no longer significant, however, whether a member is Latino becomes significant. A Latino representative is associated with a 6.5 increase in the R-score. Model 4 demonstrates that not all Latino members act the same. Cubans are positive but not significant, whereas non-Cuban Latinos (primarily Latinos of Mexican and Puerto Rican descent) are associated with just over a 7 point increase in the R score. Party continues to be significant but the effect of the ethnicity of the representative turns out to be larger than party. Overall, the results of non-roll call legislative actions demonstrate that the ethnicity of the representative matters more for the representation of immigration issues than the relative racial and ethnic composition of the constituency, which provides support for H₁ and H_{1b}, while party remains a consistent factor.

In Table 3.4 below, the dependent variable is a composite measure of total representation acts on immigration bills. While it is true that one can argue roll call

votes and non-roll call actions are apples and oranges in terms of the motivations for engaging in those behaviors, it is still useful to examine an overall picture of member behavior. In other words, by combining the two sets of actions, the strength of the variables has a higher degree of clarity as well as the comprehensive picture of member behavior in the entire issue area.

In Model 1 of this table, party is once again the dominant variable with a 12 point increase in the R-score with Democrat members. Urban percentage and income are significant but with minimal substantive impacts. Border state is positive and associated with a 2.6 increase in the R-score, though it is just outside the standard 5% bounds of significance. Party remains significant in Model 2, but with a slightly weaker effect of a 10.7 increase in the R-score. Latino constituency is significant but has little substantive impact with a 10 point increase in percentage associated with a .2 increase in the member's R-score. Model 3 shows that party is still strong and Latino constituency is no longer significant. Similar to Model 3 in Table 2, a Latino representative is associated with just under an 8 point increase in a member's R-score. Model 4 demonstrates that party is significant and both Cuban and Non-Cuban Latinos are associated with just under an 8 point increase in R-score. Overall, the combination of both types of representation acts, demonstrates that party and the ethnicity of the representative matter in total representation on immigration related bills.

Table 3.2: Analysis of Immigration Roll Call Actions (108th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	6.503 (0.618)**	6.052 (0.646)**	5.902 (0.658)**	6.380 (0.700)**
Years in Office	0.048 (0.042)	0.064 (0.041)	0.080 (0.043)+	0.062 (0.044)
Age	-0.018 (0.032)	-0.021 (0.031)	-0.029 (0.034)	-0.019 (0.033)
Male	-0.400 (0.573)	-0.535 (0.570)	-0.840 (0.626)	-0.810 (0.615)
Urban %	0.059 (0.021)**	0.016 (0.025)	0.023 (0.026)	0.018 (0.026)
Median Income	-1.797e-05 (2.191e-05)	2.159e-05 (2.981e-05)	8.822e-06 (3.181e-05)	-2.493e-06 (3.189e-05)
Border State	0.261 (0.480)	-0.012 (0.582)	0.260 (0.608)	0.724 (0.652)
Latino %		0.036 (0.015)*	0.012 (0.024)	0.007 (0.024)
Black %		0.051 (0.023)*	0.077 (0.037)*	0.078 (0.037)*
Asian %		0.029 (0.048)	0.017 (0.052)	0.016 (0.051)
Latino Rep.			1.201 (1.081)	
Black Rep.			-1.192 (1.525)	-1.398 (1.502)
Asian Rep.			2.219 (2.408)	1.883 (2.372)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				0.611 (1.112)
Cuban Rep.				2.873 (1.421)*
Constant	-4.366 (2.743)	-3.476 (2.683)	-2.828 (2.832)	-2.574 (2.785)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.81	0.83	0.84	0.85

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 3.3: Analysis of Immigration Non-Roll Call Actions (108th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	5.626 (1.459)**	4.643 (1.343)**	4.565 (1.281)**	4.086 (1.390)**
Years in Office	-0.184 (0.099)+	-0.126 (0.085)	-0.054 (0.084)	-0.036 (0.086)
Age	0.086 (0.076)	0.084 (0.065)	0.030 (0.065)	0.020 (0.066)
Male	1.276 (1.353)	1.486 (1.183)	1.137 (1.219)	1.107 (1.222)
Urban %	0.131 (0.049)**	-0.021 (0.053)	-0.005 (0.050)	0.000 (0.051)
Median Income	-1.702e-04 (5.172e-05)**	-5.579e-06 (6.194e-05)	-3.148e-06 (6.193e-05)	8.218e-06 (6.332e-05)
Border State	2.360 (1.132)*	-0.623 (1.210)	-0.067 (1.184)	-0.533 (1.295)
Latino %		0.161 (0.031)**	0.052 (0.047)	0.057 (0.047)
Black %		0.070 (0.048)	0.021 (0.073)	0.020 (0.073)
Asian %		0.143 (0.099)	0.099 (0.102)	0.099 (0.102)
Latino Rep.			6.540 (2.104)**	
Black Rep.			3.185 (2.969)	3.392 (2.983)
Asian Rep.			5.344 (4.688)	5.682 (4.711)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				7.132 (2.209)**
Cuban Rep.				4.860 (2.821)+
Constant	-7.896 (6.475)	-6.317 (5.575)	-3.799 (5.512)	-4.055 (5.529)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.54	0.68	0.73	0.74

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 3.4: Analysis of Combined Immigration Legislative Actions (108th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	12.129 (1.809)**	10.694 (1.683)**	10.468 (1.620)**	10.465 (1.770)**
Years in Office	-0.136 (0.122)	-0.062 (0.106)	0.026 (0.106)	0.026 (0.110)
Age	0.068 (0.094)	0.063 (0.082)	0.001 (0.083)	0.001 (0.084)
Male	0.876 (1.678)	0.951 (1.483)	0.297 (1.541)	0.297 (1.555)
Urban %	0.190 (0.061)**	-0.005 (0.066)	0.019 (0.064)	0.019 (0.065)
Median Income	-1.882e-04 (6.414e-05)**	1.601e-05 (7.759e-05)	5.674e-06 (7.830e-05)	5.725e-06 (8.062e-05)
Border State	2.622 (1.404)+	-0.635 (1.515)	0.193 (1.497)	0.191 (1.649)
Latino %		0.197 (0.039)**	0.064 (0.059)	0.064 (0.060)
Black %		0.121 (0.061)+	0.098 (0.092)	0.098 (0.093)
Asian %		0.172 (0.124)	0.116 (0.129)	0.116 (0.130)
Latino Rep.			7.740 (2.660)**	
Black Rep.			1.993 (3.754)	1.994 (3.798)
Asian Rep.			7.563 (5.927)	7.565 (5.998)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				7.743 (2.812)**
Cuban Rep.				7.733 (3.592)*
Constant	-12.262 (8.030)	-9.793 (6.984)	-6.628 (6.970)	-6.629 (7.040)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.69	0.78	0.82	0.82

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Education

The results for the analysis of education are similar to the above results, though there are a few important differences, as indicated in Table 3.5. In the first set of models regarding the aggregate roll call votes on education bills, party is again the primary significant variable. However, across all four models, the effect of party is associated with around a 3.4 increase in the total votes in favor of education bills which is a much weaker effect than the immigration roll call models. In Model 3, which includes racial and ethnic demographics of the district and the race or ethnicity of the representative, a Latino representative has a small effect. It results in a 1.1 increase in the pro-education roll call votes, however, this coefficient is only significant at the 10% level.

In Table 3.6 below, the dependent variable consists of member actions on non-roll call activities. In Models 1 and 2, party remains a strong influence and being a Democrat is associated with over a 12 point increase in the total R-score. Similar to the immigration models for non-roll call activity, the influence of a Latino legislator is elucidated in Model 3. A Latino legislator is associated with over a 12 point increase in the total R-score and has an equally as strong effect as party. One key difference between the analysis of education and immigration is the effect of a black legislator. In the immigration models, the strength of this coefficient was weak and it was never significant. However, in Model 3 for education, a black legislator is associated with just over a 12 point increase in the total R-score at the 10% level. While this is outside the usual standard of 5% level of significance, the finding is nevertheless intriguing. In Model 4, which distinguishes between Cuban and non-Cuban Latinos, non-Cuban Latino representatives have a slightly stronger effect of a 13 point increase in the R-score, whereas Cuban representatives have an effect of an 11.7 increase in the R-score. The strength and effect of a black representative remains constant at a 12.5 point

increase at the 10% level of significance. Similar to the immigration findings, the results for the above two sets of models for education indicate that race or ethnicity of the representative matters more than racial demographics of the district and it matters most in non-roll call activity, which again provides support for H₁ and H_{1b}.

The last set of models concerns the third dependent variable which combines roll call and non-call activity for a total representation analysis of education, which are presented in Table 3.7. Party remains a strong factor and is associated with close to a 16 point increase in the total R-score across all four models. In Model 2, a 10 point increase in the percentage of blacks in a district has a small effect resulting in a 1.9 increase in the R-score, however this result is at the 10% significance level. In Model 3, the effect of a Latino representative remains strong and is associated with a 13.7 increase in the R-score. Similar to Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.5, in Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.6, a black representative is associated with a 13 point increase in the R-score but the significance level is at 10%. Lastly in Model 4, a non-Cuban Latino legislator results in a 14 point increase in the R-score and a Cuban legislator results in a 13 point increase with significance at the 10% level. The combined model demonstrates that party and Latino legislator are the most significant factors affecting the total representation for education.

Table 3.5: Analysis of Education Roll Call Actions (108th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	3.435 (0.372)**	3.435 (0.404)**	3.408 (0.395)**	3.471 (0.432)**
Years in Office	-0.028 (0.025)	-0.027 (0.026)	-0.035 (0.026)	-0.037 (0.027)
Age	0.015 (0.019)	0.011 (0.020)	0.018 (0.020)	0.019 (0.021)
Male	-0.203 (0.345)	-0.338 (0.356)	-0.005 (0.376)	-0.002 (0.379)
Urban %	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.016)	-0.011 (0.016)	-0.012 (0.016)
Median Income	1.899e-06 (1.320e-05)	1.580e-05 (1.863e-05)	2.721e-05 (1.911e-05)	2.573e-05 (1.966e-05)
Border State	-0.194 (0.289)	0.005 (0.364)	0.071 (0.365)	0.132 (0.402)
Latino %		0.005 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.015)
Black %		0.017 (0.015)	0.009 (0.022)	0.009 (0.023)
Asian %		-0.032 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.003 (0.032)
Latino Rep.			1.107 (0.649)+	
Black Rep.			0.434 (0.916)	0.407 (0.926)
Asian Rep.			-3.240 (1.447)*	-3.284 (1.462)*
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				1.030 (0.686)
Cuban Rep.				1.326 (0.876)
Constant	5.063 (1.652)**	5.198 (1.676)**	4.084 (1.701)*	4.118 (1.716)*
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.68	0.69	0.73	0.73

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 3.6: Analysis of Education Non-Roll Call Actions (108th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	12.591 (2.784)**	12.212 (2.991)**	12.532 (2.899)**	12.257 (3.168)**
Years in Office	-0.201 (0.188)	-0.189 (0.189)	-0.092 (0.190)	-0.082 (0.197)
Age	0.193 (0.145)	0.156 (0.145)	0.071 (0.148)	0.065 (0.151)
Male	1.291 (2.582)	0.076 (2.635)	0.925 (2.759)	0.907 (2.783)
Urban %	0.026 (0.094)	-0.038 (0.118)	-0.020 (0.114)	-0.017 (0.116)
Median Income	-3.030e-05 (9.868e-05)	7.530e-05 (1.379e-04)	1.463e-04 (1.402e-04)	1.528e-04 (1.443e-04)
Border State	-1.282 (2.160)	0.638 (2.693)	1.051 (2.680)	0.784 (2.950)
Latino %		0.035 (0.070)	-0.161 (0.105)	-0.158 (0.107)
Black %		0.175 (0.108)	-0.046 (0.165)	-0.046 (0.166)
Asian %		-0.222 (0.220)	-0.234 (0.230)	-0.234 (0.232)
Latino Rep.			12.667 (4.761)*	
Black Rep.			12.470 (6.719)+	12.589 (6.796)+
Asian Rep.			-0.986 (10.610)	-0.793 (10.733)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				13.007 (5.032)*
Cuban Rep.				11.703 (6.428)+
Constant	-6.335 (12.354)	-4.528 (12.412)	-2.862 (12.476)	-3.009 (12.597)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.36	0.40	0.48	0.49

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 3.7: Analysis of Combined Education Legislative Actions (108th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	16.026 (2.860)**	15.647 (3.056)**	15.940 (2.937)**	15.727 (3.209)**
Years in Office	-0.229 (0.193)	-0.216 (0.193)	-0.127 (0.192)	-0.119 (0.199)
Age	0.208 (0.149)	0.167 (0.149)	0.089 (0.150)	0.084 (0.153)
Male	1.088 (2.653)	-0.262 (2.692)	0.919 (2.795)	0.906 (2.820)
Urban %	0.020 (0.096)	-0.051 (0.120)	-0.031 (0.115)	-0.029 (0.117)
Median Income	-2.840e-05 (1.014e-04)	9.110e-05 (1.409e-04)	1.735e-04 (1.420e-04)	1.785e-04 (1.461e-04)
Border State	-1.475 (2.220)	0.644 (2.752)	1.122 (2.714)	0.915 (2.989)
Latino %		0.040 (0.072)	-0.174 (0.107)	-0.171 (0.108)
Black %		0.192 (0.110)+	-0.037 (0.167)	-0.037 (0.168)
Asian %		-0.254 (0.225)	-0.237 (0.233)	-0.237 (0.235)
Latino Rep.			13.774 (4.823)**	
Black Rep.			12.904 (6.806)+	12.996 (6.885)+
Asian Rep.			-4.226 (10.748)	-4.077 (10.873)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				14.037 (5.098)**
Cuban Rep.				13.029 (6.512)+
Constant	-1.272 (12.694)	0.669 (12.683)	1.222 (12.638)	1.109 (12.762)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.46	0.50	0.57	0.57

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 3.8: Analysis of Labor Non-Roll Call Actions (108th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	10.359 (1.422)**	10.212 (1.571)**	10.241 (1.529)**	9.759 (1.663)**
Years in Office	-0.048 (0.096)	-0.039 (0.099)	-0.007 (0.100)	0.011 (0.103)
Age	0.050 (0.074)	0.047 (0.076)	0.021 (0.078)	0.012 (0.079)
Male	-0.464 (1.319)	-0.530 (1.384)	0.133 (1.455)	0.103 (1.461)
Urban %	0.033 (0.048)	0.007 (0.062)	0.019 (0.060)	0.024 (0.061)
Median Income	-1.758e-05 (5.041e-05)	1.535e-05 (7.243e-05)	5.321e-05 (7.392e-05)	6.465e-05 (7.573e-05)
Border State	-0.672 (1.104)	-0.951 (1.414)	-0.604 (1.413)	-1.073 (1.549)
Latino %		0.026 (0.037)	-0.081 (0.056)	-0.076 (0.056)
Black %		0.023 (0.057)	-0.063 (0.087)	-0.064 (0.087)
Asian %		-0.001 (0.116)	0.029 (0.121)	0.030 (0.122)
Latino Rep.			6.777 (2.511)**	
Black Rep.			4.896 (3.544)	5.104 (3.568)
Asian Rep.			-3.977 (5.596)	-3.637 (5.635)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				7.374 (2.642)**
Cuban Rep.				5.086 (3.375)
Constant	-3.991 (6.312)	-3.657 (6.519)	-4.303 (6.580)	-4.561 (6.613)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.61	0.61	0.66	0.67

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 3.9: Analysis of Social Security Non-Roll Call Actions (108th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	2.698 (0.774)**	3.065 (0.844)**	3.139 (0.867)**	2.604 (0.930)**
Years in Office	0.062 (0.052)	0.054 (0.053)	0.036 (0.057)	0.056 (0.058)
Age	0.009 (0.040)	0.011 (0.041)	0.024 (0.044)	0.013 (0.044)
Male	0.051 (0.717)	0.216 (0.743)	0.665 (0.825)	0.631 (0.817)
Urban %	0.027 (0.026)	0.045 (0.033)	0.042 (0.034)	0.047 (0.034)
Median Income	1.491e-05 (2.742e-05)	7.199e-06 (3.890e-05)	2.337e-05 (4.191e-05)	3.605e-05 (4.234e-05)
Border State	-0.642 (0.600)	-0.884 (0.760)	-1.025 (0.801)	-1.544 (0.866)+
Latino %		-0.008 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.032)	0.004 (0.031)
Black %		-0.044 (0.030)	-0.063 (0.049)	-0.064 (0.049)
Asian %		-0.019 (0.062)	0.012 (0.069)	0.012 (0.068)
Latino Rep.			-0.194 (1.424)	
Black Rep.			0.904 (2.009)	1.135 (1.994)
Asian Rep.			-4.008 (3.173)	-3.631 (3.150)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				0.467 (1.477)
Cuban Rep.				-2.068 (1.886)
Constant	-1.341 (3.433)	-2.089 (3.501)	-3.427 (3.731)	-3.712 (3.697)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.35	0.37	0.39	0.41

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Labor

Labor exhibits similar results to the previous two issue areas. In the previous two issue areas there was a sizable number of roll call votes to justify a model that focused on roll call votes. However, in both labor and social security the number of roll call votes was very small.²⁸ Consequently, my discussion of each of these two issue areas will focus on the non roll call models since the roll call only models and the total representation model offer limited additional explanatory value due the small number of roll call votes. The dependent variable in the labor non- roll call model consisted of bill co-sponsorship and bill introductions. As in the previous two issue areas, I use four separate models which incorporate different racial and ethnic based variables in addition to my distinction between Cuban and non-Cuban Latinos, which are presented in Table 3.8 above.

In Model 1 for labor, which includes all variables except those pertaining to race and ethnicity, being Democrat is once again the single most significant variable and results in a 10.35 increase in the R-Score. In Model 2, which included the racial and ethnic demographics of the district, party maintains a similar effect and is the sole variable of influence. In Model 3, which incorporates the race or ethnicity of the representative, a Latino representative results in a 6.77 increase in the R-score and is significant at the 1% level. Model, 4, which distinguishes between non-Cuban Latinos and Cubans, non-Cuban Latino results in a 7.37 increase in the R-score. Cuban Latino is not significant whereas, party is significant results in a 9.75 increase in the R-Score.

²⁸ For labor there was one roll call vote and social security there was two roll call votes. Despite the small population of votes, I still ran a roll call only model for each issue area. For labor since there is only one observation, I also ran a logit model and did not observe a change in the results. Party was the only significant variable. The results are available by request. In addition, I ran a combined model of roll call and non roll call behavior for both labor and social security. The findings in the total models have roughly the same findings as the non-roll call models, which can be attributed in part to the limited influence of the addition of roll call votes to the models. See Tables 3.8 and 3.9 for the non-roll call models.

Social Security

Social security policies were analyzed in this study as a non-salient issue where it is expected that Latino members would not act differently than non-Latino members. In theory, Latino members should be most responsive to issues that are of greatest importance to their Latino constituencies. The statistical analysis confirms hypothesis H₃, where across all four models, Latino representative or Latino percentage in the district are not significant (see Table 3.9 above). For social security, there is no substantive difference in the representation afforded by a Latino representative compared to a non-Latino. In the non-roll call model, where most of the legislative activity in this area occurred, once again party remains a solid predictor with an average of a 3 point increase to the total R-score. None of the other variables are statistically significant. The importance of the non-findings for Latino representative confirms the strength of my argument that Latino legislators act distinctly differently from non-Latinos with respect to issues of importance to the Latino community, but not necessarily across all issues. If Latinos simply acted the same as non-Latinos of the same party, then party ideology is the determining factor. On the other hand, if Latinos consistently act in a different manner than non-Latinos of the same party, then we might attribute this to an ideology rooted in their unique ethnic background. However, neither of these two extremes appears to be the case. Latinos only *sometimes* deviate from their party. The findings here suggest Latino members are more likely to part ways with their colleagues on issues of high salience to their constituents rather than low salience issues.

Discussion

The results from the above tables present two main findings. First, relying solely on roll call votes provides a very limited view of member actions and a restricted perspective on the nature of representation as theorized in hypotheses H_{1b} and

H_{2b}. According to the roll call models, the only consistently important factor was party. However, when I expanded my examination of representation to include other forms of legislative activity, such as bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, and house resolutions, another important variable was illuminated. While the effect of party remained strong, the ethnicity of the representative is critical in determining the total R-score for a representative across education, labor and immigration bills. The excessive reliance on roll call votes and NOMINATE scores²⁹ results in a very limited view of congressional participation. For example, in my examination of the record, on average 10,000 bills are introduced per session, 1,000 will come to the floor for a vote, and at most 500 bills will pass, many of which are appropriations bills and not substantive policy changes. The results of the analysis strongly suggest that an examination of congressional representation must include other forms of legislative participation.

Furthermore, while the racial composition of the district is certainly relevant, the ethnicity of the representative appears to be a more important factor in the degree of pro-immigration, education, and labor actions, which provides strong support for H₁. A commonly held assumption in the literature on race and representation is that members will become more responsive to minority groups as the size of those minority groups grow, independent of the racial or ethnic background of the representative. However, the findings of this investigation dispute that assumption and in fact find that non-Latino members do not become significantly more responsive to their Latino constituency as the proportion of Latinos in their districts grows. Maximum substantive representation for Latinos is achieved by having Latino members of Congress. Furthermore, the non-finding of the significance of Latino

²⁹ See (Poole and Rosenthal 1996) for more detailed information on the composition of NOMINATE scores based on roll call votes.

representative in the area of social security provides additional strength to the argument that Latino representatives are not simply more active in all areas, but rather more active with regards to salient issues among the Latino community.

2nd Sample from the 108th Session

One of the potential criticisms of this data set is the use of a particular sample of representatives rather than the entire population. To alleviate concerns regarding the sample, I conducted an additional analysis for the 108th session with all Latino members, and another random sample of 25 members from districts with at least 15% Latinos and 25 members with districts less than 15% Latinos. . Recall that in group two, members with at least 15% Latinos, there were a total of 92 members. With the second sample, I have now covered the behavior of more than half of the people in this group. I treated the second sample as a replication and used the exact same statistical models. The list of members in the second sample is listed below in Table 3.10.

The quantitative results corroborate the results from the analysis presented earlier in this chapter. Across all roll call models, being a Democrat is the only significant variable. The roll call models for immigration and education are listed below in Tables 3.11 and 3.12. In the non-roll call model of labor and immigration policies, Latino Representative is significant and results in a considerable change in the total representation score, 7.5 and 5.8 respectively. However, in the non-roll call models for education, Latino representative has a co-efficient of 8.2 but falls just outside the ten percent significance level. This is the only slight deviation from the results from the original 108th sample. Social Security remains constant across the two samples and is only affected by party. These findings provide additional support for my argument that Latinos are only more active in high salience issue areas to the Latino community.

Table 3.10 List of Representatives Used in 2nd 108th Sample

Representative	District Name, State (Distr
<i>Latinos (n = 22)</i>	
Pastor, Ed	Phoenix, AZ (4th)
Grijalva, Raúl M.	Tucson, AZ (7th)
Becerra, Xavier	Los Angeles, CA (31st)
Solis, Hilda L.	El Monte, CA (32d)
Roybal-Allard, Lucille	Los Angeles, CA (34th)
Napolitano, Grace F.	Norwalk, CA (38th)
Sánchez, Linda T.	Lakewood, CA (39th)
Baca, Joe	Rialto, CA (43d)
Sanchez, Loretta	Santa Ana, CA (47th)
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana	Miami, FL (18th)
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln	Miami, FL (21st)
Diaz-Balart, Mario	Miami, FL (25th)
Gutierrez, Luis V.	Chicago, IL (4th)
Menendez, Robert	Union City, NJ (13th)
Velázquez, Nydia M.	Brooklyn, NY (12th)
Serrano, José E.	Bronx, NY (16th)
Hinojosa, Rubén	Mercedes, TX (15th)
Reyes, Silvestre	El Paso, TX (16th)
Gonzalez, Charles A.	San Antonio, TX (20th)
Bonilla, Henry	San Antonio, TX (23d)
Ortiz, Solomon P.	Corpus Christi, TX (27th)
Rodriguez, Ciro D.	San Antonio, TX (28th)
<i>Non-Latinos with a Latino constituency of at least 15% (n = 25)</i>	
Capps, Lois	Santa Barbara, CA (23rd)
Capuano, Michael E.	Somerville, MA (8th)
Combest, Larry and Randy	Lubbock, TX (19th)
Culberson, John Abney	Houston, TX (7th)
DeLay, Tom	Sugarland, TX (22nd)
Emanuel, Rahm	Chicago, IL (5th)
Flake, Jeff	Mesa, AZ (6th)
Frost, Martin	Dallas/FW, TX (24th)
Gallegly, Elton	Thousand Oaks, CA (24th)
Harman, Jane	El Segundo, CA (36th)
Issa, Darrell E.	Temecula, CA (49th)
Jackson-Lee, Sheila	Houston, TX (18th)
Lantos, Tom	San Mateo, CA (12th)
McKeon, Howard P. "Buck	Santa Clarita, CA (25th)

Table 3.10 (Continued)*Non-Latinos with a Latino constituency of at least 15% (continue)*

Millender-McDonald, Juan	Long Beach, CA (37th)
Miller, Gary G.	Brea, CA (42nd)
Miller, George	Richmond, CA (7th)
Pascrell, Bill, Jr.	Paterson, NJ (8th)
Payne, Donald M.	Newark, NJ (10th)
Pearce, Stevan	Las Cruces, NM (2nd)
Renzi, Rick	Flagstaff, AZ (1st)
Schiff, Adam B.	Pasadena, CA (29th)
Stark, Fortney Pete	Fremont, CA (13th)
Towns, Edolphus	Brooklyn, NY (10th)
Udall, Tom	Santa Fe, NM (3rd)

Non-Latinos without a significant Latino constituency (n = 25)

Bachus, Spencer	Birmingham, AL
Boehlert, Sherwood	Utica, NY (24th)
Burton, Dan	Indianapolis, IN (5th)
Case, Ed	Honolulu, HI (2nd)
Crane, Philip M.	Schaumburg, IL (8th)
DeMint, Jim	Greenville, SC (4th)
Doolittle, John T.	Granite Bay, CA (4th)
Duncan, John J., Jr.	Knoxville, TN (2nd)
Etheridge, Bob	Raleigh, NC (2nd)
Forbes, J. Randy	Chesapeake, VA (4th)
Franks, Trent	Glendale, AZ (2nd)
Hart, Melissa A.	Pittsburgh, PA (4th)
Kanjorski, Paul E.	Wilkes-Barre, PA (11th)
Langevin, James R.	Warwick, RI (2nd)
Markey, Edward J.	Framingham, MA (7th)
Neal, Richard E.	Springfield, MA (2nd)
Northup, Anne M.	Louisville, KY (3rd)
Peterson, Collin C.	Red Lake Falls, MN (7th)
Pitts, Joseph R.	Lancaster, PA (16th)
Putnam, Adam H.	Bartow, FL (12th)
Ryan, Timothy J.	Youngstown, OH (17th)
Shays, Christopher	Stamford, CT (4th)
Simpson, Michael K.	Boise, ID (2nd)
Visclosky, Peter J.	Gary, IN (1st)

Table 3.11: Analysis of Immigration Roll Call Actions (108th Second Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	7.321** (0.538)	7.308** (0.599)	7.319** (0.625)	7.964** (0.624)
Years in Office	-0.015 (0.036)	-0.014 (0.036)	-0.010 (0.038)	-0.018 (0.036)
Age	0.029 (0.025)	0.033 (0.026)	0.031 (0.027)	0.046+ (0.026)
Male	-1.122+ (0.654)	-1.090 (0.666)	-1.207+ (0.709)	-1.283+ (0.666)
Urban %	0.051** (0.018)	0.040 (0.024)	0.039 (0.025)	0.037 (0.023)
Median Income	-7.067e-05** (2.484e-05)	-5.401e-05 (3.815e-05)	-5.751e-05 (3.944e-05)	-7.165e-05+ (3.729e-05)
Border State	-0.340 (0.491)	-0.806 (0.583)	-0.924 (0.700)	0.050 (0.733)
Latino %		0.018 (0.017)	0.032 (0.032)	0.007 (0.031)
Black %		-0.014 (0.025)	-0.003 (0.035)	-0.003 (0.033)
Asian %		0.003 (0.047)	0.005 (0.048)	-0.003 (0.045)
Latino Rep.			-0.807 (1.467)	
Black Rep.			-0.960 (1.750)	-1.400 (1.648)
Asian Rep.			-0.103 (2.125)	-0.105 (1.993)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				-0.913 (1.377)
Cuban Rep.				2.907 (1.854)
Constant	-3.374+ (2.018)	-3.541 (2.156)	-3.362 (2.239)	-3.447 (2.100)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.842	0.848	0.850	0.870

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 3.12: Analysis of Education Roll Call Actions (108th Second Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	3.533** (0.370)	3.572** (0.387)	3.664** (0.397)	3.648** (0.427)
Years in Office	-0.000 (0.025)	-0.003 (0.024)	-0.008 (0.024)	-0.008 (0.025)
Age	0.003 (0.017)	0.000 (0.017)	0.005 (0.017)	0.004 (0.018)
Male	0.009 (0.450)	-0.004 (0.431)	-0.076 (0.451)	-0.074 (0.455)
Urban %	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.039* (0.016)	-0.038* (0.016)	-0.038* (0.016)
Median Income	2.495e-05 (1.709e-05)	7.601e-05** (2.468e-05)	7.770e-05** (2.506e-05)	7.805e-05** (2.548e-05)
Border State	0.109 (0.337)	-0.405 (0.377)	-0.162 (0.445)	-0.186 (0.501)
Latino %		0.035** (0.011)	0.019 (0.020)	0.019 (0.021)
Black %		0.014 (0.016)	0.028 (0.023)	0.028 (0.023)
Asian %		-0.012 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.031)	-0.016 (0.031)
Latino Rep.			0.746 (0.933)	
Black Rep.			-0.945 (1.112)	-0.935 (1.126)
Asian Rep.			-1.046 (1.350)	-1.046 (1.362)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				0.749 (0.941)
Cuban Rep.				0.655 (1.267)
Constant	4.357** (1.388)	3.942** (1.395)	3.648* (1.423)	3.650* (1.435)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.624	0.681	0.695	0.695

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table3.13: Analysis of Immigration Non-Roll Call Actions (108th Second Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	4.349** (1.091)	4.242** (1.061)	4.186** (1.060)	3.947** (1.136)
Years in Office	0.030 (0.073)	0.020 (0.065)	-0.007 (0.065)	-0.004 (0.066)
Age	-0.021 (0.051)	-0.034 (0.046)	-0.015 (0.046)	-0.020 (0.047)
Male	0.319 (1.326)	0.378 (1.180)	0.771 (1.204)	0.799 (1.211)
Urban %	0.175** (0.037)	0.061 (0.043)	0.066 (0.042)	0.067 (0.042)
Median Income	-2.726e-04** (5.035e-05)	-8.343e-05 (6.760e-05)	-6.629e-05 (6.692e-05)	-6.106e-05 (6.783e-05)
Border State	2.509* (0.994)	0.398 (1.034)	1.621 (1.187)	1.260 (1.333)
Latino %		0.138** (0.030)	0.035 (0.054)	0.044 (0.057)
Black %		0.065 (0.044)	0.043 (0.060)	0.043 (0.060)
Asian %		0.001 (0.083)	-0.012 (0.082)	-0.009 (0.083)
Latino Rep.			5.754* (2.490)	
Black Rep.			2.877 (2.970)	3.039 (2.998)
Asian Rep.			1.663 (3.605)	1.664 (3.625)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				5.793* (2.504)
Cuban Rep.				4.380 (3.373)
Constant	-2.517 (4.090)	-3.406 (3.820)	-4.684 (3.799)	-4.653 (3.820)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.662	0.752	0.775	0.776

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 3.14: Analysis of Education Non-Roll Call Actions (108th Second Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	9.944** (2.239)	9.760** (2.462)	9.564** (2.511)	9.461** (2.699)
Years in Office	-0.109 (0.151)	-0.127 (0.150)	-0.170 (0.154)	-0.168 (0.156)
Age	0.090 (0.106)	0.046 (0.108)	0.068 (0.110)	0.065 (0.113)
Male	2.617 (2.721)	2.552 (2.739)	3.724 (2.851)	3.736 (2.878)
Urban %	0.117 (0.077)	0.003 (0.099)	0.009 (0.100)	0.009 (0.100)
Median Income	-2.311e-04* (1.034e-04)	-4.026e-05 (1.569e-04)	-6.557e-06 (1.585e-04)	-4.290e-06 (1.612e-04)
Border State	1.258 (2.041)	0.742 (2.400)	1.984 (2.812)	1.828 (3.167)
Latino %		0.105 (0.069)	-0.035 (0.129)	-0.031 (0.135)
Black %		0.191+ (0.103)	0.080 (0.142)	0.080 (0.144)
Asian %		-0.003 (0.193)	-0.018 (0.194)	-0.017 (0.196)
Latino Rep.			8.232 (5.897)	
Black Rep.			9.807 (7.033)	9.877 (7.122)
Asian Rep.			2.596 (8.539)	2.596 (8.612)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				8.249 (5.950)
Cuban Rep.				7.637 (8.013)
Constant	-3.593 (8.397)	-3.710 (8.869)	-5.406 (8.997)	-5.392 (9.075)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.432	0.467	0.496	0.496

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 3.15: Analysis of Labor Non-Roll Call Actions (108th Second Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	7.762** (1.064)	7.604** (1.130)	7.608** (1.078)	7.306** (1.153)
Years in Office	0.036 (0.072)	0.032 (0.069)	0.003 (0.066)	0.007 (0.067)
Age	-0.001 (0.050)	-0.001 (0.049)	0.030 (0.047)	0.023 (0.048)
Male	0.187 (1.293)	0.298 (1.257)	0.148 (1.225)	0.183 (1.230)
Urban %	0.068+ (0.036)	0.001 (0.046)	0.009 (0.043)	0.011 (0.043)
Median Income	-7.815e-05 (4.910e-05)	2.246e-05 (7.200e-05)	3.412e-05 (6.807e-05)	4.074e-05 (6.888e-05)
Border State	1.405 (0.969)	-0.206 (1.101)	1.978 (1.208)	1.522 (1.354)
Latino %		0.086** (0.032)	-0.057 (0.055)	-0.045 (0.058)
Black %		0.009 (0.047)	0.069 (0.061)	0.069 (0.061)
Asian %		0.022 (0.088)	0.005 (0.083)	0.009 (0.084)
Latino Rep.			7.589** (2.533)	
Black Rep.			-2.366 (3.021)	-2.160 (3.044)
Asian Rep.			2.738 (3.668)	2.739 (3.681)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				7.639** (2.543)
Cuban Rep.				5.851+ (3.425)
Constant	-3.847 (3.988)	-4.201 (4.069)	-5.969 (3.864)	-5.929 (3.879)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.618	0.666	0.723	0.726

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 3.16: Analysis of Social Security Non-Roll Call Actions (108th Second Sample)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	2.835** (0.670)	3.051** (0.735)	3.179** (0.754)	3.136** (0.811)
Years in Office	0.119* (0.045)	0.115* (0.045)	0.118* (0.046)	0.119* (0.047)
Age	-0.006 (0.032)	-0.017 (0.032)	-0.017 (0.033)	-0.018 (0.034)
Male	-0.159 (0.815)	-0.309 (0.817)	-0.614 (0.857)	-0.609 (0.865)
Urban %	0.017 (0.023)	0.020 (0.030)	0.021 (0.030)	0.021 (0.030)
Median Income	-6.655e-05* (3.094e-05)	-4.992e-05 (4.683e-05)	-5.495e-05 (4.763e-05)	-5.399e-05 (4.842e-05)
Border State	0.277 (0.611)	0.940 (0.716)	0.941 (0.845)	0.875 (0.952)
Latino %		-0.011 (0.021)	0.001 (0.039)	0.002 (0.040)
Black %		0.044 (0.031)	0.080+ (0.043)	0.080+ (0.043)
Asian %		-0.046 (0.058)	-0.047 (0.058)	-0.047 (0.059)
Latino Rep.			-0.876 (1.772)	
Black Rep.			-2.894 (2.114)	-2.864 (2.140)
Asian Rep.			-1.519 (2.566)	-1.518 (2.588)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				-0.869 (1.788)
Cuban Rep.				-1.127 (2.408)
Constant	2.613 (2.514)	2.183 (2.647)	2.226 (2.704)	2.231 (2.727)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R-squared	0.430	0.469	0.490	0.491

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Conclusions

The results of the models have implications for future work in this area and the relevant literature. First, the justification for examining representation beyond roll call voting is bolstered by the results of this study. Analysis based solely on roll call votes obscured the finding that it matters if a representative was Latino. This substantive finding is important given that the current race and representation literature fails to offer a clear answer to whether Latino members afford a higher amount of substantive representation. Moreover, the difference in the effect of a black legislator in education policy compared to immigration or labor policies is interesting. While it is not surprising that black members of Congress would consistently act in favor of pro-education bills given the salience of the issue in the black community, the effect of a black member is comparable to the effect of Latino legislators. While the findings indicate that race matters on immigration, labor and education bills, I am cautious to conclude that it will be salient across all other issue areas given the social security findings. Thus, an examination of additional issues is critical for the explanatory power of future research in this area.

Additionally, this examination of the legislative record indicates that a considerable amount of member action is spent on non-roll call legislative activity. This study has utilized the most easily quantifiable measures of such activity, but other potentially important forms of action are less amenable to quantification. For example, debate on the House floor, meetings of small groups of members, policy statements, and memos between members are all rich sources of representational acts. A mixed-methods approach allows for a fuller investigation of the issues and different types of representative acts across members of Congress. Chapter 5 of this dissertation aims to address this issue with a qualitative examination of the legislative record, case studies of representatives and analysis of interviews with staff of members of Congress.

CHAPTER FOUR

A ONE SESSION PHENOMENON? EXAMINING THE 109th and 110th SESSIONS

Introduction

Drawing on the analysis of the previous chapter on Latino representation in the 108th Session of the U.S. House of Representatives, this analysis seeks to provide robustness checks to the quantitative findings. In the last chapter, I argued that Latino representatives are significantly more active in areas of high salience to the Latino community than their non-Latino counterparts, even controlling for the racial and ethnic demographics of the district. I also argued that this distinction in behavior was best elucidated when examining non-roll call behavior. Whereas party, being a Democrat, was the only predictor of behavior in the roll call models across all issues, whether a member was Latino became a significant and important variable in predicting the member's total representation score in the non-roll call models.

In the congressional literature, findings can sometimes be called a 'one session phenomenon' because the results do not seem to hold across additional sessions. This can happen due to the changing composition of the legislative body and the policy and political atmospheres. Therefore, in this chapter I present my analysis of the 109th and 110th sessions across the four policy areas of immigration, education, labor and social security. The purpose of this investigation is not only to determine more conclusively if Latino representatives offer greater substantive representation but also if the ways in which they are more active differ over sessions. Also central to this extension is whether the other members in the sample become more responsive across the issue areas examined due to external motivating factors such as the current economic climate. In other words, do Democrats become more active and representative over time and thus reduce the need for Latino constituents to have Latino legislators?

Finally, the additional analyses are important for my argument regarding the need to distinguish between roll call and non-roll call behavior. To augment the statistical analysis and provide a deeper explanation for some of the divergent findings, I also draw upon interviews that I conducted with the staff members of Latino members of Congress in Chapter Five.

Theory & Research Design

The hypotheses, models and data collection in this chapter are identical to those presented in the previous chapter.³⁰ I will briefly review them here for the purposes of clarity of the latter presentation of the findings and discussion of the results. The hypotheses examined for the 109th and 110th sessions are as follows.

H₁ Latino Representatives will act more often to achieve pro-immigration, pro-education, and pro-labor legislation than Non-Latino Representatives.

H_{1b} The difference in representation acts between Latino and non-Latino members will be most evident in non-roll call legislative action.

H₂ Representatives with larger Latino constituencies will act more often to achieve pro-immigration, pro-education, and pro-labor legislation than representatives with smaller Latino constituencies, irrespective of the race or ethnicity of the representative.

H_{2b} The effect of Latino percentage on member actions will be greatest on non-roll call legislative actions.

H₃ There will be no substantive difference between Latino and non-Latino Representatives' actions in the area of social security, given its limited salience to the Latino community.

In the additional sessions, I utilized the same sample of 72 members that was used for the primary analysis of the 108th session. In instances where the member left Congress for any reason such as death, loss of election or retirement, I substituted the

³⁰ For a longer discussion of the details on the collection of data and coding, please refer to Chapter 3 pages 33-38.

subsequent member for that district.³¹ I elected to continue with the original sample and use substitutions, in order to provide consistency in the analyses by keeping as many variables as possible, such as district demographics, constant over time. By tracking the same districts over time, the findings are even stronger than if I had selected a new random sample for each additional session. By the 110th session there were also three additional new Latino members who won seats in the House of the Representatives. Albio Sires was nominated to replace Robert Menendez, who took over one of the New Jersey Senator positions when John Corzine became governor. John Salazar was elected in New Mexico. Finally, in a complicated case of redistricting in several Texas districts, Ciro Rodriguez lost his seat to Henry Cuellar.³²

The data was collected from the Library of Congress website, THOMAS, which houses the entire legislative record. Member behavior on roll call votes, bill introduction, bill co-sponsorship, and house resolutions were included in the data set. The four issue areas examined are immigration, education, labor and social security. As you may recall from the previous chapter, I selected three high salience issue and one low salience issues for the analysis. The first three policies are high salience issues to the Latino community where I argue members should be the most active if they have sizeable Latino populations within their constituency and/or the member is Latino. The fourth area, social security, is a low salience issue that was included as a

³¹ In the 109th session there were six substitutions. The members who left from the 108th sample were Calvin Dooley, William Lipinski, Ciro Rodriguez, Porter Goss, Jack Quinn, and Charles Stenholm. The new members were Jim Costa, Daniel Lipinski, Henry Cuellar, Connie Mack, Brian Higgins, and Chet Edwards. In the 110th session there were seven substitutions. The members who left from the 109th sample were Lane Evans, Jim Gibbons, Gil Gutcknecht, William Jenkins, Kim Kolbe, Robert Menendez and Henry Bonilla. The new members were Phil Hare, Dean Heller, Gabrielle Giffords, Tim Walz, David Davis, Ciro Rodriguez, and Albio Sires.

³² However, Ciro Rodriguez became a House member again in the 110th session when he ran against incumbent, Henry Bonilla, and beat him. All of these districts overlap in the San Antonio area. This case and variation among these Latino representatives is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, where I examine pairs of members.

control. Its inclusion in the previous analyses allowed me to offer a rebuttal to the argument that Latino representatives are either more active overall compared to other members, or more liberal. In my analysis of the 108th session, I found that there was no difference between Latino and non-Latino members on social security bills, thus providing strength to my argument that Latino representatives are only more active in policy areas of high salience to the Latino community.

Empirical Results

The statistical analysis utilized OLS regression since the dependent variables are approximately interval level and it was the method used in my analysis of the 108th session. I ran several sets of models to tease out the differences between roll call and non-roll call behavior. Additionally, the models were multi-staged and incorporated different sets of independent variables to distinguish between their effects. The standard set of independent variables in every model included party, age of member, years in office, gender, urban percentage, median income, and whether the district was in a border state.³³ The racial and ethnic related explanatory variables include the percentage of the district that is Latino, black or Asian and the race or ethnicity of a member. Model 1 refers to the models where only independent variables that are not related to any racial or ethnic demographics are included. In Model 2, I included the district demographics that included the racial and ethnic breakdown for the district. Model 3 comprises all of the above variables in addition to the race or ethnicity of the member. Finally, in Model 4 there is a distinction between non-Cuban Latino and Cubans in case the conservative bias of Cuban Latinos is skewing the results of the Latino representative variable in model 3. I will now proceed to present the findings from the 109th and 110th Sessions.

³³ For a longer discussion of the logic behind the inclusion of each explanatory variable, please refer to Chapter 3 pages 37-39.

109th Session

The 109th session of the U.S. House of Representatives took place from January 3, 2005 to January 3, 2007. The House was Republican controlled and termed the “Do-Nothing” Congress and the “Lamest of the Lame Duck” sessions by the media and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) due to the lack of real progress in any of the major policy areas.³⁴ Congress was only in session for 242 days which is the smallest amount of time since World War II, where the 80th session, 1947-1949 met for 256 days. The result of this inaction and limited time in session was observed in the data of this analysis since there was a significant drop in the number of bills in every policy area.

Across the four policy areas the roll call analysis for the 109th session was much more limited than in the 108th session. For both labor and social security, no actual floor votes took place in these areas. While a small number of votes was observed in the 108th session, a reduction to zero indicates that these issues were extremely low priority to the members at the time. The roll call models in Table 4.1 on immigration bills confirmed the findings of the previous sessions, where party was a dominant explanatory factor. Party was associated with 2 point increase in the number of times a member voted in favor of on immigration related bills. In contrast to the 108th session results, party was not a significant variable in explaining the outcomes on education roll call votes. However, this statistical result can be largely explained by the small number of votes, four, and the limited range of variation of actions on those four bills. The relative amount of agreement and consensus on the bills was much higher than in the previous analysis. The majority of members voted in favor of the

³⁴ Washington Post 12/3/06.

bills, thus limiting the degree to which party could be a significant explanatory variable.

Latino representative also has an effect with a 1.7 increase in votes in favor of immigration. This finding was not observed in the 108th session. While the coefficients of 2 and 1.7 seem small, they are actually significant given the range of votes. In this session only three roll call votes pertaining to immigration policies occurred which is in contrast to the seven that took place in the 108th session. Similar to the immigration roll call models, Latino representative is associated with a 1.5 increase in votes in favor of education and is significant at the 1% level in Table 4.2 above. The Latino representative finding across immigration and education roll call models, gives some support for the argument that even in roll call behavior, Latino constituents are better represented by Latino members of Congress than their non-Latino counterparts.

The non-roll call models of the 109th session have some similarities but also several interesting differences with the data from the 108th session. For immigration policy, party remains significant across all four models in Table 4.3 below, and is associated with a 4.3-4.4 increase in non-roll call actions in favor of immigration. This finding is not surprising given the Democratic Party's liberal platform on immigration compared to the conservative position of the Republican Party.

Table 4.1: Analysis of Immigration-Related Roll Call Actions (109th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	2.282** (0.510)	1.893** (0.473)	1.820** (0.470)	1.867** (0.519)
Years in Office	0.046 (0.036)	0.056+ (0.032)	0.068* (0.033)	0.067* (0.033)
Age	0.041 (0.029)	0.034 (0.026)	0.022 (0.027)	0.023 (0.027)
Male	-0.355 (0.488)	-0.271 (0.447)	-0.301 (0.478)	-0.302 (0.482)
Urban %	0.077** (0.017)	0.022 (0.020)	0.030 (0.020)	0.029 (0.021)
Median Income	-3.478e-05+ (1.898e-05)	9.024e-06 (2.372e-05)	1.032e-05 (2.453e-05)	9.375e-06 (2.509e-05)
Border State	0.071 (0.415)	-0.727 (0.460)	-0.586 (0.467)	-0.540 (0.514)
Latino %		0.048** (0.012)	0.020 (0.018)	0.020 (0.018)
Black %		0.043* (0.018)	0.023 (0.028)	0.023 (0.028)
Asian %		0.078* (0.037)	0.067+ (0.040)	0.067 (0.040)
Latino Rep.			1.662* (0.768)	
Black Rep.			1.259 (1.148)	1.248 (1.158)
Asian Rep.			1.239 (1.880)	1.215 (1.899)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				1.614* (0.804)
Cuban Rep.				1.836 (1.104)
Constant	-8.818** (2.409)	-7.283** (2.202)	-7.065** (2.298)	-7.011** (2.330)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.637	0.728	0.753	0.754

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4.2: Analysis of Education-Related Roll Call Actions (109th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	0.410 (0.279)	0.398 (0.287)	0.261 (0.265)	0.101 (0.288)
Years in Office	0.007 (0.020)	0.010 (0.019)	0.003 (0.018)	0.007 (0.018)
Age	0.007 (0.016)	0.006 (0.016)	0.012 (0.015)	0.010 (0.015)
Male	0.018 (0.267)	0.049 (0.271)	0.272 (0.269)	0.277 (0.267)
Urban %	0.000 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.002 (0.011)
Median Income	-2.155e-05* (1.039e-05)	-2.486e-06 (1.437e-05)	3.839e-06 (1.382e-05)	7.040e-06 (1.392e-05)
Border State	-0.326 (0.227)	-0.632* (0.279)	-0.484+ (0.263)	-0.640* (0.285)
Latino %		0.016* (0.007)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.010)
Black %		0.003 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.016)
Asian %		0.003 (0.022)	0.023 (0.022)	0.023 (0.022)
Latino Rep.			1.568** (0.433)	
Black Rep.			0.408 (0.646)	0.446 (0.642)
Asian Rep.			-1.986+ (1.059)	-1.903+ (1.053)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				1.732** (0.446)
Cuban Rep.				0.975 (0.612)
Constant	1.938 (1.319)	2.013 (1.334)	0.814 (1.295)	0.631 (1.292)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.137	0.207	0.379	0.398

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4.3: Analysis of Immigration-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (109th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	4.644** (0.934)	4.331** (0.938)	4.328** (0.958)	4.471** (1.058)
Years in Office	-0.068 (0.065)	-0.054 (0.063)	-0.030 (0.067)	-0.033 (0.068)
Age	0.054 (0.052)	0.059 (0.051)	0.037 (0.054)	0.038 (0.055)
Male	0.125 (0.894)	0.547 (0.885)	0.412 (0.974)	0.408 (0.981)
Urban %	0.074* (0.032)	0.031 (0.040)	0.036 (0.041)	0.034 (0.042)
Median Income	-4.481e-06 (3.473e-05)	2.792e-05 (4.698e-05)	2.914e-05 (5.001e-05)	2.628e-05 (5.112e-05)
Border State	-0.425 (0.760)	-1.961* (0.911)	-1.876+ (0.952)	-1.736 (1.048)
Latino %		0.051* (0.024)	0.025 (0.037)	0.023 (0.037)
Black %		-0.007 (0.036)	-0.044 (0.057)	-0.044 (0.057)
Asian %		0.125+ (0.073)	0.096 (0.081)	0.096 (0.082)
Latino Rep.			1.598 (1.566)	
Black Rep.			2.195 (2.339)	2.161 (2.360)
Asian Rep.			2.941 (3.833)	2.867 (3.868)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				1.451 (1.639)
Cuban Rep.				2.128 (2.249)
Constant	-10.527* (4.409)	-9.985* (4.362)	-8.930+ (4.685)	-8.766+ (4.746)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.496	0.557	0.575	0.576

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

One interesting difference is the role of the border state variable. I constructed a border state variable that designated whether a member came from a state that bordered Mexico. I included it because border politics might affect a member's actions despite other variables that might lead them to favor immigration politics such as party. In the 108th session, border state was never significant across any of the issue areas or any of the models within an area. However in this session, members from border states were associated with two additional acts that were anti-immigration. While in the roll call data, this negative finding would mean that members could either vote in favor of anti-immigration legislation or vote against pro-immigration legislation, this is not the translation for the non-roll call data. This data captures the sum total of deliberative acts by members to introduce and co-sponsor legislation. In other words, Congressman from border districts introduced or co-sponsored bills that were anti-immigration or supported house resolutions of that position. This finding indicates that something in the nature of border politics changed between the 108th and 109th sessions to lead to its stronger effect.

In contrast to the previous session, in the 109th session, Latino representative is not a significant variable across any of the models for non-roll call actions on immigration policy. Additionally, the percentage of Latinos in the district is also not significant across the models. Given the design of the models to incorporate additional racial and ethnic variable with each succeeding model and the strong results of the 108th session, these results are surprising. In Table 4.3 Model 2, where there are only the district demographics, the percentage of Latino is not significant. Then in Models 3 and 4 where the race of the representative is included, neither the percentage of Latinos nor a Latino representative is significant.

One possible explanation for the observation of the small coefficients and insignificant findings for each of the variables is multicollinearity between the two

variables. In essence, the presence of the two variables in this model makes it difficult for the statistical analysis to differentiate their individual effects and muddies the results. To test the strength of this hypothesis, I ran the Model 3 (the all inclusive model) again but this time dropped the other variable. When I ran Model 3 with either only Latino representative or the percentage of Latinos in the districts, each variable became significant. The potential problem of multicollinearity between these two variables is something I have been aware of from the start of this project, however in previous literature in this area the standard has been to include both variables in the model despite potential risks. The argument to support the inclusion of the two variables is that both factors are necessary to determine if non-Latino members become more responsive as the percent of Latino constituents in their district increases. Moreover, I conducted a test of the variation inflation factor (VIF) in the 108th session which assesses the relative problems posed by multicollinearity. The VIF was below 10, thus leading me not to be overly concerned. However in the 109th session, it appears to be a much more significant problem given the washing out of both variables. While I am uncertain of how to overcome this problem statistically, another way to gain some traction in this area is in the matching-style paired cases that I study in Chapter Five. I examine several districts and assess member behavior over time with the switch of members from a non-Latino to a Latino representative. I analyze how the actions of the two Congressmen compare given that the district demographics have remained nearly constant and the only variable that changed was the race or the ethnicity of the member.

Another possible reason for the limited Latino Representative finding was raised during the interviews that I conducted with the Hispanic Liaisons and Legislative Directors of various Latino Congressmen. I asked many questions regarding immigration legislation, bill introductions, co-sponsorships, proposals

during the 108th-110 sessions.³⁵ When asked what explained the significant decrease in bill introductions and co-sponsorships in the area of immigration, every respondent cited the role of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) in dictating the direction of immigration policy. Staff members indicated that the CHC had switched to a platform of comprehensive immigration reform and wanted to move away from ‘piecemeal’ attempts to reform the immigration system. Under this plan, the CHC asked members to only introduce and support bills that sought to improve the rights of immigrants, paths toward legalization for undocumented immigrants, increasing the allowances for guest workers, and some security measures for border control. The push for broad-based reform became even stronger during this particular session due to the immigration rights protests that took place in March 2006. Most of the CHC members who had been quite active on non-roll call immigration related bills in the 108th session dramatically reduced their participation levels in the 109th. However, when broad-based bills were introduced, these members were active supporters. In essence the role of the CHC in shaping immigration legislation skewed the statistical results to make it appear as if being a Latino Representative had no effect on immigration policy.

In the analysis of non-roll call behavior on education policy the results were mixed compared to the 108th session. Being a Democrat remained a strong predictor for promoting education bills and was associated with a 10 point increase in the R-score. However, similar to immigration policy in the 109th, the finding that a Latino Representative resulted in more substantive representation in the 108th session was not observed in the 109th session. In fact, none of the other independent variables were

³⁵ Methodological details regarding the interviews including the questionnaire, sample will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. In Chapter Five, I utilize various types of data and research to probe more deeply the quantitative results and findings. The questionnaire is available in the Appendix on page 147.

significant besides party. The findings are presented in Table 4.4 below. The additional analysis on the 110th session also revealed the same non-finding for Latino Representative. These results have led me to revise my previous argument that Latino constituents are best served by Latino representatives in the area of education. While education is rated consistently as the most important issue to Latinos, it is also ranked as an important issue to non-Latino constituents, particularly Democrats. Thus, it is not surprising that Democrats are extremely active in this area and offer the best representation in this area not just in terms of raw participation but the largest ability to actually pass legislation given the size of the Democratic Party.

The results for labor policy in the 109th session are very similar to the 108th and are presented in Table 4.5 below. Once again party is a strong and significant coefficient with a 5.3 increase in the R-Score. In Models 3 and 4 that include the entire spectrum of race and ethnicity based variables, the percent Latino and black are significant, however the coefficients are very small. Latino Representative is significant and results in 3 additional acts in support of labor. Similar to the 108th results, in Model 4 which distinguishes between Cuban and non-Cuban Latinos, the effect of a Non- Cuban Latino is even stronger than the Latino Representative in Model 3. The analysis of this group of data mirrors the results from both of the 108th samples. Thus, my argument that Latino representatives offer greater substantive representation in the area of labor policy than non-Latinos members is bolstered by this additional analysis.

Table 4.4: Analysis of Education-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (109th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	10.144** (1.881)	10.477** (2.007)	10.327** (2.052)	10.253** (2.267)
Years in Office	-0.120 (0.132)	-0.118 (0.135)	-0.100 (0.143)	-0.098 (0.146)
Age	0.190+ (0.105)	0.193+ (0.109)	0.174 (0.116)	0.174 (0.118)
Male	2.365 (1.800)	2.455 (1.894)	2.832 (2.084)	2.834 (2.102)
Urban %	0.098 (0.065)	0.109 (0.085)	0.128 (0.088)	0.129 (0.090)
Median Income	1.598e-05 (6.996e-05)	2.965e-05 (1.005e-04)	5.175e-05 (1.071e-04)	5.321e-05 (1.095e-04)
Border State	-0.853 (1.530)	-1.193 (1.949)	-0.985 (2.039)	-1.056 (2.246)
Latino %		0.005 (0.050)	-0.066 (0.078)	-0.065 (0.080)
Black %		-0.042 (0.078)	-0.124 (0.122)	-0.124 (0.123)
Asian %		-0.050 (0.157)	-0.050 (0.174)	-0.050 (0.176)
Latino Rep.			4.395 (3.352)	
Black Rep.			4.812 (5.008)	4.830 (5.056)
Asian Rep.			-0.601 (8.205)	-0.563 (8.289)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				4.470 (3.511)
Cuban Rep.				4.123 (4.819)
Constant	-17.755* (8.881)	-19.137* (9.334)	-19.989+ (10.029)	-20.073+ (10.170)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.484	0.488	0.508	0.508

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4.5: Analysis of Labor-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (109th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	5.308** (0.770)	5.281** (0.813)	5.073** (0.810)	4.775** (0.890)
Years in Office	0.021 (0.054)	0.019 (0.055)	0.032 (0.056)	0.039 (0.057)
Age	0.041 (0.043)	0.052 (0.044)	0.041 (0.046)	0.037 (0.046)
Male	-0.469 (0.737)	-0.256 (0.767)	-0.280 (0.823)	-0.271 (0.825)
Urban %	0.031 (0.026)	0.051 (0.035)	0.068+ (0.035)	0.072* (0.035)
Median Income	3.523e-06 (2.866e-05)	-2.972e-05 (4.073e-05)	-3.044e-05 (4.226e-05)	-2.450e-05 (4.300e-05)
Border State	-0.521 (0.627)	-0.692 (0.790)	-0.353 (0.805)	-0.643 (0.882)
Latino %		-0.016 (0.020)	-0.070* (0.031)	-0.067* (0.031)
Black %		-0.031 (0.032)	-0.045 (0.048)	-0.046 (0.048)
Asian %		0.049 (0.064)	0.042 (0.069)	0.043 (0.069)
Latino Rep.			3.073* (1.323)	
Black Rep.			1.076 (1.977)	1.146 (1.984)
Asian Rep.			1.159 (3.239)	1.312 (3.253)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				3.377* (1.378)
Cuban Rep.				1.970 (1.891)
Constant	-5.036 (3.639)	-5.494 (3.781)	-5.713 (3.959)	-6.053 (3.992)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.595	0.607	0.642	0.646

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4.6: Analysis of Social Security-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (109th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	1.144*	1.346**	1.459**	1.266*
	(0.440)	(0.462)	(0.474)	(0.521)
Years in Office	0.041	0.040	0.040	0.045
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Age	0.021	0.019	0.018	0.016
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Male	0.191	0.104	0.186	0.192
	(0.421)	(0.436)	(0.482)	(0.483)
Urban %	0.005	0.014	0.007	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Median Income	2.228e-05	2.937e-05	3.560e-05	3.945e-05
	(1.635e-05)	(2.314e-05)	(2.475e-05)	(2.515e-05)
Border State	0.001	0.177	-0.000	-0.188
	(0.358)	(0.449)	(0.471)	(0.516)
Latino %		-0.004	0.012	0.015
		(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Black %		-0.009	-0.027	-0.027
		(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Asian %		-0.055	-0.056	-0.055
		(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Latino Rep.			-0.814	
			(0.775)	
Black Rep.			0.862	0.907
			(1.158)	(1.161)
Asian Rep.			-0.378	-0.279
			(1.897)	(1.903)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				-0.616
				(0.806)
Cuban Rep.				-1.528
				(1.106)
Constant	-1.129	-1.705	-1.537	-1.758
	(2.076)	(2.148)	(2.319)	(2.335)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.261	0.289	0.311	0.320

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Finally in the last issue area, social security, which was the low salience Latino issue area, the only significant variable was party. Being a Democrat resulted in a member supporting an additional 1.3 acts in favor of social security. While the coefficient might appear to be quite small, it is important to recognize that the range of actions in this area is not very large compared to other areas.³⁶ None of the racial or ethnicity based variables are significant. These findings are analogous to those of the 108th session. This provides robustness to my argument that Latino representatives are not merely more active and more liberal members than non-Latino members, rather they specifically differentiate themselves on high salience issue to the Latino population. I will now turn to my discussion of the 110th session and how those results compare to the original analysis performed on the 108th session data. See Table 4.6 above for the results of the social security bills.

110th Session

The 110th session of the U.S. House of Representatives spanned from January 3, 2007 to January 3, 2009 during the final two years of former President George W. Bush's eight year reign. In contrast to the previous sessions, this is the first session in my analysis that Congress was controlled by the Democratic Party in both the House and Senate. During this session Nancy Pelosi became the first House Speaker that was a woman. During the entire session, the presidential campaign dominated the political discussion in the media culminating in the election of Democrat, Barak Obama in November 2008. One critical event during this session was the downward turn in the economic climate, massive loss of jobs and rise in unemployment. The economic

³⁶ In the 109th session there were a total of 39 bill introductions, co-sponsorships, and house resolutions in social security. Compare this range to that of education where there was a total of 109 actions in non roll call behavior.

crisis has continued to persist and has undoubtedly shaped the actions of members in the latter half of the 110th session and the analysis of this term.

Similar to the 108th across both education and labor roll call votes, in the 110th session roll call models party was a significant variable, as seen in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 below. In education, being a Democrat was associated with between a 2.5 and 3 point difference in votes in favor of education. On bills related to labor that effect was even stronger with a coefficient of 5.8 and 6.4 depending on which model is examined. Border state resulted in roughly 1-1.6 less actions in favor of labor policy, thus giving potential credence to the argument made by Borjas (1999) that people in high immigrant areas may feel threatened by the labor flow of unskilled foreign workers. No roll call votes occurred on social security, thus making it impossible to offer a robustness check on the finding from the 108th session social security roll call behavior finding.

The push for reforms, divisiveness over the issue, and the CHC platform led to a halt of any serious progress in immigration policy. In the 110th session only a single immigration bill came up for a house vote and it was a bill on immigrant smuggling in which almost all members voted in favor. The result was that none of the variables in the analysis were significant.³⁷ The precipitous decline in the number of bills coming to the house floor is indicative of not only the strength of the CHC in cajoling its members into a unified position, but also the division in the House over the issue. The inability to come to a consensus over what should be done about immigration policy and divided public opinion prevented members from making any headway in this area.

³⁷ There was extremely limited variation in member behavior, thus leading to no relevant variables. Due to a sample size of 1 vote, I also ran a logit analysis since it is the most appropriate tool of analysis in such instances. For all cases in which there was only 1 vote, I ran logit analysis and there was no substantive change in the results. For the purposes of uniformity in presentation of results, I elected to present the OLS tables for all models given that there was no observable difference in the OLS and logit results.

Table 4.7: Analysis of Education-Related Roll Call Actions (110th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	2.522** (0.522)	2.461** (0.518)	2.498** (0.536)	2.976** (0.568)
Years in Office	-0.002 (0.036)	0.008 (0.035)	0.006 (0.037)	0.009 (0.036)
Age	0.017 (0.028)	0.009 (0.027)	0.011 (0.030)	0.010 (0.029)
Male	-0.409 (0.484)	-0.337 (0.476)	-0.444 (0.524)	-0.472 (0.510)
Urban %	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.038+ (0.022)	-0.041+ (0.023)	-0.047* (0.023)
Median Income	-1.702e-05 (1.932e-05)	1.449e-05 (2.627e-05)	8.837e-06 (2.819e-05)	-2.072e-06 (2.790e-05)
Border State	-0.222 (0.427)	-1.017* (0.505)	-1.054+ (0.537)	-0.616 (0.562)
Latino %		0.034* (0.013)	0.044* (0.021)	0.040+ (0.020)
Black %		0.003 (0.021)	0.017 (0.032)	0.017 (0.031)
Asian %		0.043 (0.040)	0.039 (0.045)	0.039 (0.044)
Latino Rep.			-0.676 (0.901)	
Black Rep.			-0.792 (1.321)	-0.891 (1.285)
Asian Rep.			0.704 (2.154)	0.645 (2.094)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				-1.188 (0.909)
Cuban Rep.				1.121 (1.223)
Constant	5.738* (2.314)	6.712** (2.323)	6.976** (2.510)	7.675** (2.463)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.352	0.431	0.440	0.479

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4.8: Analysis of Labor-Related Roll Call Actions (110th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	5.831** (0.493)	5.862** (0.475)	5.876** (0.493)	6.483** (0.505)
Years in Office	0.015 (0.034)	0.027 (0.032)	0.032 (0.034)	0.036 (0.032)
Age	0.004 (0.026)	-0.006 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.027)	-0.010 (0.026)
Male	-0.213 (0.457)	-0.149 (0.436)	-0.144 (0.483)	-0.178 (0.453)
Urban %	0.013 (0.016)	-0.020 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.021)	-0.028 (0.020)
Median Income	-3.702e-06 (1.825e-05)	3.728e-05 (2.407e-05)	3.901e-05 (2.597e-05)	2.515e-05 (2.479e-05)
Border State	-0.717+ (0.403)	-1.604** (0.463)	-1.620** (0.495)	-1.064* (0.500)
Latino %		0.039** (0.012)	0.037+ (0.019)	0.030+ (0.018)
Black %		-0.004 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.030)	-0.014 (0.028)
Asian %		0.022 (0.037)	0.018 (0.042)	0.019 (0.039)
Latino Rep.			0.169 (0.830)	
Black Rep.			0.551 (1.217)	0.424 (1.142)
Asian Rep.			0.360 (1.984)	0.284 (1.861)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				-0.482 (0.808)
Cuban Rep.				2.452* (1.087)
Constant	-1.982 (2.186)	-1.277 (2.128)	-1.102 (2.312)	-0.214 (2.188)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.761	0.803	0.804	0.830

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

In non-roll call behavior, party has a significant and sizeable effect across all three salient policy areas. In immigration, the effect results in a 5 point difference in additional bills co-sponsored or introduced. For labor policy, the role of party is comparable, resulting in around a 6 point difference in the R-score. For education, being a Democrat results in roughly a 3 point increase in participatory acts. Similar to the other sessions, it is not unexpected that being a Democrat results in more actions in favor of these three areas, given their liberal orientation. Refer to Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 below for the results for each policy area.

The more intriguing results lie in the role of other variables across the policy areas. In Table 4.9, Model 1 of immigration policy, which does not incorporate any racial or ethnically related variables, border state once again, emerges as a significant variable with a 2.8 increase in the R-score. However, this effect washes out in Model 2 and is replaced by a small effect of Latino percentage. In models 3 and 4 which incorporate the racial and ethnic characteristics of the district and the member of Congress, Latino Representative emerges as a significant variable with a sizeable impact of a 4.8 increase in non-roll call actions in favor of representation. It should also be noted that Asian Representative is significant, however in this sample there is only one Asian member, Michael Honda, thus we can only draw very limited conclusions from this result. In contrast, in labor non-roll actions, the only significant variable is party which results in a 5 point difference in the representation score.

Party is also a dominant explanatory variable in non-roll behavior on education policy, resulting in approximately an 11 point increase in actions. Seniority of a member results in a -0.6 decrease in member actions. Similar to the results from the 108th session, in Models 3 and 4, Black Representative is associated with a large effect of 13.8 and is just above significance at the .05 level. Latino Representative is not

significant, thus confirming the previous 109th session result. The effect of Black Representative is even stronger than party and provides some evidence that Latinos may be best represented by black members of Congress, rather than Democrats or Latino members.

Recall the inclusion of social security as a fourth, non-salient issue area as a control for the salient policy areas of immigration, education, and labor. If a member is a Democrat, the result is a 1.5 increase in actions in favor of social security, as seen in Table 4.12 below. None of the other variables were significant. This social security non-finding provides additional support for my argument that Latino representatives are not simply more liberal and more active than other members, rather they specifically target their legislative actions in areas of importance to the Latino community.

Discussion

The purpose of this further discussion is to examine the broader trends across all three sessions and determine the implications of the findings across the three sessions on the arguments I made in Chapter Three. I argued that Latino members of Congress provided more substantive representative in the areas of immigration, education, and labor than their non-Latino counterparts. This difference was evident in non-roll behavior and would have been obscured by an analysis of roll call votes alone. Furthermore, I argued that Latino representatives were not simply more active and liberal than other members and provided the case of social security policy to support my argument. I will examine each issue area and assess whether Latino constituents are better served by Latino members and differences in roll call and non-roll behavior.

Table 4.9: Analysis of Immigration-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (110th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	5.236** (1.103)	5.362** (1.065)	5.160** (1.015)	5.178** (1.117)
Years in Office	-0.155* (0.076)	-0.128+ (0.071)	-0.065 (0.071)	-0.065 (0.071)
Age	0.109+ (0.059)	0.080 (0.056)	0.028 (0.056)	0.028 (0.057)
Male	0.666 (1.022)	0.649 (0.979)	0.166 (0.992)	0.165 (1.001)
Urban %	0.108** (0.036)	0.028 (0.046)	0.046 (0.044)	0.046 (0.044)
Median Income	-5.485e-05 (4.083e-05)	5.445e-05 (5.400e-05)	4.277e-05 (5.340e-05)	4.235e-05 (5.482e-05)
Border State	2.827** (0.902)	1.103 (1.039)	1.678 (1.018)	1.694 (1.105)
Latino %		0.090** (0.027)	0.009 (0.039)	0.009 (0.040)
Black %		0.008 (0.042)	-0.016 (0.061)	-0.016 (0.062)
Asian %		0.001 (0.083)	-0.063 (0.085)	-0.063 (0.086)
Latino Rep.			4.807** (1.707)	
Black Rep.			1.941 (2.502)	1.937 (2.526)
Asian Rep.			7.376+ (4.080)	7.374+ (4.115)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				4.788** (1.787)
Cuban Rep.				4.876* (2.404)
Constant	-14.105** (4.889)	-12.497* (4.774)	-9.850* (4.754)	-9.824* (4.839)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.585	0.655	0.712	0.712

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4.10: Analysis of Education-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (110th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	11.190** (2.969)	10.945** (3.109)	11.211** (3.062)	11.389** (3.369)
Years in Office	-0.787** (0.203)	-0.765** (0.207)	-0.596** (0.213)	-0.595** (0.215)
Age	0.529** (0.159)	0.508** (0.164)	0.365* (0.170)	0.365* (0.171)
Male	3.014 (2.751)	3.172 (2.857)	2.587 (2.995)	2.577 (3.021)
Urban %	0.181+ (0.096)	0.093 (0.133)	0.102 (0.131)	0.100 (0.134)
Median Income	9.114e-06 (1.099e-04)	8.718e-05 (1.576e-04)	1.067e-04 (1.612e-04)	1.026e-04 (1.654e-04)
Border State	-0.023 (2.428)	-1.966 (3.030)	-1.951 (3.071)	-1.788 (3.334)
Latino %		0.086 (0.079)	-0.012 (0.118)	-0.014 (0.120)
Black %		0.020 (0.123)	-0.217 (0.185)	-0.217 (0.186)
Asian %		0.124 (0.241)	-0.061 (0.258)	-0.061 (0.260)
Latino Rep.			6.991 (5.151)	
Black Rep.			13.818+ (7.551)	13.781+ (7.620)
Asian Rep.			17.538 (12.311)	17.515 (12.416)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				6.800 (5.391)
Cuban Rep.				7.661 (7.254)
Constant	-34.269* (13.161)	-31.397* (13.930)	-23.927 (14.346)	-23.667 (14.601)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.428	0.442	0.501	0.501

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4.11 Analysis of Labor-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (110th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	5.012** (0.940)	5.129** (0.994)	5.048** (1.026)	4.663** (1.122)
Years in Office	-0.055 (0.064)	-0.053 (0.066)	-0.034 (0.071)	-0.037 (0.072)
Age	0.067 (0.050)	0.069 (0.053)	0.053 (0.057)	0.054 (0.057)
Male	-0.376 (0.871)	-0.349 (0.914)	-0.567 (1.003)	-0.545 (1.006)
Urban %	0.045 (0.030)	0.054 (0.043)	0.060 (0.044)	0.065 (0.045)
Median Income	-6.321e-06 (3.479e-05)	-6.111e-06 (5.040e-05)	-1.389e-05 (5.399e-05)	-5.091e-06 (5.507e-05)
Border State	-0.559 (0.769)	-0.600 (0.969)	-0.376 (1.029)	-0.729 (1.110)
Latino %		-0.003 (0.025)	-0.028 (0.040)	-0.025 (0.040)
Black %		-0.016 (0.039)	-0.011 (0.062)	-0.011 (0.062)
Asian %		-0.021 (0.077)	-0.041 (0.086)	-0.042 (0.087)
Latino Rep.			1.459 (1.726)	
Black Rep.			-0.051 (2.530)	0.029 (2.537)
Asian Rep.			2.620 (4.125)	2.668 (4.134)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				1.872 (1.795)
Cuban Rep.				0.010 (2.415)
Constant	-4.526 (4.167)	-5.097 (4.456)	-4.200 (4.806)	-4.764 (4.862)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.469	0.471	0.481	0.488

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4.12: Analysis of Social Security-Related Non-Roll Call Actions (110th)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Democrat	1.248** (0.443)	1.531** (0.447)	1.434** (0.460)	1.587** (0.504)
Years in Office	-0.036 (0.030)	-0.029 (0.030)	-0.035 (0.032)	-0.034 (0.032)
Age	0.011 (0.024)	0.009 (0.024)	0.014 (0.026)	0.014 (0.026)
Male	-0.287 (0.411)	-0.296 (0.411)	-0.269 (0.450)	-0.278 (0.452)
Urban %	-0.004 (0.014)	0.005 (0.019)	0.009 (0.020)	0.007 (0.020)
Median Income	-3.002e-05+ (1.641e-05)	-1.359e-05 (2.267e-05)	-1.541e-05 (2.421e-05)	-1.890e-05 (2.473e-05)
Border State	-0.085 (0.363)	-0.205 (0.436)	-0.062 (0.461)	0.078 (0.499)
Latino %		0.004 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.018)
Black %		-0.026 (0.018)	-0.010 (0.028)	-0.010 (0.028)
Asian %		-0.064+ (0.035)	-0.053 (0.039)	-0.052 (0.039)
Latino Rep.			0.547 (0.774)	
Black Rep.			-0.853 (1.135)	-0.884 (1.139)
Asian Rep.			-0.959 (1.850)	-0.978 (1.857)
Latino (non-Cuban) Rep.				0.384 (0.806)
Cuban Rep.				1.121 (1.085)
Constant	2.707 (1.965)	1.626 (2.004)	1.131 (2.155)	1.354 (2.183)
Observations	73	73	73	73
R-squared	0.200	0.275	0.293	0.300

Standard errors in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Immigration

Immigration politics and policy is an area very intimately tied to the Latino community, given their historical experience as immigrants. In this area, I expected to see the most obvious difference between Latino and non-Latino members given that this issue is squarely within the Latino policy domain and one where many Latino constituents seek help with casework from their representatives. As previously noted, the landscape of immigration and politics has evolved and changed considerably during the time period of this analysis from 2003 to 2009. Pushes for a broader guest worker program, amnesty for undocumented people and a path towards legalization, and militarization of the border have all become increasingly salient. Schisms within and between the parties as well as the Executive Branch have lead to minimal actual progress in the area. The force of the immigrant rights movement was visualized during the marches across the U.S. in spring 2006 that drew millions of participants. Latinos around the country resoundingly pronounced their support for comprehensive immigration reform and marched for freedom and equal rights. The result was increased media attention towards the issue and a unified push by the Congressional Hispanic Caucus for comprehensive reform, though little substantive progress occurred in the House. Several versions of comprehensive immigration bills were introduced, but none successfully navigated the entire legislative process to culminate in a floor vote.

How then does this history of immigration politics mesh with the results of the quantitative analysis and my arguments? For both the 108th and 110th sessions, Latino representative did offer more substantive representation than their non-Latino counterparts in the arena of non-roll call behavior. However, in the 109th session, this effect was not observed. As argued previously, this non-finding was likely a result of the increasing tensions over immigration politics that culminated in the protests in

2006 during the 109th session. The unified position of the CHC led Latino members to temporarily reduce their introduction of less comprehensive immigration-related bills. It should be noted that once it became clear that comprehensive immigration reform was going to be a long and difficult battle, in the 110th session Latino members started to introduce more immigration bills again.³⁸ Moreover, the number the actual immigration bills that came to the floor for a vote consistently declined through the sample from 7 votes in 108th session to 3 in the 109th to 1 in the 110th.

Another interesting change over the period of analysis is the emergence of whether a member is from a border state becoming a relevant explanatory variable. Originally the variable was included because members could either be more adamantly pro-immigration because of the large portion of their constituency that is immigrant-based, or be more anti-immigration because of nativist concerns over the increasing dominance of immigrant issues in their district. While in the 108th session, there was no observed effect, in both of the latter sessions the border state variable became a significant and in some models was negative and associated with less actions in favor of immigration. During this period, the rise of the organization of the Minutemen Project, where citizens policed the border for illegal crossings, brought increased negative media attention towards the issues. Additionally, raids and deportations of undocumented people by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services started to become a more frequent occurrence. The change in the role this variable plays is also most likely the result of the changing political atmosphere of immigration politics that became increasingly more hostile towards undocumented immigrants. Given the historical background underlying the empirical results, I would still argue

³⁸ This argument is supported not only by the legislative record but also was expressed in various interviews with staff members of Latino representatives.

that Latino representatives provide more substantive representation to Latino constituents than their non-Latino constituents on immigration policy.

Education

Education policy is consistently ranked as one of the top issues in general public opinion surveys (NES, PEW, GSS) and is always ranked as the most important issue to the Latino community (LNS, Pew Hispanic Research Survey). Accordingly, I expected that Latino members of Congress would actively pursue legislation in this area reflecting the importance of the issue to their Latino constituents. The results, however, have been quite mixed. In the 108th session, Latino representatives were more active than non-Latinos, however in both the 109th and 110th session, this difference is not observed. Instead, the one consistent variable across all three sessions was party. Being a Democrat resulted in greater substantive representation and often resulted in significant increases in pro-education actions. However, this finding is not unforeseen given the lengthy history of education as a dominate issue in the Democratic Party's platform.

One fascinating and unexpected finding concerns the effect of a black representative. From both public opinion surveys and the black representation literature, it has been established that like Latinos, education is a top priority for the African American community (Cannon 1999, NES). While it could have been anticipated the black members of Congress would be fairly active in this area, it was unpredictable for the effect observed in the 108th and 110th sessions to be as strong as party and have more explanatory power than whether a member is a Latino representative. While the results of this finding are not consistent across all three sessions and the number of black members in the sample is limited to six, the results are thought-provoking nonetheless.

In the race and representation literature there is an underlying assumption that descriptive representation most often results in the greatest substantive representation, however this issue area provides evidence to the contrary. In fact, Latino constituents may be better off with Democrats than Latino representatives, but they also might be as equally well served by black members. The idea of minority groups being better served by Democrats rather than individual members from their group is by no means novel. In fact, it is often suggested that minority members are outliers within the chamber and have limited ability to form coalitions, which means the presence of majority minority districts may paradoxically dilute the overall influence of the minority group (Lublin 1999). However, the suggestion that they might be best served by a different minority group is unique and offers new implications for the idea of coalitions between minority groups and the drawing of district lines. In the end, the take away message from the education analysis is that Latinos are best served by either Democrats or possibly black members of Congress. Education policy is an area where the mantra of descriptive representation always leads to the best substantive outcome is not accurate.

Labor

Traditionally labor policy is an issue area that neither receives significant amounts of attention in any given session of Congress nor is often covered extensively by the media. Instead broader economic based-bills regarding macroeconomic and tax policies are usually the focus of legislative action. Labor is typically a standard issue in which the Democratic Party is in favor of positive labor changes and workers rights. However, during periods of economic crisis, the public becomes more concerned with issues of unemployment, wages, and job growth. By late 2008 it was clear that the U.S. economy was beginning to slope downward with an increase in the unemployment rate (6.1% Sept 08) and inflation starting to rise (5.4% Aug 08)

(Lewis-Beck 2009). The economic climate continued to deteriorate with the September 2008 crash through 2009 with an increasing number of home foreclosures, declining value in stock shares, rapidly increasing unemployment. The salience of economic-related policy and awareness of the status of economic indicators dramatically increased among the general public during the 2008 election season (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2009). The growing importance of policies within the economic realm is reflected in my analysis of the legislative record. In the 108th and 109th sessions, very few labor-related bills made it to a floor vote in the house. However, in the 110th session, which occurred during the start of the economic decline and the crash in the fall of 2008, the number of bills rapidly increased from zero roll calls in the 109th to five in the 110th.

During periods of low salience to the general public at large, such as the 108th and 109th sessions, Latino legislators were considerably more active than non-Latino representatives on non-roll call actions such as bill co- sponsorship and introduction. I argue this is because labor concerns have always been at the forefront of the issues that most directly affect Latino constituents given the economic dependence on segments of the Latino community to provide work in the agricultural, hotel, and service industries (Waldinger and Lichter 2003). However, when there is a significant boost in media attention towards the increasingly dire economic situation, representatives at large, particularly Democrats, are forced to treat labor policy as a high salience issue. The issue becomes very important to constituents and members must respond in kind or risk political alienation as consequences of inactivity.

In my analysis of the 110th session of non-roll call behavior, the effect of a Latino representative is no longer observed. Rather, party becomes the dominant explanatory variable to predict positive actions in favor of labor legislation. I am hesitant to conclude that this means that Latinos are equally served by Democrats

given the findings for the 108th and 109th sessions which demonstrate distinct differences in behavior between Latino and non-Latino members. The economic crisis of 2008 should be treated as an external shock that makes the results from the 110th session muddled. Drawing a conclusion on this issue must be reserved for a period of increased economic stability where the issue becomes less salient overall. If we observe that during a future period of low salience, Democrats are equally as active as Latino members of Congress, then we can conclude that the 110th session marks a distinct change by Democrats in this issue area. However, if Democrats return to their previously limited activity in this area, then we must conclude that the behavior observed in the 110th session was a response to a powerful external stimulus. In other words, the jury is still out on whether Latinos need Latino members of Congress to get the most substantive representation for labor policy, but I would be inclined to say that is the most probable outcome.

Social Security

Of the four issues areas in this study, social security is the least salient issue area to the public at large and one of particularly low salience to the Latino community. Its inclusion in this analysis was intended to serve as a control to determine if Latino members of Congress were simply more active or more liberal than other members. Across all three sessions, there was no observed impact of a Latino representative on legislative behavior in this area. This non-finding provides strong evidence for my argument that Latino members are only more active in issue of high salience to Latino community. They are in essence quite responsive to the concerns of their constituents and offer greater substantive representation than non-Latino members. The only significant variable in my analysis of social security was that of party. Being a Democrat consistently led to additional non-roll call actions in favor of social security and more roll call votes supporting social security bills.

One other interesting side note is that not only is this a low salience issue but over time the number of social security roll call votes has also declined from two bills in the 108th session to zero in both the 109th and 110th session. This policy area has been reduced to complete inaction despite what many economists argue is a system that is in serious jeopardy. While the immediate policy concerns are that of unemployment, job creation and housing stability, eventually legislators will have to turn to more long-term economic policy concerns. Sadly, one of the particularly damaging consequences of the downturn has been the effect on the private retirement accounts of individual citizens. Consequently, the public may increase their attention towards the government-supported Social Security retirement program to ensure the system will still be functioning and available when they need it. It will be interesting to see if this pattern of decline continues to be observed, or rather in a similar manner to labor policy, a period of increased legislative activity will occur due to external pressures.

Roll Call v. Non-Roll Call behavior

One of the primary arguments that I made in the previous empirical chapter was the need to examine not only roll call behavior but also non-roll actions. My argument was based on two facts. First, practically speaking a very small percentage of a member's action within the legislative chamber involves actual voting on bills. This is mostly due to the lengthy process a bill must undergo before it comes up for a floor vote and disagreements between the various bureaucracies within the house on the exact version of any given bill (Davidson and Olezek 2007). Second, in my analysis of the three salient Latino public policy areas, the examination of non-roll call behavior revealed a key explanatory variable, whether a member is Latino, which would have otherwise been obscured if I had only focused on roll call behavior.

After examining in close detail the actions of members in the 109th and 110th session, I believe there is even stronger evidence to support my argument that non-roll call behavior should be examined in order to get the most accurate view of representation. First, I observed a decline in roll call votes across all of the areas during certain sessions. The smaller number of total observations of roll calls would provide a very limited perspective on the relevant policy area given that in non-roll call behavior there were still plenty of actions taking place. Second, in all of my roll call models, the only variable that consistently is significant and has a sizeable effect is that of party. However, in the non-roll call models several variables are also important. For example, Latino representative is significant in many models and has implications for descriptive representation. Likewise, in some of the education models, black representatives also have important effects that have implications for coordination between minority members. Additionally, whether a member is from a border state can result in negative actions in a given area, which demonstrates some of the pressures that members may feel in high immigrant areas. All of these variables have important substantive implications for politics and policy, and thus it would be unfortunate not to recognize their broader impact.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an extensive form of robustness checks by examining member actions across two additional sessions of Congress. The result has been a confirmation of my argument that Latinos are best served by Latino legislators on immigration and labor policies. However, in the area of education, Latinos may be best represented by Democrat or black members of Congress. On social security bills, the low salience issue to Latinos, Democrats offer the greatest substantive representation. Finally, examination of non- roll call behavior in the three salient issues revealed important variables that were hidden in the roll call models.

CHAPTER 5

STYLES OF REPRESENTATION: HOW MEMBERS OF SIMILAR CONSTITUENCIES BEHAVE IN DIFFERENT WAYS

Introduction

In this final substantive chapter, I utilize several case studies, paired comparisons, and data obtained from interviews with the staffs of Latino members to assess varying representation styles. The analysis presented here is intended to further differentiate between the actions of members of Congress representing sizeable Latino constituencies. The first set of cases will examine differences in behavior between Latino and non-Latino representatives to evaluate additional ways in which their behavior might vary. Drawing on the quantitative analysis from the previous two chapters, I revisit the claims I made previously regarding the substantive representation of Latinos. In the latter portion of the chapter, I move away from the Latino vs. non-Latino comparisons to evaluate within group differences among Latino members. In what ways are their actions similar and in what ways do they think differently about their Latino identity and their relationship with the Latino community? Finally, based on the quantitative and qualitative analyses, I draw some conclusions about which members have best served the Latino community and their policy interests.

Latino versus Non-Latino Members

One potential methodological concern that is raised by some scholars in response to my quantitative analysis is why I did not adopt a matching estimation model to examine member behavior. In his foundational pieces on frameworks for causal models, Rubin developed what is now commonly known as the Rubin Causal Model. (Rubin 1974, 1990). One of the necessary components of causal models is that there are treatments that are assigned to units in the study. By definition a treatment

must be something that conceptually is able to be manipulated. For example, patients in Group A receive a drug treatment and patients in Group B were not given the medicine. However, qualities such as race or age cannot be thought of as being able to be manipulated and randomly assigned to people in a similar manner. Due to this requirement, I decided not to employ a matching estimation model, since the treatment in my research project is whether a member is Latino or not and its effect on member behavior. Given the appeal of matching techniques, I offer this informal and rudimentary examination using paired comparisons on various shared characteristics of members and a case where a district switched from a non-Latino to a Latino representative to explore variation in behavior.

Paired Comparisons

In this section, I employ the sample of all Latino and non-Latino representatives with sizeable Latino constituencies to compare and assess their actions across non-roll call behavior. The aim is to examine more qualitatively their legislative records to determine the ways in which Latinos and non-Latinos operate differently to serve the Latino community. Recall that the statistical results, on average, indicated that Latino representatives were considerably more active in salient policy areas than non-Latinos, irrespective of the size of the Latino population in their district. I begin with a brief presentation of three examples of paired members from the 108th and 109th sessions. Then, I will discuss a case study of two members who represented the same district in California, one who was not Latino and the current member, who is Latino. The cases for the paired comparison were selected randomly using Stata, but I limited the sample to members with percent Latino in the district within a specified range. To compare a Latino member with 70% Latinos to a non-Latino with only 20% Latinos in their district, presents a serious bias in case selection in favor of my arguments. Thus,

for the purposes of equal comparison, I only examine two members' actions that have similar Latino populations.

The first case to be explored is that of Joe Baca (D) from CA and Calvin Dooley (D) from CA. Both members are Democrats with nearly 60% of their district composed of Latinos. Joe Baca represents the 43rd district, an interior area in Southern California that includes Ontario, Rialto, and San Bernardino. Dooley represents the 20th district which is a central interior district that is based in Fresno. Joe Baca, the Latino representative, is considerably more active across the salient policy areas of immigration, education, and labor than his non-Latino counterpart. He has approximately three times the number of actions in each area than Representative Dooley. It should be noted that both members are Democrats, so this is not simply a case of partisan differences but rather ethnicity-based differences that explain the variation in their actions despite comparable Latino constituencies. The exact number of actions in each area is presented below in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Non-Roll Call Actions for Calvin Dooley and Joe Baca 108th

Non-Roll Call Actions for 2 Members		
	Calvin Dooley	Joe Baca
State	CA	CA
Latino	No	Yes
Latino%	63.1	58.3
Immigration	4	13
Education	3	15
Labor	4	14
Social Security	2	5

A second example is from the 109th session comparing the actions of Jim Costa and Jose Serrano. Jim Costa replaced Calvin Dooley in the 20th district in California. It has the largest Latino population that is not currently represented by a Latino member of Congress. One of the advantages of examining this district is that one would assume this is a case where you would expect to see non-Latinos be the most

active and exhibit a legislative record comparable to Latino representatives. However, despite the sizeable Latino population, Rep. Dooley was not particularly active on Latino issues and neither is his successor, Jim Costa. In fact, Costa was even less active in the 109th session, than Dooley was in the 108th. In contrast, Jose Serrano, the other member selected for a comparison, is extremely active on salient Latino policies. Rep. Serrano, a Puerto Rican, serves the 14th district of New York which encompasses the Bronx. Both members have roughly 63% Latinos in their district, but the difference in their actions is quite stark. Their actions by policy area are presented below in Table 5.2. For education and labor, Rep. Serrano is at least four times more active than Rep. Costa and on immigration policies he is three times more active. The observed difference in behavior cannot be attributed to party, since both members are Democrats. Some may argue that non-Latino members do not need Latinos to form a winning coalition, however in this district Latinos comprise the majority of the constituents. At the minimum, their sizeable presence and potential electoral sanction should have motivated Reps. Costa and Dooley to be attentive to their policy concerns. Since I have presented two examples for the same district, one might wonder if this is a special case where Latino representation happens to be surprisingly low. I now turn to a new district.

Table 5.2 Non-Roll Call Actions for Jim Costa and Jose Serrano 109th

Non-Roll Call Actions for 2 Members		
	Jim Costa	Jose Serrano
State	CA	NY
Latino	No	Yes
Latino%	63.1	62.8
Immigration	2	6
Education	3	13
Labor	1	8
Social Security	2	3

The third case is from the 2nd sample of the 108th session and examines the behavior of Representatives Lois Capps (D) and Robert Menendez (D). Rep. Capps serves the 23rd district which is based in Santa Barbara, California. At the time, Menendez served as the representative for the 13th district which comprises portions of Newark, Elizabeth, and Union City. Both members are Democrats and have a Latino population in their district that is near the mid-forties in percentage terms. While this match is not as close as the two previous cases, this is due to the limited number of non-Latino members who have above 40% Latinos in their districts. Additionally, for Latino members, Menendez has the smallest percentage of Latinos with 47.6%. In this case, one might expect Menendez to be less active given the lower number of Latinos and the diverse nature of his district. However, he is still quite active in the salient issue areas and consistently more active than Representative Capps. The details of their legislative actions are reported in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3 Non- Roll Call Actions for Lois Capps and Robert Menendez 110th

Non-Roll Call Actions for 2 Members		
	Lois Capps	Robert Menendez
State	CA	NJ
Latino	No	Yes
Latino%	41.7	47.6
Immigration	3	7
Education	2	16
Labor	4	10
Social Security	5	2

The examination of member behavior in these three examples above confirms my claim that Latino members are more active than non-Latinos. However, this does not imply that every non-Latino legislator in my sample was always significantly less active than Latino members. There are a handful of exceptions and surprisingly a few of those cases were not necessarily representatives from the districts with the largest Latino constituency. For example, Representatives Honda and Lee are especially

active and in some instances even more active than Latino members. See Table 5.4 below for details on their activity in each policy area. One potential explanation for their behavior may be that they both represent very liberal districts in the Bay Area, San Jose, and Oakland where these issues may be salient to the area as a whole. Another intriguing variable is the role of the percentage of Asians in their districts. In all cases of non-Latino members with lower percent Latinos in the district (below 20%) who are very active on Latino issues, they have a corresponding significant Asian presence within their district. Rep. Honda has 29.4 % and Rep. Lee has 15.4% Asians in their respective constituencies. It is possible that the rather than a liberal Bay Area effect, the explanation is instead that Asians may share similar policy preferences with Latinos, thus the combination of the two populations in one district combines to exert significant pressure on the member to respond to those policy arenas.

Table 5.4 Active Non- Latino Representatives with low Latino Populations

Non-Roll Call Actions for 2 Members 109th Session		
	Michael Honda	Barbara Lee
State	CA	CA
Latino	No	No
Latino%	17.2	18.7
Immigration	8	6
Education	16	24
Labor	7	10
Social Security	3	3

While the two examples above are of members with small Latino populations, there are also non-Latino members with sizeable Latino populations who are extremely active. However, there are not enough members who share these attributes, to make the variable of percent Latino in a district significant in my quantitative analysis in the previous two chapters. Two examples of members who do fall into this category are Charles Rangel and Zoe Lofgren. Rep. Rangel represents the 14th district in New York which encompasses Harlem. Rep. Lofgren represents the 16th district in

California, which is based in San Jose. The percentage of Latinos in their districts is 47.5% and 37.6%, respectively. Across all issue areas, both members participated at rates analogous to Latino members and in some cases, were even more active. Table 5.5 displays their actions in each area. However, it should be noted that these examples are exceptions to the sub-group. On an individual policy basis, education is the one area in which members from this group are equally as active as Latinos. As a whole across all three issue areas, non-Latinos with significant Latino populations are less active than their Latino counterparts.

Table 5.5 Active Non-Latino Representative with high Latino Populations

Non-Roll Call Actions for 2 Members 108th Session		
	Charles Rangel	Zoe Lofgren
State	NY	CA
Latino	No	No
Latino%	47.5	37.6
Immigration	11	12
Education	25	23
Labor	16	14
Social Security	9	10

One additional paired comparison elucidates the role of party. The statistical results indicate that party played a significant role in determining the total representation score for a given member. The effect was often comparable to that of a member being Latino. In the examples discussed in this section, being a Democrat did not always lead to an equal number of legislative actions in each policy area. However, the effect of being Republican on non-Latinos with significant Latino populations in their district is striking. While there are less Republicans in this group than Democrats, the number is significant enough to at least comment on a pattern. In the 108th and 109th sessions there were 8 Republicans in this group and 6 in the 110th session. Not only is their behavior much more infrequent than other members in their group or the Latino members, but it is also often negative in nature. In other words,

when they do participate, they engage in acts that are anti-immigration, anti-education, and anti-labor.

For example, Mary Bono (R) who represents the 45th district in California has 38% Latinos in her district. In the 109th session, her total immigration score was -4 which means she actively supported anti-immigration bills. Her education, labor, and social security scores were 0, -1, and 2. Overall, she appears to be a very inactive member and when she is active, it is to support bills that are in direct opposition to the policy positions of her Latino constituents. The records of Rep. Ken Calvert (R) 44th district, Corona, California and Rep. Pete Sessions (R) 32nd district, Dallas, Texas appear to follow the same pattern. Despite all three members having nearly a third of their district that is comprised of Latinos, their actions consistently reflect anti-immigration and anti-labor positions. Moreover, on education which is a top issue for the general public, they appear to be inactive and not participate in any of the over one hundred educational bills that were introduced during the 109th session. The results are presented below in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Republican Non-Roll Activities with Sizeable Latino Population

Non-Roll Call Actions for Republicans 109th			
	Mary Bono	Ken Calvert	Pete Sessions
State	CA	CA	CA
Latino	No	No	No
Latino%	38	35	27.4
Immigration	-1	-1	-4
Education	0	0	0
Labor	-1	-2	-2
Social Security	2	5	5

After examining various groups of legislators and their legislative records, several facts become clear. First, Latinos on average appear to be the most consistently active across all three policy areas, however sometimes less active on education. Second, there is a significant range of activity level of non-Latinos with sizeable

Latino populations. Some members are extremely active independent of district composition while others seem totally insulated from pressures from the Latino community. Finally, being a Republican in the non-Latino group is associated with a low amount of activity and activity that is negative in nature. I will now turn to a closer inspection of the case of George Brown Jr. and his successor, Joe Baca, who represented the same district, the 43rd district in California to analyze how member behavior differs when serving the exact same constituency.

A Tale of Two Representatives from Southern California

The selection of a case for this section was a difficult process for several reasons. My aim was to identify a district that switched from a Latino member to a non-Latino member and a district that switched from a non-Latino member to a Latino member. Ideally the district would be similar in composition and geographic area across both members' terms. Since all Latino representatives have been elected from nearly majority Latino districts, there are no cases where a district switched from Latino legislator to being represented to a non-Latino member during the period of my study through the 110th session. However, it should be noted that in a special election primary in the May of 2009 to replace the vacancy of Hilda Solis' seat, Judy Chu, beat the Latino challenger, State Senator Gil Cedillo, and then went on to win in the general election in July 2009.³⁹ Her election in a predominately Latino district (64%), which encompasses large portions of East L.A., has challenged traditional views of Latino voting behavior and could potentially change how we view substantive representation of Latinos. Examination of her behavior in the 111th session compared to former Rep. Solis' behavior will be a critical case to examine in the book version of this research endeavor.

³⁹ Rebecca Kimitch, "Judy Chu Wins 32nd Congressional District Race"
http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/ci_12839817

Among the twenty-three districts represented by Latinos, very few were eligible to be classified as a case where it was represented by a non-Latino and then switched to a Latino member. Five of the districts were created after a U.S. Census and drawn to have a majority of Latinos, therefore there was no predecessor. Six of the districts underwent significant re-drawing of district boundaries in response to results from the U.S. Census immediately before or after the Latino member assumed office. In eight of the districts, the district switched from one Latino legislator to another Latino. This left only four eligible cases that met the criteria. From this group, I had to eliminate the case of Reps. Pastor and Udall because Rep. Pastor has been in office since 1991 and the legislative record for the non-Latino member was not available on THOMAS.⁴⁰ I excluded the case of John Salazar and John McInnis because Salazar was only recently elected and there were minimal observations of his legislative behavior. The remaining cases were Joe Baca and George Brown Jr. and Silvestre Reyes and Ron Coleman. I chose Baca/Brown because Baca assumed office in 1999 and Reyes assumed office in 1997. By selecting the Baca/Brown case, I had an additional session of legislative data for the non-Latino member to draw inferences from than I did in the Reyes/Coleman case.⁴¹ Now that I have justified my case selection, I will now move on to briefly discuss the district and the biographical backgrounds of Reps. Baca and Brown.

George Brown Jr. was the longest serving member from California and the oldest member of the house when he died from surgical complications on July, 15th 1999.⁴² He represented what was once called the 42nd district and Joe Baca won the

⁴⁰ THOMAS, the Library of Congress online resource, has very limited specific legislative data prior to the 103rd session.

⁴¹ In preparation of this dissertation into a book manuscript, I would also like to include the Reyes/Coleman case as a point of comparison between the two pairs.

⁴² Green, Stephen. 1999. "Liberal George Brown Jr. Dies" Daily News: Los Angeles: Obituary. July 17, 1999.

special election to take over his seat in the fall of 1999. In 2003, the district lines were slightly altered and it was re-named the 43rd district due to massive population growth in the area. The original 42nd district is now entirely within the current 43rd district. The 43rd district is east of Los Angeles and includes the cities of Colton, Fontana, Rialto, Ontario and San Bernardino. It is located in the Inland Empire and between the Pacific Ocean and the San Bernardino Mountains.⁴³ At the time of Brown's death, the Latino population was estimated at nearly 50% in the district after the 2000 Census. Over the next 8 years that percentage grew over another 10 percent to nearly 60% Latinos under Rep. Baca.

George Brown Jr. was born near the Mexican border in Holtville, CA. He received his bachelor's degree in physics from UCLA and served in World War II. In his lengthy career as a congressman, he had a reputation as a champion of the sciences and served on the Science, Space, Technology Committee, where he was chairman during the 102nd and 103rd sessions.⁴⁴ He was very active in building and securing funding for the National Sciences Foundations (NSF) and a strong supporter of NASA and the space program. He was also an active member on the House Agriculture Committee. Despite his seniority of 32 years in the House, elections in his district were highly competitive which is atypical for most legislators. He often won by a slim majority with around 50% of the vote and once only won by 996 votes.⁴⁵

In contrast, Joe Baca was born in Belen, New Mexico in a house with fourteen siblings where Spanish was the predominant spoken language. Similar to Brown, Baca also served in the military as a paratrooper from 1966-1968. Prior to taking over

⁴³ District information was obtained from Joe Baca website <http://www.house.gov/baca/districtinfo/di.htm>

⁴⁴ Biography on The George Brown Jr. Network for Earthquake Engineering at UCSB website <http://nees.ucsb.edu/outreach/gebrown>

⁴⁵ "George Brown Jr." *Almanac of American Politics* 1998

Brown's seat in 1999, he was active in the CA state assembly and worked in community relations for 15 years before entering politics.⁴⁶ In 1999 during the special election, he ran against Brown's widow, Marta Macias Brown, and beat her to win the congressional post. Just like Brown, Baca also serves on the House Agriculture committee as well as House Financial Services and Natural Resources Committees. In November of 2006 he was elected as Chairman of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC). He is traditionally very active in health, education, immigration, labor and Latino-related bills.⁴⁷

I compare the legislative actions and participation of Brown during the 104th-106th sessions and Baca during the 106th-107th sessions to examine variation in representation styles.⁴⁸ I examine a wide range of issues that is broader than the three salient policies examined in the previous two chapters in order to get a better sense of how the members allocated their time and energy in the policy sphere. Rep. Brown was not very active on high salience Latino public policy areas during the 104th-106th sessions. When active, he focused his attention on bills aimed at the sciences, environment, agriculture and technology. For example, he introduced a bill in the 105th session regarding national forests. Additionally, he was very active on health care bills, in particular those related to treatments of specific diseases such as cancer and the funding of the Medicare and Medicaid systems. Brown co-sponsored very few bills in the following areas: immigration, education, labor, economy, crime, and Latino-related bills, which are typically thought of as most of the top issues to the

⁴⁶ Biographical information obtained from Rep. Joe Baca's website <http://www.house.gov/baca/meetjoe/bio.htm>.

⁴⁷ Barone *The Almanac of American Politics* 1998, 2000, and 2008 editions.

⁴⁸ I do not discuss the results from my examination of the legislative record for Baca during the 108th through 110th sessions since the 42nd district was renamed to the 43rd district in 2003 and included more Latinos than it previously had before. Baca's actions in latter sessions were consistent with his behavior observed in the previous sessions and confirm his dedication to salient policy areas to the Latino community.

Latino community. On immigration, he was not involved in any bills during the 104th session and only 2 bills in the 105th session and 106th sessions. Similarly, on both Labor and Latino-related bills⁴⁹ he agreed to be a co-sponsor on two bills in each area in each session. His participation levels on education bills was moderately higher than in other Latino issue areas with at least three co-sponsored bills in each session that I examined. He focused far less on high salience Latino issues than Baca during his terms in the House of Representatives. His true focus while serving in the House was his passion of science and technology.

From the outset of his campaigns and prioritization of important issues, Joe Baca has consistently embraced his Latino background and the priority of Latino issues. On his website he lists Latino issues as a separate category of bills targeted towards the Latino community. He says “whether it is in the fields of education, health, immigration, or business, he will continue to fight for issues that are important to Hispanics.” In a speech delivered in his district in San Bernardino, he pronounces “that Latinos are coming! Latinos are coming! United Latinos will win”.⁵⁰ Baca plays off of Paul Revere’s famous quote and intimates that Latinos are a powerful group to be reckoned with and that cannot be ignored by politicians. As Chairman of the CHC, he fought hard to push bills that would help the Latino community and spoke out against the increasing number of anti-immigrant messages in the media.⁵¹

An examination of his legislative record further substantiates his dedication to the Latino community. In his first term during in the second half of the 106th session,

⁴⁹ Latino-related bills are defined as bills that specifically target the Latino community in the statutory language of the bill. For example, in the 107th session H.R. 5499 sought to increase health programs for Latinos.

⁵⁰ Baca, Joe. Speech at a Latino Forum in San Bernardino. January 12, 2006
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RM9uH4XgOmI>

⁵¹ Baca, Joe. Speech at Media Matters Press Conference regarding Anti-Immigrant Messages in the Media. Dec 23, 2008.

he co-sponsored five Latino-related bills and introduced two others. On immigration, he co-sponsored six pieces of legislation in the 106th session and eight in the 108th in addition to introducing one bill. On education, he participated in seven bills in the second half of the 106th session and twenty in the 107th. His participation levels on labor and health care legislation are equally as active. With the rising Latino population in his district, the inclusion of additional Latinos after the 2003 redistricting, growing seniority and his elevation to the CHC chair, his activity in Latino policy domains increased even more dramatically. For example, by the 109th session his attention towards Latino-specific bills had increased to twelve bills in this area, three of which he introduced. In a speech at the Democratic National Convention in Denver in 2008 as CHC chair, Baca proclaimed “Latinos are growing in numbers and in influence. The Latino vote will be critical”. While he may not been correct about the potential for Latinos to be swing voters, his statements indicate that he views Latinos as an important political constituency that politicians must respond to and represent. His legislative record and his statements demonstrate a serious commitment to serving his Latino constituents and Latinos as a group.

What then does the examination of Reps. Brown and Baca’s background and legislative record demonstrate about the representation of Latinos? It is clear that the personal backgrounds of each representative influenced their trajectory within the Congress. For example, Brown’s educational background in physics led to him becoming a lifelong supporter of advances in scientific research and technological advancement.⁵² Likewise, Baca grew up in a Latino household speaking Spanish, which inevitably cemented his Latino identity and helped guide him towards a path of

⁵² Brown Jr., George “Past and Prologue: Why I am Optimistic about the Future” Speech delivered April 29th at the 23rd Annual American Academy of Arts and Sciences Colloquium on Science and Technology Policy.

aiding Latinos. Personal background played a foundational role in determining the focus of each member's scarce legislative resources.

There is no question that George Brown Jr. was an amazing representative who was involved in series of monumental pieces of legislation given his long tenure in Congress. For example, he was a co-sponsor on the bill to establish the Environmental Protection Agency and he pushed for passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.⁵³ However, despite his abundance of activity in scientific policy domains, he failed to serve his Latino constituents by addressing their most salient policy concerns. While the Latino community can benefit from scientific advances, they still have more direct policy concerns that affect them as individuals that were not addressed by Brown. For example, Brown's record on immigration is very sparse. Despite having a sizeable Latino population in his district, Brown rarely participated in Latino-specific bills.

Conversely, Joe Baca has devoted much of his political career to serving the Latino community. What is important to take note of is that for the first two sessions, Baca represented the exact same district as Brown, however his emphasis could not have been any more different. Moreover, as the district became even more dominated by Latinos, Baca further increased his activity in this area. One interesting note is that Baca enjoyed a much larger winning margin in subsequent elections than Brown ever did and part of this may be the degree to which he catered to Latino voters demands.⁵⁴ This detailed examination of two legislators representing the same district has demonstrated that Latino members of Congress do offer greater substantive representation than their non-Latino counterparts. After analyzing differences between non-Latino members and Latino members, I turn to variation among Latino

⁵³ Information obtained from Biography on The National Academies website http://www7.nationalacademies.org/nrclibrary/George_E_Brown.html.

⁵⁴ Washington Post database on National Election Results. <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/elections/keyraces/551/>

representatives in terms of their actions, Latino identity, and relationships with the Latino Community.

Variation among Latino Representatives

The literature on race and representation often discusses representatives of a given race or ethnicity as monolithic actors. The black representation literature has concluded that African Americans are best served by black members of Congress because as a group they tend to offer the most substantive representation (Cannon 1999; Tate 2003). While the averages of their behavior indicate strong similarities between members, it should not be assumed that no in-group variation exists.

In fact, there is evidence that variation between members exists in the electoral politics arena. For example, some studies have found that black politicians can vary widely in the degree to which they embrace identity politics and run a campaign based on the politics of difference (Cannon 1999). Often politicians from minority groups feel they face a difficult choice concerning identity politics. They can pander to members of the minority group and embrace their identity as a member of the group but risk alienating members of the out group. Candidates can also elect to present themselves more broadly as a good representative for their constituents' interests at large in order to appeal to the widest audience. Similarly, representation styles can vary widely according to which group of their constituents they hold to be the most important to represent or the most critical for re-election (Fenno 1978). Moreover, despite sharing the same race or ethnicity, minority members come from various backgrounds and political points of view. In particular, the Latino community is more heterogeneous in nature than the black community as demonstrated by the number of countries of origin, diversity in political opinions, and presence of both conservative and liberal segments of the Latino community. Consequently, in the last segment of

this chapter, it is important to examine differences among Latino members of the House of Representatives.

A brief examination of the total number of actions for a given Latino member in each session reveals a very wide range of participation levels.⁵⁵ For example, across all four issue areas in the 108th session, Rep. Henry Bonilla engaged in six non-roll call actions and a total of twelve actions when including roll call votes. Conversely, the most active Latino member, Rep. Raul Grijalva engaged in ninety-nine non-roll call actions and one hundred and eighteen total actions, including roll call votes. To put this range in perspective, the median number of non-roll actions was twenty-two and the median for total representation actions was approximately twenty-six. Figure 5.1 below shows the distribution of the members (indicated by the dots) according to their total non-roll call activity and total representation score that included roll call data. The graph demonstrates two important points. First, clearly some members are more active than other members within the Latino sub-group. Second, given the linear nature of the graph, it is clear that the effect of including roll call actions is minimal and the majority of the behavior is non-roll call based. To give more context on variation within the subgroup and elucidate the participation levels of specific members, the subsequent three tables list all Latino members for the 108th-110th sessions and their total actions within each term. The data is presented below in Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9.

⁵⁵ The totals represent member actions across the four policy areas examined in the previous two chapters. The issues are immigration, education, labor and social security.




Figure 5.1 Variation Among Latino Representatives in the 109th Session

Table 5.7 Range of Latino Members' Actions 108th

Latino Members's Actions in the 108th Session		
Name of Representative	Non Roll Call	Total Actions
Bonilla, Henry	6	12
Diaz-Balart, Mario	12	21
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln	17	26
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana	23	32
Velázquez, Nydia M.	22	40
Reyes, Silvestre	24	42
Ortiz, Solomon P.	26	43
Becerra, Xavier	29	44
Gonzalez, Charles A.	35	52
Sanchez, Loretta	33	52
Menendez, Robert	35	53
Roybal-Allard, Lucille	34	53
Napolitano, Grace F.	40	58
Pastor, Ed	43	61
Baca, Joe	47	66
Hinojosa, Rubén	57	73
Solis, Hilda L.	56	74
Rodriguez, Ciro	68	85
Sánchez, Linda T.	66	85
Gutierrez, Luis V.	72	87
Serrano, José E.	73	90
Grijalva, Raúl M.	99	118
Mean	41.68	57.59

Table 5.8 Range of Latino Members' Actions 109th

Latino Members's Actions in the 109th Session		
Name of Representative	Non Roll Call	Total Actions
Bonilla, Henry	-3	-4
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln	4	9
Diaz-Balart, Mario	5	9
Sanchez, Loretta	9	14
Cuellar, Henry	10	15
Salazar, John	13	16
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana	12	17
Becerra, Xavier	15	20
Menendez, Robert	21	22
Velázquez, Nydia M.	17	22
Ortiz, Solomon P.	17	23
Pastor, Ed	18	23
Baca, Joe	19	24
Napolitano, Grace F.	21	25
Roybal-Allard, Lucille	19	26
Reyes, Silvestre	22	27
Serrano, José E.	30	35
Gonzalez, Charles A.	31	37
Sánchez, Linda T.	33	38
Solis, Hilda L.	35	40
Gutierrez, Luis V.	40	45
Hinojosa, Rubén	46	52
Grijalva, Raúl M.	68	73
Mean	21.83	26.43

The tables demonstrate which members are the most active and which members are the least active. The least active three members across every sample are Republicans and the most active members are Democrats. This is consistent with the partisan effect noted in the quantitative models and with the Cuban finding, where in Model 4 Latino Non-Cubans (Democrats) are the most active. While the Diaz-Balart brothers demonstrate comparable levels of participation, the Sanchez sisters behave in radically different ways. Rep. Linda Sanchez is twice as active as her sister, Loretta, in

the 108th session and three times more active in the 109th and 110th sessions. Latinos as a group are quite active especially compared to their non-Latino peers from similar districts, however there are meaningful differences in their participation levels within the sub-group. To assess in group variation in more detail I examine the case of three Latino representatives from the Texas.

Table 5.9 Range of Latino Members' Actions 110th

Name of Representative	Non-Roll Call	Total Actions
Diaz-Balart, Lincoln	8	19
Diaz-Balart, Mario	12	24
Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana	18	30
Sanchez, Loretta	20	32
Velázquez, Nydia M.	19	33
Becerra, Xavier	22	35
Salazar, John	23	36
Rodriguez, Ciro	23	37
Ortiz, Solomon P.	29	41
Cuellar, Henry	33	46
Baca, Joe	33	47
Serrano, José E.	34	48
Reyes, Silvestre	35	49
Gutierrez, Luis V.	37	51
Roybal-Allard, Lucille	39	52
Gonzalez, Charles A.	42	55
Napolitano, Grace F.	41	55
Pastor, Ed	43	57
Solis, Hilda L.	46	60
Sires, Albio	51	65
Sánchez, Linda T.	59	73
Hinojosa, Rubén	69	82
Grijalva, Raúl M.	86	99
Mean	35.74	48.96

The Texas Trifecta

I selected a case of members from the same geographic area, in order to keep constant as many characteristics as possible such as constituencies and local interests, and allow the inferences that I draw from their actions to be the strongest. The three

Latino representatives either currently serve or have served the two districts that encompass San Antonio and Laredo areas of Texas. The three members are Representatives Henry Cuellar, Henry Bonilla, and Ciro Rodriguez.

This group of members has a long and complicated history that I will briefly review before comparing their legislative actions. At the start of my quantitative analysis in the 108th session, Henry Bonilla represented the 23rd district which included a portion of San Antonio and Laredo. Bonilla had a conservative voting record and was a Republican, despite the fact that Laredo was dominated by Democrats. The presence of liberal voters in his district resulted in a very close election in 2002. He was challenged by Henry Cuellar, a conservative Democrat, and won by a two point margin. In response to the closeness of the race, the Republican-controlled state legislature redrew district lines by packing the liberal voters of Laredo into the already heavily Democratic 28th district, which was represented by Ciro Rodriguez. As a consequence of the 2003 redistricting, Bonilla's seat was protected. In the 108th session, both Bonilla and Rodriguez held congressional offices.

After losing to Bonilla in the 2002 election, Cuellar challenged Rodriguez in the 2004 Democratic primary election for the 28th district and won by an extremely small margin. Rodriguez challenged the results, but the Texas Court of Appeals did not find in his favor. Thus, in the 109th session, Bonilla and Cuellar were in office. In the spring of 2006 Rodriguez attempted to regain his seat but lost in the primary election again to Cuellar. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry* that the 2003 redistricting plan implemented by the Texas legislature was unconstitutional because it violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by diluting the strength of Latino voters in the 23rd district. A three-judge panel drew new district lines and reincorporated much of the south side of San Antonio, which had been a strong component of Rodriguez's base. In the fall of

2006, Rodriguez decided to run against Bonilla in the 23rd district race. Despite the bad blood between Rodriguez and Cuellar, Cuellar helped Rodriguez defeat Bonilla in the runoff election.⁵⁶ What makes this case so interesting is that both of the districts have at one time contained a portion of the other district, all three members are Latino, and one of the members, Rep. Rodriguez has served two of the three districts. It provides an unusual and unique situation for studying variation among Latino legislators.

The primary research question of this section is whether all three members provide the same degree of representation to their Latino constituents. A brief examination of their legislative records that I presented earlier has already put serious doubt into the similarity of all members. If we look more closely at the three people involved in this case, the differences are even starker.

In Tables 5.7 and 5.8, Bonilla is the least active Latino member and lags considerably behind Rodriguez and Cuellar in total representation actions. He is also the lone Mexican-American Republican legislator in the House. Substantive review of his legislative record reveals a very low level of participation in any policy domain. The only two areas that he participates in are health care and tax policies. However, on health care his activity levels were fairly limited which is evidenced by co-sponsoring six bills in the 109th and eight bills in the 108th. His activity in immigration, education, and labor policies are almost non-existent in the 108th and 109th sessions with less than four bills in each area. Bonilla was not involved in any Latino-related bills that sought to specifically help the Latino community. Moreover, when he was active in immigration, half of the time his actions were in support of anti-immigrant legislation. These actions are despite the heavy Latino presence in his district, which is 55% of the

⁵⁶ Rio Grande Guardian.com “Cuellar: Bonilla’s Vote for Border Wall will help Rodriguez campaign” November 22, 2006. http://www.riograndeguardian.com/archives_results.asp.

population. In response to his apparent lack of concern for the Latino community, some members of the media accused him of only being Latino in name and called him 'Henry Vanilla' since he relied mostly on conservative white voters for re-election.⁵⁷ Additionally, he criticized politically active Latinos for waving Mexican flags during demonstrations as insulting to Americans, thus demonstrating an underlying hostility towards the transnational and dual identities that many immigrants possess.⁵⁸ Moreover, other politicians and politicians such as Rep. Cuellar claimed his anti-immigrant votes led to his loss to Rodriguez in the runoff election.⁵⁹ Ultimately, Bonilla demonstrated very weak allegiances to the Latino community and provided limited substantive representation for Latinos.

In contrast, Rep. Cuellar and Rep. Rodriguez have stronger records of activity in high salience Latino issue areas. However, Rodriguez's record is more consistent with promoting Latino interests than Cuellar. In his first term during the 109th session, Cuellar was primarily very active in health care policy and co-sponsored forty-two bills in this area compared to Bonilla's six bills. Health care is an important issue for the Latino community given some of the problems they face as a group such as increasing rates of diabetes and obesity (Martinez et al. 2004). On education policy, he participated in a range of bills that sought to increase grants, reduce student loan interest rates, and expand opportunities at Hispanic serving institutions. When active on immigration, he often co-sponsored bills that aimed to solve border control problems. In the area of labor policy, Cuellar is quite inactive compared to some of his other Latino peers. In each session, he only co-sponsored two pieces of legislation. His

⁵⁷ Ken Rudin, 2006. "Obama or a History of Black Presidents"

<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6594955&ps=rs>

⁵⁸ NBC News Transcripts. Meet the Press. "Representatives Bonilla, Hayworth, and Gutierrez discuss immigration reform" April 9th 2006.

⁵⁹ "Cuellar: Bonilla's vote for Border wall will help Rodriguez campaign" Riogrande Guardian November 22, 2006.

website reflects his lack of attention to these two areas by failing to list either Immigration or Jobs/Labor on the Issues and Legislation portion of his website. Despite his inaction in these two areas, Cuellar frequently supports Latino-related bills that recognize Latino contributions and heritage. Rep. Cuellar is also very active in the area of Veterans' Affairs and believes it to be an important issue that cannot be disregarded.⁶⁰ In particular, he has co-sponsored several bills that address the healthcare of veterans. While not traditionally thought of as a Latino issue, Veterans' Affairs are relevant to the Latino community since they comprise nearly 10% of the military and there is a large presence of Veterans in the South Texas area.⁶¹ While not necessarily active as defined in the quantitative sections from the previous chapters, Rep. Cuellar has found other issues areas that are important to the Latino community to demonstrate his commitment.

In the 108th session, Rep. Ciro Rodriguez represented most of the district that is now represented by Rep. Cuellar. There are some similarities in their behavior but also some significant differences in the way in which they served the same constituency. While serving the 28th district, Rodriguez, like Cuellar, devoted significant amounts of time to health care policy and co-sponsored fifty-four bills. Similarly, in education he supported a wide range of bills that addressed various aspects of education, with an emphasis on aid for student loans. Rodriguez was also an active participant on Veterans' Affairs bills. He also demonstrated enthusiasm for Latino-related bills by co-sponsoring 20 bills during this term, which is twice the amount of Cuellar. On labor policy, the two members diverged and Rodriguez co-sponsored ten bills that ranged from increasing minimum wage, to supporting labor

⁶⁰ Rep. Cuellar's Website, Issues, Veterans' Affairs
<http://cuellar.house.gov/Issues/Issue/?IssueID=3827>.

⁶¹ Pew Hispanic Center. 2003 Hispanics in the Military.
<http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=17>

unions to increasing unemployment benefits. In the area of immigration, Rodriguez was very active and co-sponsored fifteen bills. Only two of these bills were focused on border security, unlike Cuellar's record. The vast majority of the bills sought to help immigrants adjust their status and allow more visa and worker programs. Despite his legislative record on immigration policy, on his campaign website, Rodriguez lists 'securing our homeland' as a top priority.⁶² The geographical location in South Texas and the proximity of the two districts to the border has led to a particular way in which immigration is framed to the media and public by all of the legislators. However, Bonilla, Cuellar, and Rodriguez have acted differently in the degree to which they support pro-immigration policies within the House. Ultimately, Rep. Rodriguez demonstrated a serious commitment to issues that both affect Latinos and are important to them as a group. His actions indicate that he offered the Latino residents of the 28th district more substantive representation than Rep. Cuellar since assuming office.

In the 109th session, Ciro Rodriguez was not in office since he was beaten by Henry Cuellar. However, in the 110th session, he came back to the House when he beat Henry Bonilla in the 23rd district. Rodriguez continued his high levels of participation in his new district. Recall Bonilla's relative inaction in the areas of education and labor and often anti-immigration actions. In contrast, when representing the same constituency, Rep. Rodriguez co-sponsored eleven education bills, seven labor bills, and five immigration bills. He also continued his dedication to health care and Veterans' Affairs issues with the co-sponsorship of forty-eight and thirty eight bills respectively. Analogous to his behavior on Latino-related bills in the 108th session serving the 28th district, in the 110th serving the 23rd district, he co-sponsored nine bills

⁶² Rep. Rodriguez Campaign Election Website <http://www.cirodiazrodriguez.com/issues.asp>.

in this area. From analyzing Rodriguez's behavior in relation to both Cuellar and Bonilla, it is apparent that he is the most active in representing Latino interests. During the 108th session, the 23rd district represented by Bonilla had 66.8% Latinos and the 28th district represented by Rodriguez had 69.6%. When Cuellar took over the 28th district its Latino population had swelled to 77% and the 23rd was back to 65% by the time Rodriguez took over.⁶³ Given the variation among the three members' behavior despite all having Latino majority districts, it is clear that the percentage of Latinos in the constituency does not explain the differences in their behavior. To probe explanations for variation in behavior, I turn to evidence from interviews with the staff members of Latino representatives.

Interview Methodology

In order to evaluate finer differences between Latino members of Congress, I conducted face-to-face and telephone interviews with staff members from various Latino members' offices during June 2008-April 2009. Originally the research plan also included interviews with members of Congress, but many members were extremely hesitant to participate and scheduling was quite difficult given their demanding schedules. Consequently, I focused on staff interviews which allowed me to learn about the member's views but also the inner workings of the office and its outreach efforts with the Latino community. The interviews lasted between thirty to forty-five minutes. I asked various questions regarding representation, community outreach, Spanish language usage, legislation, and the specific policy areas that I investigated in my quantitative analysis.⁶⁴ The objective of the interviews was to

⁶³ During the redistricting scandal, Texas Republican state legislators had moved Latinos into the 28th district and decreased the number of Latinos in the 23rd district to 55% in the 109th session.

⁶⁴ A copy of the questionnaire is contained in the appendix at the end of this manuscript.

glean richer qualitative data that would shed light on the quantitative results in addition to exploring the multitude of ways that members serve their districts.

I contacted the legislative director and Chief of Staff of twenty-three different Latino members of Congress during this period requesting to conduct an anonymous interview.⁶⁵ Of those people contacted, ten offices agreed to participate as long the information supplied during the interview was not attributed to the staff member, the office, or the representative in any way.⁶⁶ This is roughly a forty-five percent participation rate. The response rate to my request was seventy percent. The other twenty-five percent indicated that they were not able to participate due to rules in their office against interviews, even those conducted for the purposes of academic research. Office policies banning staff interviews reflect concerns over public perceptions of the member and potential electoral ramifications. The other thirty percent of those contacted did not respond to my various requests despite using the connections of staff members from interviews I had already conducted. Interestingly, of those offices that agreed to participate, none of the members were Republican and consequently my analysis of variation among Latino members in this section is restricted to Latino Democrat members of Congress. However, this limitation does not pose a significant problem given that only four of the Latino members are Republicans.⁶⁷ Overall, the interviews revealed several main differences in member behavior regarding their view

⁶⁵ I contacted all members from the sample, however for some members who had left office since the 108th session, I was not able to locate any contact information for the member directly or any of the previous members of their staffs.

⁶⁶ Interviews were contacted with either a Chief of Staff, Legislative Director or Hispanic Caucus Liaison. Due to the assurance of anonymity, I am unable to name the offices that agreed to participate since the total number of staff is small enough that the identity of persons making statements could potentially be determined by others who are intimately aware of the politics and actions of these members.

⁶⁷ In previous sections of this chapter, I have explored the effects of being Republican on the representation of districts with significant Latino populations.

of Latino identity, working with the Latino community, and which policies merited the greatest attention.

Latino Identity

When discussing the member's relationship to their Latino constituency and their views of representing Latino interests as a group, the role of identity became a crucial explanatory variable. I tried to determine what leads a member to focus on his Latino constituency but also national policy concerns for Latinos as a group. For six of the ten members interviewed, the staff member indicated that being Latino was a critically important characteristic that shaped the member's view on representation. Similar to the representation literature on African-American Representatives (Tate 2003), these six members felt compelled to serve all Latinos as a group, not just their constituents. In other words they were ambassadors for Latino policy concerns writ large and adopted a model of surrogate representation. For them, being Latino was a critical part of their identity and served as a way to connect with their constituency. Additionally, they were also very proud of their national identity, for example as a Mexican-American.

I examined the backgrounds of the members, office characteristics, and composition of their districts to try to determine what led to the adoption of a strong Latino identity and its consequent effect on how the member viewed his role as a representative. One striking similarity between the members with a strong Latino identity was their high level of Spanish language usage. For example, all members in this group frequently spoke Spanish in their offices, at least 70% of the office staff was fluent in Spanish and they reported that at least 50% of their Latino constituents contacted their D.C. office in Spanish. This is in contrast to the other members who rarely spoke Spanish in the office, had less than 30% of the D.C. office staff who was fluent in Spanish, and reported infrequent contact from Latino constituents in Spanish.

In essence this demonstrated that the member's dominant view of identity led to other policies and practices inside and outside the office that promoted a strong connection to Latino culture.

The diverse nature of the backgrounds of the members failed to provide a single variable that could explain the identity outcome. Of those who adopted this viewpoint, some were born in other countries, grew-up in predominately Spanish speaking house, or both parents were immigrants, while others had been in the U.S. for several generations, grew up in integrated areas, and primarily spoke English. Despite, not being able to pinpoint an explanation for the factors that led to embracing Latino identity, the adoption of a strong ethnic identity resulted in distinct differences in their behavior compared to the other members who did not express the same sense of shared pan-ethnic identity.

Relationship with the Latino Community

The members who identified strongly as Latino tended to utilize different strategies of communication and interaction with their Latino constituents than those with a weak identity. Strong identity members (SIMs) sent mailings to some segments of their constituents in Spanish whereas weak members (WIMs) did not. Representatives in the former group attended more community organization meetings or hometown association meetings in their district than members with a weaker Latino identity. When visiting their districts, SIM staffs attempted to organize town hall meetings or events that specifically addressed Latino policy concerns. This is on contrast to WIMs who still organized a comparable number of meetings but the events were framed in terms of the broader constituency or issues not specifically related to Latinos. When WIMs staff members were asked about the member's interaction with the Latino community, two of them specifically indicated that they did not address Latino-specific concerns per se, since they felt Latinos were adequately represented by

addressing issues important to their constituency as a whole. While this would not necessarily lead to less substantive representation for Latinos, a closer examination of the legislative record and their professed policy foci is necessary to make this determination.

Policy Work

When discussing decisions on which policy areas to focus on both WIMs and SIMs offices indicated the same decision rule. In essence, a balance between views expressed by constituents via direct contact such as mail, e-mail, organized community interest groups from within the constituency, and their personal background or interests. The responses to the question regarding what are the most important issues affecting Latinos reflected the diversity of influential sources. All members indicated that education, labor/jobs, healthcare, and immigration were top issues. However, when asked on which issues the member devoted the most time, the responses did not necessarily coincide with the top Latino issues. One member indicated trade was a top priority for her office, while others indicated education and immigration were key areas of action. One office even cited working with the Census as a critical part of the member's work in order to reduce or eliminate undercounting of Latinos to ensure representation for all. Others focused on various aspects of labor policy such as job training, the creation of new jobs, and minimum wages. One member cited security as a top priority given the proximity of his district to a port. There appeared to be a disjuncture between perceived important issues facing Latino and how members actually spent their time.

After conducting the interviews, I went back to the data set of member actions to examine member behavior across the three high salience policy areas which all interviewees identified as important issues facing the Latino community. When comparing the total number of actions in each issue area and total number of actions

across the 108th-110 sessions, there is no observable difference in the legislative behavior of WIMs and SIMs. Some of the most active Latino members are those who possessed a weaker Latino identity. This finding is counter to what one might expect given the level of engagement of SIMs with their Latino constituencies. However, one potential explanation for this finding is that even if members do not closely identify or appeal to their Latino constituents, on a pragmatic level they are realistic about re-election and pander to an important part of their constituency (Mayhew 1973). While my strong versus weak identity theory does not explain variation in member's actions in the legislative sphere, it may still have important effects on the views Latinos have of their representatives, Latino voter turnout, trust in government, or the level of support in elections by Latinos.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to probe deeper into the statistical findings in the previous two chapters. I studied in close detail differences in non-Latino and Latino behavior to assess if Latino representatives offer greater substantive representation. After a series of paired comparisons, I conclude that on average Latinos offer greater substantive representation and the percentage of Latinos does not seem to be a key determining factor in member behavior. Among the non-Latino members who have sizeable Latino populations, I find that certain members are quite active in Latino policy areas. Republicans in this-group are systematically inactive and often engage in actions counter to Latino policy interests. Within the Latino subgroup, there is substantial variation among members' actions, where Republican members are considerably less active than the others. Finally, I find that certain Latino members adopt a strong sense of Latino identity that affects the ways in which they interact with their constituents and frame salient policy issues but does not necessarily change the overall amount of substantive representation derived from legislative work.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

In studies of Congress, it is often argued that descriptive representation is necessary for the substantive representation of minority groups. In other words minority members will serve minority interests best. The bulk of the work in this area concerns black interests and black members of Congress. This dissertation has sought to determine if Latinos need Latino representatives in order to have their interests represented. I have argued two main points throughout this dissertation:

- 1) On the whole, Latinos offer greater substantive representation than their non-Latino counterparts.
- 2) We must examine actions beyond roll call votes, such as bill introduction and co-sponsorship, because rolls call-only analysis obscures important findings.

While the first claim is not controversial in nature given the findings from the black representation literature, some scholars have been suspect about whether the findings would apply to Latinos. The second claim regarding non-roll call behavior is a bit more radical given that a sizeable portion of the Congressional literature has focused on roll call behavior. By analyzing a wide range of member actions from the 108th-110th sessions, paired comparisons, case studies and interviews, I have amassed a substantial amount of evidence to support my claims.

Latinos vs. Non-Latino Representatives

In the congressional literature, it is assumed that members are responsive to their constituencies, which is often primarily due to electoral concerns (Griffin 2006). I investigated whether non-Latino members were responsive to Latino policy concerns when Latinos comprised a significant portion of their district. The statistical evidence presented in Chapters Three and Four indicates that for both labor and immigration, Latino representatives are considerably more active in bill introductions and co-

sponsorships than non-Latino members. On education policy, Latinos are very active but so are Democrats and black members of Congress. In this policy arena, it is less clear that Latinos are best served by Latinos. To assess if Latino representatives are simply more active or liberal than non-Latino legislators, I also examined Social Security policy. Across all three sessions, I find that Latinos are not simply more active and the only predictor of the most representation in social security is whether a member is a Democrat. This finding provides strong evidence to support my argument that Latino representatives are only more active on high salience issues to the Latino community.

In Chapter Five, I probe the quantitative results to examine pairs of members with similar percentage of Latinos in their district. The examination confirms the previous findings and reveals a pattern of steady action on Latino issues by Latino members of Congress. However, the paired comparisons reveal that some non-Latino members are very active in their pursuit of immigration, education, and labor policies. Republican members with sizeable Latino populations are consistently less active than their Democratic counterparts. Moreover, Latino members of Congress are also very active in additional policy areas that are important to the Latino community such as health care, Veterans' Affairs, and more particular Latino-focused bills. The components from Chapters Three, Four and Five come together to build a strong case that Latino representatives offer greater substantive representation than non-Latino representatives on the whole.

The Importance of Non-Roll Call Behavior

Throughout my study of the legislative record, it became apparent that a small percentage of members' actions involve roll call votes. The vast majority of legislative action is non-roll call behavior such as bill introduction and bill co-sponsorship. I adopted a broad view of legislative participation to assess the representation of Latino

interests. Part of the reason for this view was because of relative amount of time members spend on non-roll call actions, but also the fact that the existing literature based on votes was uncertain about whether being Latino had a substantive effect on representation. The design of my models allowed a comparison of the results of roll call and non-call behavior. The roll call models indicated that the only salient variable was whether a member was a Democrat, which resulted in higher representation scores. In sharp contrast, in the models that incorporated non-roll call behavior, the role of the ethnicity of the representative became a critical explanatory variable. This important finding was obscured in the roll call-only models. Moreover, detailed analysis of the legislative records of various members confirmed the marginal importance of roll call votes in a given member's scope of actions. It was in activities such as bill introductions and co-sponsorships where members truly signaled their support or resistance to certain policy changes. It was also the domain in which they could devote scarce resources to their most important policy concerns. By examining this portion of their legislative records a broader picture of each member's policy preferences emerged.

Implications

The findings of this research study have four main implications. The primary implication is that descriptive representation is necessary for maximum substantive representation for Latinos. Descriptive representation may make constituents feel closer to their representatives and more able to reach out to them for support when they need help. Current studies have documented that descriptive representation enhances views of representatives and more positive feelings towards Congress (Brunell et. al. 2008). Recent work has also shown that Latino preferences are not represented as much as white preferences (Griffin and Newman 2007).

Despite controversy surrounding majority-minority districts and member responsiveness in non-competitive districts, Gay (2007) demonstrates that minority members are actually quite responsive to their constituent concerns. My study has shown that members do not grow more responsive to Latino policy concerns as the percentage of Latinos in a district rises. In fact some non-Latinos representatives have districts that have up to 63% Latinos, and yet they remain very inactive and ambivalent towards a large segment of their district. This study did not explicitly test why non-Latinos are less responsive to Latino policy concerns. However, two plausible explanations include re-election constituency and the absence of feelings of group consciousness and surrogate representation. It is possible that the lack of attention for Latino constituents could be the role of that constituency in re-election of the non-Latino members. Fenno (1978) advocates the concept of multi-layered constituencies with a core re-election constituency at the heart of the model. Non-Latino members may not rely on their Latino constituents for support and are able to form a winning coalition without their support. This could be due to low levels of participation from Latinos and/or a small enough number of Latinos in the district that their votes become unnecessary for re-election. However, in some of the non-Latino member districts, Latinos comprise more than half of the district population and other minority groups comprise an additional 10-15% percent. For Democrats who traditionally rely on minority groups for their electoral support it becomes less plausible that the Latino constituency is not an important part of the voting constituency. Future work, should examine more closely the types of electoral coalitions utilized by non-Latinos to determine if this winning coalition hypothesis explains non-Latino member behavior.

An alternate explanation for the difference between Latino and non-Latino member actions stems from the concepts of group consciousness and surrogate

representation. Latino members do afford greater substantive representation than non-Latinos by being considerably more active on the issues. While much of the literature on ethnic group consciousness has focused on blacks, there is evidence that Latinos also possess an ethnic group consciousness (Stokes 2003, Welch and Hibbing 1984). Moreover, ethnic group consciousness for Latinos can affect Latino policy preferences (Sanchez 2006). In addition to group consciousness, surrogate representation is advocated in the mission of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC). Mansbridge (2003) defines surrogate representation as the notion that representatives believe that they have a duty to represent a larger constituency beyond their geographical constituency. The CHC proclaims to be “dedicated to voicing and advancing through the legislative process the issues affecting Hispanics in the U.S. and Puerto Rico.”⁶⁸ Nearly all of the Latino members of the House other than the Republican members are members of the CHC. Thus, Latino representatives as in group members are likely have a sense of group consciousness and surrogate representation. Together these concepts combine to form a strong theoretical explanation of the observed difference in behavior between Latino and non-Latino representatives. Implied by this statement is that as out group members, non-Latinos would not share a sense of group consciousness or a duty of surrogate representation for Latinos. Additional case studies and interviews with representatives would shed more light on the feeling that Latino representatives may share due to their shared ethnicity and group membership.

Another implication of the findings is how we conceptualize representation. The case studies revealed that members have different representation styles and different foci even when serving the same constituencies. Traditionally, we have been stuck in two standard dichotomies of descriptive versus substantive representation and

⁶⁸ <http://velazquez.house.gov/chc/>

trustee versus delegate. This research has shown that members often adopt trustee and delegate modes of representation at different times and it is exceedingly difficult to categorize them as one type. New theories of representation must encompass the wide variation in styles of representation and reflect their fluid adoption of various styles under different circumstances. Theories of representation should aim to be more general in nature to encompass the diversity of ways in which members act to balance their own interests and background with the demands of their constituents.

For Latinos to achieve the most substantive representation, they need descriptive representation where members act as delegates. The purpose of representation is to act as an advocate for constituents and ultimately must reflect some degree of their constituents' policy preferences. The most active Latino members acted as delegates on high salience issues and as trustees in policy areas of personal interest. This balance allows the maximum substantive representation of Latinos while allowing members to specialize and utilize their expertise. An important additional conceptualization of descriptive representation would include the concept of surrogate representation. In this instance it would be the representation of all Latinos by Latino members of Congress. Evidence from interviews with staff members and case studies indicates that many Latino members often felt a duty to represent Latinos as a group. Latinos need a mixture of delegate, descriptive and surrogate representation in order to be fully represented.

This dissertation also has important implications for the composition of minority districts and how to achieve maximum representation. As discussed in the introduction, one of the primary purposes of the VRA was to allow minority groups access to the political system by having a voice and ability to elect members of their own group. Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA have been utilized and justified via various Supreme Court cases to allow the creation of majority-minority districts for the

purposes of achieving minority representation. However the ability of blacks and Latinos to utilize the VRA to achieve descriptive representation varies quite considerably. Currently there are only 23 Latino representatives in the House despite Latino presence as the largest minority group in the U.S. Compare this figure to the total number of black representatives, which is 42 House members. According to the 2004 Current Population Survey Estimates, the black population in the U.S. is approximately 12.5% and their corresponding population in the House is 9.5%. Despite comprising 15% of the U.S. population, Latinos are only 5% of the House. Latinos are lagging behind in descriptive representation within the institution compared to blacks. While this dissertation has not attempted to explain why Latinos have been less successful than black in securing more seats within the legislature⁶⁹, this fact makes the topic of this dissertation an important avenue of inquiry in terms of minority representation.

One immediate policy solution might be to create more Latino majority districts to increase the number of Latino representatives to be more commensurate with the national Latino population and to offer greater representation of the Latinos. Other long-term possibilities to create more representation for Latinos include higher Latino voter turnout, increased interaction with members of Congress by Latino constituents, and forming alliances with other groups within the district. This project has also demonstrated that not all descriptive representation is created equal. The least active Latino members may not actually provide better legislative representation for Latinos than active non-Latino members. In terms of policy, this may mean that in some instances Latinos might better served by other minority group members such Black representatives who often reflect similar policy positions. In addition to the

⁶⁹ See Casellas (2006) for more on the election of Latinos to higher offices at both the state and federal levels.

potential creation of Latino majority districts, another option is the creation of mixed majority-minority districts. I found evidence of considerable action in favor of Latino policy positions by black representatives particularly in the area of education. It may be the case that a mix of black and Latino constituents would allow the election of more black and Latino members and allow greater representation of both groups. Increased coordination between the Black and Hispanic Caucus may lead to increased effectiveness on legislative actions introduced by minority members of Congress. Additionally, in my examination of active non-Latinos, I found evidence that a sizeable Asian population resulted in more actions in high salience issue areas. It is possible that minority groups may share common interests and districts may be able to utilize mixed racial and ethnic composition to achieve optimal substantive representation. Ultimately, it is important that Latinos apply more electoral pressure on representatives so that they cannot simply ignore Latinos and create a separate winning coalition without Latino support.

A final implication is that future congressional studies focused on representation must move beyond roll call votes in order to obtain a broader picture of member behavior. This study has demonstrated the critical role of ethnicity in non-roll call activity and Latino representation. The finding that it mattered if a member was Latino was obscured in the roll call-only analysis. Studies have increasingly become cognizant that important differences in member behavior and legislative contributions are present in non-roll call actions (Minta 2009; Carruba et. al 2009). The research presented here has demonstrated that most representatives spend a small fraction of their time on roll call votes, largely due to how few bills actually come up for a floor vote. Members choose non-roll call behavior, such as bill introduction and co-sponsorship, to focus on certain policy passions and develop a reputation as champions of certain causes. Representatives utilize input from their constituents,

national policy concerns, their personal backgrounds and interests to develop a policy agenda. An examination of roll call votes only gives a researcher a snapshot of their policy positions. What it does not show is which policy areas members focus on and whether these are issues that are important to constituents in their district. To assess the quality of a representative it is critical to examine not only the congruence of their policy positions with their district, but also on which policies they are spending the most time and whether these issues matter at all to their constituents (Jones et al. 2009). Moreover, a given member's ability to deviate from the party line is extremely limited in roll call votes. In non-roll activity, members are making active decisions to introduce a bill or co-sponsor a piece of legislation and reveal policy preferences and interests.

Skeptics could argue that bill introduction and co-sponsorship are costless activities that are utilized for the purposed of credit claiming with constituents. I argue that these activities are not costless because it takes time and resources to draft and create a bill, identify and lobby co-sponsors, and potential costs within the institution of signaling a position on an issue. Most importantly if these actions are cheap and meaningless, then why are all members independent of ethnicity not engaging in them? The stark difference between the observed actions of Latino and non-Latino members' actions indicates that Latinos are more focused on Latino representation. The results in this research endeavor necessitate a move beyond roll call votes in evaluating representation.

While this dissertation has demonstrated that Latinos do engage in more total acts of representation than non-Latinos i.e. time spent, the question concerning effectiveness is not one that can be summarily dismissed. I argue that the act of introducing and sponsoring bills still counts as representation, regardless of the outcome of the bill for two reasons. As discussed in Chapter 2, the acts of bill

introduction and bill-sponsorship can have a wide range of effects including but not limited to, bringing issues to table that would not otherwise be discussed, changing the terms of debate on an issue, increasing the salience and support of an issue over time, widening the range of possible options, and the likelihood of future success of a bill. These are meaningful consequences within the legislature that have significant implications for politics and policy that cannot be dismissed because they are not synonymous with passing a bill. In particular for minority representation where the number of minority members in Congress is so small, the actions of these members become even more critical since other members are significantly less likely to champion the causes of minority groups. Second, given the slow trajectory of most bills and the difficulty in getting a bill passed, it is an unreasonable standard to measure effectiveness in terms of bills that are voted on or pass a floor vote. Additionally, often the types of bills that are voted on and pass are often related to taxes and appropriations and less focused on substantive policy changes. Nevertheless, it is still important to measure effectiveness and future work on this project will attempt to assess progress on bills. For example, rather than using house floor votes as effectiveness, other measures to capture effectiveness might include the length of time to move through different stages of the legislative process, debate in committee, and size of coalitions and co-sponsor support for bills.

Future Research

I have discussed the major findings and implications of this research endeavor and now address how this research project could be augmented in future research. This project focused on the question of whether Latino representatives offered the most substantive representation by examining various pieces of data. The implication of the statistical findings was that we still need descriptive representation and without it Latinos constituents will not be represented to the fullest degree. In the quantitative

analysis, I only addressed three salient issue areas for a sample of members. In the narrowest sense of expanding from this project, the next step would be to examine additional sessions and policy areas and the entire population of all 435 House members. Moreover, additional interviews with staffers from Latino members' offices would provide more insight into variation among Latino representatives.

In Chapter Five, I examine several case studies to analyze how member behavior changes when the same district is represented by different members. This is particularly important in the area of Latino members to better understand what factors explain why some members are considerably more active than others and what causes members to adopt strong Latino identities. Additionally, Judy Chu winning former Rep. Solis' seat provides a new and exciting example of an instance where a predominately Latino district was represented by a Latino member and then switched to a non-Latino member. This is the first instance of this kind of switch and it will provide great insights into how we view representation of minority groups if Rep. Chu is very active on Latino issues.

Beyond the immediate extensions of this project, future work should explore the theoretical conception of descriptive representation. I found that in the case of education, the importance of black members was equal to that of party, and blacks offered more substantive representation than Latinos in this area. This finding indicates that minority groups may share certain commonalities or viewpoints that enable members to serve other minority groups outside of their own group. Do different minority groups share common policy positions and thus can a minority member catering to their own group at the same time represent another minority group? If Latino members are just as well served by a black Congressman, this changes how we view descriptive representation and the need for members from the exact same group.

The way we conceptualize majority-minority districts could be radically than the present form. Do Latinos need majority-minority districts for representation purposes, or can they be one part of a multi-ethnic and multi-racial district and still have their concerns adequately addressed? If not, is this because there is something unique about Latino identity, such as Spanish language, that prevents a multi-ethnic coalition? Future work should examine behavior of black and Latino representatives with particular attention on mixed districts.

It is also critical to probe deeper into the Latino public's view of the importance of Latino representatives. The 2004 Pew Hispanic National Latino Survey found that 70% of Latinos would vote for a Latino candidate and another 56% would vote for a Latino candidate even if there was a more qualified non-Latino on the ballot. While studies of black representatives have sought to explain the group's desire for a legislator of the same race and the benefits gleaned from it, there has been a fundamental lack of scholarly work in this area for Latinos. What drives Latinos to want a Latino representative? Is it the desire to have someone like themselves? Does it matter if the member has a strong Latino identity or speaks in Spanish? Do they believe that person will do the best job and why? What are the benefits for Latinos in having Latino members besides policy representation? Does having a Latino member of Congress make Latinos participate more, increase voter turnout, or develop greater trust in government? Finally, how do Latinos view their representatives and evaluate their behavior? To gain more traction on potential benefits of descriptive representation beyond legislative outcomes, it is necessary to actually ask Latinos what they feel is gained by having members with a shared ethnicity.

Moving away from the narrow subset of the race and representation literature, another future avenue of research is exploring further non-roll call behavior. This dissertation demonstrated that non-roll call activity is common and is necessary to

examine given its dominance in the legislative record. I evaluated a small subset of non-roll activity including bill introductions, bill co-sponsorship, and house resolutions, however future work should consider additional forms of non-roll call activity, such as committee actions and house floor speeches, to gain more analytical depth. When we evaluate whether a representative is doing a good job, it is critical to include a wide range of participatory acts in order to truly get a sense of how a member spends his time. Future research could examine under which conditions members choose non-roll call approaches over voting. Also, are there certain non-roll call activities that members engage in more frequently and why do they choose those activities over others? Do members use the forum of non-roll call behavior to differentiate themselves and build a reputation? If members are going to adopt controversial stances that may differ from the party line, do members utilize the non-roll arena to participate on those issues? Given the dominance of roll call voting in the literature, it is critical that we begin to understand more about when and why members utilize non-roll call actions.

Ultimately, this research endeavor has addressed Latino representation from an institutional perspective. More research is needed on the public opinion side of this topic in order to understand the complex relationship between Latino constituencies and the members who serve them. As the Latino national population and geographical dispersion over additional congressional districts grows, it will be interesting to see how representatives change their level of responsiveness to this increasingly important constituency.

APPENDIX

Interview Instrument -For interviews with a staff member of a Congressperson

Section I. Representation

- 1) In what ways does the office seek to represent Latinos?
- 2) According to direct communications with Latino constituents such as email or letters, what issues seem to be the most important to Latinos?
 - a. What type of actions has the member taken in these areas?
 - b. Are these areas different than what the office or member thought would be the most salient issues?
 - c. Have constituents introduced new issues? What were these? How has the office responded to these?
- 3) What kinds of constituent service work are directly aimed at Latinos?
 - a. How much time or resources are dedicated to this work?
 - b. How does your office determine what types of constituent work would best serve the Latino portion of the constituency?
 - c. What is the relationship between this work and informing the Latino constituency of this work?
- 4) In terms of mobilizing Latino voters, what are the main methods your office uses?
 - a. What factors determine your mobilization methods?
 - b. Which methods seem to be most effective?
 - c. What types of contact does your office use and why?

Section II. Spanish Language Usage

- 1) How important is it to the member that persons on the staff speak Spanish?
- 2) What percentage of the office staff speaks Spanish?
- 3) How often are activities within the office conducted in Spanish? For example, conversations, staff meetings
- 4) How often are activities outside of the office conducted in Spanish?
 - a. How often in rallies?
 - b. How often in mailings
 - c. How often in commercials?
 - d. How often on radio ads?
 - e. How often in constituent letters?
 - f. How often in constituent phone calls?
 - g. How often in campaign TV commercials?
 - h. Are any of these activities conducted in a combination of English and Spanish?
 - i. What factors determine whether it is a Spanish, English, or Bilingual event?

Section III. Specific Representation

- 1) Regarding immigration, in what ways does your office seek to represent the interests of your Latino constituency?

- 2) Regarding labor, in what ways does your office seek to represent the interests of your Latino constituency?
- 3) Regarding education, in what ways does your office seek to represent the interests of your Latino constituency?
- 4) Regarding social security, in what ways does your office seek to represent the interests of your Latino constituency?
- 5) Outside of these four policy areas, are there other policy areas your office has done work that you believe represent the interests of your Latino constituents? Please describe these areas and the work done.
- 6) Are there designated staff persons in each of these areas?
 - a. If so, how many?
 - b. What types of work does this person perform?
- 7) Is there a designated staff person for Latino representation?
- 8) Overall, how would you evaluate the office as a whole in terms of representation of Latino constituents?

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